The position of the Ukrainian language in Ukraine by Taylor, Jennifer Elizabeth Pickurel
The Position of the 
Ukrainian Language 
in Ukraine
Phd Thesis submitted August 1998 
School of Slavonic and East European 
Studies
Jennifer Elizabeth Pickurel Taylor
ProQuest Number: 10016058
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest.
ProQuest 10016058
Published by ProQuest LLC(2016). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
The Position of Ukrainian Language 
in Ukraine
Acknowledgements 2
Synopsis 3
Chapter One;
Language Planning and State Languages 4
Chapter Two:
Language Planning in Ukraine 38
Chapter Three:
Languages and State-building in Ukraine 77
Chapter Four: 
Media in Ukraine 
Supplement
115
152
Chapter Five: 
Education in Ukraine 160
Chapter Six:
Beyond politics: Internal Problems of the 
Ukrainian Language
190
Conclusions: 239
Bibliography: 251
Acknowledgements:
I would like to thank first of all my supervisor Jim Dingley 
for his support, help and encouragement, regardless -  not 
to mention his unparalleled expertise on all matters 
Ukrainian.
I would also like to thank my wonderful husband, my 
parents, both sets, and Cara, and John, for their support 
and encouragement. I have also greatly benefited from the 
support of a lot of super friends both in London and at 
home in Virginia, especially Emily, Rob and Beate.
In Ukraine, a number of very talented and knowledgeable 
people contributed their expertise and advice, without 
whom the gathering of much of this material would have 
been nearly impossible. I am very grateful to Professor 
Svitlana and Oleksandra Ermolenko, Sergeant First Class 
Max Duke, Olena, Serhiy and Yaroslav Bekh, Professor O. 
Taranenko, and Olga Ivashchenko.
I would also like to thank Dr Ali Granmayeh, Dr Peter 
Duncan and Dr Robert Service for their willingness to 
discuss the subject of my PhD with great patience. I must 
also thank Taras Kuzio for offering an excellent alternative 
viewpoint in the form of his book.
A note about transcription:
There are a number of acceptable means of transcribing 
or transliterating Ukrainian words into Latin letters, each 
with certain problems. The system used is generally the 
British Library system with a few modifications: to 
distinguish the jotated [i] from the non-jotated [i], a ‘y ’ is 
used to represent the jot (as in Ukrayina), and a y  also 
appears where there is an ‘i kratkoe. Otherwise, the soft 
vowels are spelled with an Ï  before the vowel letter, as in 
/de/8. Soft consonants are designated with an apostrophe, 
and original apostrophes are preserved.
Additionally, the names of state organisations and 
academic bodies have been translated for clarity. Thus, 
the Akademiia Nauk is referred to as the National 
Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, and the Instytut 
Movoznavstva imeni O O Potebni is referred to as the O O 
Potebnia Institute of Language Studies.
The transliterated version of Ukrainian which appears was 
chosen in place of Cyrillic to facilitate easier reading for 
those unfamiliar with Ukrainian, or the Ukrainian alphabet.
The Position of Ukrainian Language in Ukraine 
Jennifer Pickurel Taylor, PhD Thesis
Before one even begins to discuss language in Ukraine, one basic premise 
must be understood: there are no easy ansv^ers. One may succeed best in 
identifying relevant, objective questions instead.
This research offers few solutions or predictions concerning the competition 
between Ukrainian and Russian languages in Ukraine, and the national 
consciousness of Ukrainians with relation to their language and world view. At 
this stage in Ukraine’s development, it is more useful to bring all the disparate 
trends of government language planning policy, social trends and politics into 
one cohesive body of work for analysis.
5ocio-linguistic5 provides an appropriate and objective methodological 
framework to discuss both the internal linguistic problems of the language and 
external social and political problems. This means the analytical viewpoints 
generally adopted by political science or theoretical linguistics may feature, 
but are not handled in any depth. Rather, the inter-relationship of language 
and society is examined in detail using a variety of reference points. These 
include education in Ukraine, Ukrainian media and the internal and external 
attempts to regulate the use and content of Ukrainian language.
This research is unique in that most of the material here presented has not 
appeared together in any language, nor separately in English. Furthermore, 
the approach is a departure from traditional methods of either linguistic or 
historical study, and does not reflect the political science framework adopted 
by contemporary scholars. It is thus an attempt to collect subjective 
diagnostic and corrective work on the language situation in Ukraine, to 
combine this research with statistical data and to present an objective 
analysis of the status of the Ukrainian language in Ukraine and its prospects 
for the future.
Chapter 1: Language Planning and State Languages 
introduction:
Contemporary Ukraine is a heterogeneous language community. Its 
population uses several different languages which reflect ethnic, regional 
or political loyalties, or all three. Current government policy states that 
Ukrainian is the sole official language of Ukraine, but after centuries of 
foreign rule, not everyone speaks enough Ukrainian to use that language 
in every situation. In order to ensure the undisputed supremacy of 
Ukrainian language within the boundaries of the Ukrainian state, measures 
are in force to promote its usage and to discontinue the usage of 
competing languages in official situations. This policy and its processes 
can be referred to as language planning.
This work intends to investigate the status and usage of Ukrainian 
language in Ukraine, and evaluate the effectiveness of proposed and 
already enacted means of improving the perception of Ukrainian and its 
feasibility for usage in every function necessary in daily life. In Ukraine, 
despite statistics and studies which show the that number of speakers of 
Ukrainian has increased, and other indicators of linguistic stability or 
improvement, many if not most native speakers remain pessimistic, 
convinced of the impending demise of their mother tongue.
Is the situation as bad as one is led to believe? Is Ukraine totally 
Russified, the Ukrainian language relegated to archaic textbooks and the 
conversation of ageing dissidents? Is there a political consequence of the 
demise of Ukrainian that means regional identities will become separatist 
tendencies, creating a domino effect that brings down the entire country? 
As the numbers will show, those quick to leap to the defence of political
demands made by ethnic Russians, or to support Ukrainians themselves 
who believe their language is on the verge of extinction, may in fact wish 
to rethink their position. Though the position of Ukrainian language in 
Ukraine is far from established as comfortably as English in Britain or 
French in France, with Ukrainian independence a political fact and the 
continued presence of international support, one can hardly describe the 
situation as critical, grim or precarious. As Magocsi asserts.
Urbanization, moreover, did not lead, as many Soviet and Western social 
scientists predicted, to national assimilation. It turned out that the 
multicultural urban environment was more likely to produce a sharpening 
than a lessening of ethnocultural awareness. Thus in the same period 
when Soviet Ukraine’s population grew more urban, the number of 
persons claiming Ukrainian as their mother tongue continued to increase, 
from 30 million in 1959 to 37.4 million in 1989. It is also true that among 
persons who declared Ukrainian to be their nationality, there was a slight 
decrease in the percentage who claimed Ukrainian as their mother 
tongue (from 94 to 88 percent between 1959 and 1989). But such trends 
did not necessarily mean that either the Ukrainian language or he 
Ukrainian identity was seriously threatened, as the dire predictions of 
dissident writers and Ukrainian commentators in the West were 
suggesting.^
Magocsl’s assertion that the Ukrainian nation remains unassimilated 
and Ukrainian-speaking is demonstrated in recent population statistics and 
borne out by research. The important question addressed by this work is 
not, therefore, exactly how bad the situation is. One must ask instead, 
where are the language planning successes, how do they affect Ukrainian 
society, and what remains to be done?
The approach taken is therefore a sociolinguistic one, in as much 
that this research examines language behaviour and attitudes as an 
indicator and a reflection of social behaviour in general. Changes in one 
cause or reflect changes in the other, and mark Ukraine’s progress 
towards a more established national identity on the world stage. While
 ^Magocsi, (1996), p. 664.
one cannot discuss language or society without some mention of 
linguistics or politics, the emphasis in this research is on the connections 
between these areas and state-building, all within the framework of 
language planning. For this reason, neither issues pertaining to political 
science nor theoretical linguistics are covered in depth.
The results of the investigation presented here were obtained both 
by a survey of available sources on the region and field work conducted in 
Kyiv. Emphasis is placed on interviews and observations, as the question 
concerns a subjective area-speaker attitudes-and answers are less 
readily discernible from statistics or demographic surveys alone^. Materials 
include relevant articles from recent journals and newspapers, ensuring 
older material from textbooks is adequately supplemented. Where 
disagreements occur in source materials, both opinions are offered for 
consideration. Although ample subjective material exists, especially in 
Ukrainian, no work was discovered which addressed these topics in 
English, nor which examined the inter-relationship of language and culture 
in a developing country in a non-political light. This work therefore 
combines the most recent available materials on the subject with a 
different approach in an attempt to introduce new information and research 
not previously brought together.
One might ask, why Ukraine? It is possible to cite several reasons, 
both objective and subjective. First, any case in which a new state 
attempts to establish itself outside the influence of its former conqueror 
merits study. Language competition and language promotion can be 
expected, which presents an opportunity to study these phenomena in a
 ^The author would like to note that the interviews, conducted as part of field work in 
summer 1996 and autumn 1997, were conducted mostly in Ukrainian. Those interviewed
contemporary setting. Lessons learned from Ukraine may later be applied 
to the situation in Southern United States, where Spanish is gaining 
popularity as a second language, or in French-speaking areas of Canada.
For those interested in the former Soviet Union, Ukraine, as one of 
the largest successor states, represents all that is contradictory in these 
countries. Communist and pre-communist history complicate already 
fraught ethnic and religious differences in this region. The desire to be 
perceived as European motivates Ukraine and other states to cast Russia 
as ‘Asia’, something foreign and undesirable, but at the same time the 
closeness of the two cultures and languages, and the presence of ethnic 
Russians and Russian speakers in Ukraine prevents Russia from 
becoming entirely ‘other’.
Strategically and economically, Ukraine matters on the world stage. 
It is the fifth largest European country by population and the largest by 
area. Even with the decay of Ukrainian (ex-Soviet) industry and industrial 
structures which remain, the country has rich natural resources and 
agricultural potential. The population is literate and educated, with 
internationally reputed scholars and other theorists. Furthermore, Ukraine 
straddles an important geo-political line between the West and Russia, so 
that any future relations with Russia will likely also include Ukraine. Just as 
Ukraine compares itself with Russia, so too Russia must re-shape itself 
without a significant portion of its industry, resources and human capital.
Ukraine’s relations with Russia have a long history of tension and 
conflict, stretching back before the Soviet era, through the time of the 
Russian empire and beyond. Because of this frailty, as with other former 
Soviet republics, Ukraine cannot attempt reforms too quickly. There is no
formally are listed in the bibliography. ^
reliable infrastructure, politically, industrially or financially to support a fully 
democratic state with a free market. For this reason, the situation in 
Ukraine may appear bleak and unpromising, in language politics as in 
other areas. Rapid and revolutionary changes cannot help but create 
‘chaos and instability' in Ukraine, and one can only hope for prudence in 
the government and in the West when contemplating the nature and pace 
of reform.3
That said, history has shown one can never bet against Ukraine. 
Despite years of hegemony by its neighbours and partitions, Ukraine is 
now one unified state. Despite ethnic, political and linguistic tension this 
state has survived nearly seven years at the time of writing. Additionally, 
this state has ratified an admirably tolerant constitution, and maintains a 
good record on human rights. Though the economy is bad, it is improving 
slowly, and while Russia will not allow itself to be lightly dismissed, 
Ukraine has begun to forge healthy relationships with Western states. As 
one of many problems, language competition and the low status and 
relative usage of Ukrainian language remains on the agenda of matters to 
address, though in comparison with pressing economic and political issues 
language may seem less of a priority. One must not assume, however, 
that the slow pace and relative lack of emphasis on linguistic issues spell 
failure for language planning in Ukraine. On the contrary, as other more 
urgent problems are addressed and remedied, such as the poor economy, 
and as time allows the fostering of Ukrainian national identity, the slow 
pace of language planning and its non-radical nature may prevent 
discontent and indeed ensure a smooth, peaceful transition to the
 ^A summary of relevant demographic and geographic Information on Ukraine can be 
found in Motyl, A., Dilemmas of Independence: Ukraine After Totalitarianism,tievj York,
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exclusive usage of Ukrainian as state language within Ukraine.
The propaganda version of Slavic history presenting Ukraine as one- 
third of an East Slavic family tree, with Russia and Belarus' representing 
the other two branches, combined with geographic, religious, cultural and 
linguistic similarity have served to maintain a national inferiority complex 
which is now beginning to improve. To forge a national identity that ethnic 
Ukrainians and all Ukraine’s minorities will accept requires political loyalty, 
and to a certain extent, linguistic loyalty to the Ukrainian independent 
state. The relevant legislation in support of Ukrainian is in place; it 
remains to see what the government and the general public do about 
enforcing it.
At what stage is Ukraine, demographically and linguistically at time 
of writing? Sources containing this information show that a clear majority 
of ethnic Ukrainians exists in every region except Crimea, which has been 
granted special autonomous status for this reason. Ukrainian speakers 
(those who are able to speak Ukrainian, not native speakers) also 
constitute a majority in every region but Crimea, though much of the 
population is bilingual. Usage of Ukrainian has increased since 
independence in all areas except arguably the media.'^
Russian speakers of both Russian and Ukrainian ethnic 
background, and minorities who communicate in Russian represent 
groups which may be targeted by language planners, though many who do 
speak Ukrainian could also benefit from planning to improve the quality of 
their knowledge. One must not assume that language and political or 
national loyalty are unavoidably interconnected. After all, Ukrainian
Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993, pp. xi-xv;1-3. 
 ^Kuzio, (1997), p. 339.
independence was ratified by Russians in Ukraine and Russian-speaking 
Ukrainians as well as ethnic Ukrainians who speak the state language. 
Data from the 1989 census shows language usage as follows®:
Nationality language of nationality (%) language of other nationality (%)
Ukrainian 87.8 (Ukrainian) 12.2 (Russian)
Russian 98.4 (Russian) 1.6 (Ukrainian)
Jews 7.1 2.1 (Ukrainian), 90.6 (Russian)
Belarusian 35.4 9.3 (Ukrainian), 55.2 (Russian)
Bulgarian 69.5 6.1 (U), 15.5 (R)
Pole 12.5 66.6 (U), 20.3 (R)
Hungarian 95.6 26 (U), 1.6 (R)
Romanian 62.3 9.8 (U), 3.4 (R)
Greek 18.5 2.3 (U), 78.9 (R)
Tatar 49.0 2.9 (U), 47.5 (R)
Gypsy 58.6 12.3 (U), 10.3 (R)
Crimean Tatar 92.3 .2 (U), 4.0 (R)
German 23.2 9.2 (U), 67.2 (R)
Azerbaijanis 72.4 2.6 (U), 24.4 (R)
Gagauz 79.5 1.4 (U), 17.1 (R)®
A change in attitude is required if language planning is to succeed 
in Ukraine in support of the Ukrainian language. Both ethnic Ukrainians 
and ethnic Russians residing in Ukraine must learn to think of these 
Russians as a national minority, similar in status to Poles, Jews or Tatars. 
This shift in thinking will allow citizens of Ukraine to support the state 
language, while speaking the language of their choice at home, or allowing 
their children to be educated in their national language up to university 
level.
The Ukrainian government has made this transition as easy as it 
could possibly be, due to Ukraine's liberal minorities policy and favourable 
human rights record. Russian children may choose to attend Russian 
schools, and in Crimea all Russians have the right to use Russian as an 
official language since they are compactly settled. The October 1989
® Minorities other than Russians represent 4,6% of the population.
® Chart taken from Shamsur, but figures have been widely quoted and used In other
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Language Law did not intend to force a sudden transition to full usage of 
Ukrainian and a total rejection of Russian; rather policymakers envisioned 
a slow and evolutionary process over five or ten years for this to occur/
Ukraine’s record shows tolerance for Russians and other national 
minorities in a number of ways, including tolerance for languages other 
than Ukrainian (while promoting use of the state language among these 
peoples). First, everyone residing in Ukraine was granted citizenship 
regardless of ethnicity when the state became independent. The 
government supports resident minorities by maintaining good relations 
with neighbours including Hungary and Poland, and by allowing for cultural 
developments previously suppressed under Soviet rule.® Kuzio asserts 
that affirmative action in Ukraine can only be expected, and should not be 
seen as discrimination against Russian and other minorities (indeed, 
special status for Russian would discriminate against the other minorities 
in Ukraine), but rather as an attempt to undo the damage of years of 
foreign rule and promote Ukrainian as the state language.®
Ukraine as the object of language planning attempts could be seen 
as fertile ground upon which such suggestions could fall. The population is 
highly literate and educated. Most households own at least some means of 
receiving Ukrainian language media. Furthermore, there is a great deal of 
pride in Ukrainian independence, a strong sense of connection with 
Ukraine’s past and a developing sense of national identity. Already the 
majority of the population uses Ukrainian at home, while almost all of the 
population at least understands the state language. This means that the
sources such as Aral, Kuzio, and Soichanyk.
Deychakiwsky, (1994), p. 374.
® Deychakiwsky, (1994), p. 377.
® Kuzio, (1997), pp. 337-38.
11
population of Ukraine is equipped to receive language planning messages 
via the education system and the media, the two most convenient means 
of social support for government policy. Furthermore, the people living in 
Ukraine for the most part need only improve their knowledge of Ukrainian, 
and do not need to acquire an entirely foreign language. A survey 
conducted in 1995 shows this information numerically”'
Homes have:
Radio 60%
Radiotochka 66%
Television 90%
Satellite or cable television 7%
VCR 5%
Education level All Urban Rural
none/informal 10 9 13
primary 28 26 33
secondary 50 51 48
graduate 10 13 6*
*in percentages
Home Language All Urban
Rural
Ukrainian 55 41 81
Russian 43 57 17
Other 1 1 2*
Spoken or understood;
Ukrainian 84 79 94
Russian 88 93 80
English 8 11 3
German 6 5 7
Polish 4 5 4
French 1 1 1
Other 5 5 5*
*in percentages
Statistics from BBC survey taken in March and April 1995. Copyright 1996, BBC 
International Broadcasting Audience Research.
12
Previous studies of Ukraine, especially of the relationship between 
Russia or the West and Ukraine on any level, whether political or social, 
tend to fit into one of three categories. Many Western observers are 
Ukrainian by origin, (usually referred to as Ukrainians in diaspora or simply 
diaspora Ukrainians), whose opinions, while obviously valid, must 
necessarily be affected by their lineage. Some of the more extreme views 
presented are in fact espoused by diaspora Ukrainian scholars. The 
second category, most usually witnessed in political science but found in 
nearly every discipline is an inclination by other Western scholars to favour 
Russia, sometimes only by predicting the imminent collapse of the 
Ukrainian state or its eventual assimilation, linguistic or otherwise, back 
into a union with its ‘Big Brother'. Within Ukraine itself, one finds a third 
viewpoint, from Ukrainians themselves who are also less objective as 
participants in, rather than observers of the process of change in Ukraine. 
Of course these opinions vary enormously across the spectrum, from the 
Pragmatists to the Neo-Romanticists, as discussed in Chapter Three. 
Most Ukrainian scholars, whether Russian or Ukrainian by ethnicity share 
a pessimistic outlook which is not necessarily supported by recent 
numerical data. This research, then, attempts to bring together a variety of 
opinions and assessments, many of which are not previously discussed in 
English, and conduct a comparison of disparate voices to analyse and 
attempt to make sense of the language picture in Ukraine.
An examination of language and language planning requires an 
attitude something like that of an art critic. One begins by taking in the 
gallery as a whole, attaining a sense of atmosphere and the overall mood. 
Progressing to the painting itself, one stands back-what is the overall
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impression? Is the artist a master, or an apprentice who shows great 
talent? Closer examination, from a closer range, reveals both faults and 
praiseworthy traits: despite vivid colours and a clarity of theme, our artist 
may have lacked technique in his brush strokes, or proved incapable of 
transmitting the grandeur of his original vision to the canvas. The art critic 
and the linguist share the task of performing a multi-layered critique of 
external and internal factors to produce a final review. And as with the art 
world, one may hope this final analysis is not negative, although one can 
be sure it will be mixed.
Chapter Outline:
The remainder of Chapter One serves as an introduction to the 
concept of language planning, and includes several case studies from 
various areas in an attempt to give the broadest and most complete 
possible understanding to the reader of what can be accomplished by 
language planning and what kinds of behaviours are involved. Further 
details are presented or» page 14/ using the Cooper rubric to compare 
various cases. This rubric serves as a skeleton for analysis, revealing the 
basic elements of any situation where language planning has been used 
or is in the process of implementation.
Chapter Two focuses on Ukraine, including Soviet Language 
Planning and the policy of Russification, and describes the nature of the 
society which allowed the form of language control that occurred under 
Soviet rule. More examples are given before concentrating on Ukraine, its 
linguistic history, and the measures which have led up to the current 
situation. The remainder of this chapter portrays Ukraine as one would find
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it today: language policy, the emerging trends, their cultural consequence, 
concerns of language experts and areas for linguistic work. Observations 
based on field work in Ukraine appear together with the observations and 
prognoses of native Ukrainian professionals in the language field, as well 
as their goals for their language. To balance the subjective viewpoint, 
recent laws detailing policy aims, which may or may not be reflected in the 
behaviour of the general public, are given to show the government 
perspective on language in Ukraine.
Chapter Three adopts a more political viewpoint to address 
language planning and its relation to nation-building in post-Soviet 
Ukraine. This includes ideas about ethnicity, the history of the Ukrainian 
state and the importance of language in national identity. A survey of 
works on the subject will demonstrate that this topic is a highly emotional 
one, eliciting both provocative challenges to the Soviet picture of the Slavic 
legacy and some rather far-fetched ‘delusions of grandeur". Sources of 
policy close to the government are classified according to their approach 
to language planning and their attitudes towards enforcing language 
policy.
Chapter Four opens a new section, in which specific areas will be 
studied to show the particulars of planning where it applies to specific 
fields. First, education in both Russian and Ukrainian will be examined, in 
an attempt to see if progress has been made in this socialiser par 
excellence' to increase the use of Ukrainian in both Russian and Ukrainian 
schools. Areas of particular concern include schooling in multi-lingual 
areas of Ukraine and teacher training (a more far-sighted policy indicator 
than changes in curriculum itself). The teaching of Ukrainian as a subject
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(history, literature and language) in otherwise Russian-language schools, 
the use of Ukrainian as a medium of instruction and problems faced by 
reformers in the field of education are all examined.
Chapter Five continues along this vein, examining the media for 
similar trends. Television, radio, and newspaper/journal publishing are 
profiled. Data from an interview with a media company in Kyiv are included 
to provide a useful subjective perspective from local experts. The overall 
question must be answered: what problems do Ukrainian media face in the 
struggle to compete with in situ Russian-language media?
Chapter Six will pick up on an earlier thread—terminology, lexical 
development and slang. The development of new terms-from old, 
discarded Ukrainian terms purged by the Soviets, from international 
vocabulary-reveals a debate on acceptable sources for enrichment of the 
language. Trends away from anything resembling Russian to a reluctant 
acceptance of a less-than-perfect word which is already in wide usage, 
along with data about new Ukrainian slang show in more detail the 
progress of Ukrainian from a Romanticised literary language to a more 
popularised, useful conversational tool. Other issues affecting a changing 
language are also profiled, including controversies over spelling of several 
contentious phonemes as well as syntactic, lexical and morphological 
elements. Furthermore, the cultural weight of importing terms from 
languages which do not have taboos against the concepts they express, 
and the motives for making changes in the language against perceived 
Russification will be treated, as such attitudes express important self­
perception and perceptions about Ukrainians' security as a nation and a 
culture. This section shows most clearly the image of Ukrainian language
16
as a work in progress, an entity which recreates itself every time an 
individual speaker opens his or her mouth and has to make a host of 
decisions about what kind of Ukrainian will come out.
The concluding chapter will then tie together these threads and 
present a cohesive picture of Ukrainian society, regionally divided, 
linguistically disparate-with a prediction for the future. The effectiveness of 
policies designed to influence language behaviour will be addressed, and 
suggestions for further language planning will be promulgated. One must 
then end with a survey of the implications of language planning, the 
potential effects of interference (culturally and in relations with Russia and 
the West) to formulate what amounts to a checklist of trouble spots for 
Ukraine, both those dealt with and those which remain.
What is Language planning and what does it do?
To place Ukrainian attempts at programming language 
behaviour, the generalities of language planning should first be explained. 
It should be remembered that language planning, while it includes political, 
historical, and psychological elements, is a social process which seeks to 
influence one particular social behaviour, that of language choice, 
knowledge, and usage.
Haugen’s early definition of language planning included four 
steps: selection of code, standardisation, implementation, and
elaboration.^^ Other researchers expand this basic framework to focus on 
a particular aspect of planning. In what seems to be one of the more 
complete definitions encountered. Cooper defines language planning as 
‘deliberate efforts to influence the behaviour of others with respect to the
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acquisition, structure, or functional allocation of their language codes. 
This encompasses several important issues relevant to language planning 
as an area of policy.
First, several questions must be answered. Who is attempting to 
influence language policy? Who is the target of this influence, and for what 
ends? The motive of language planners is particularly noteworthy as often 
linguistic means are used to accomplish other, non-linguistic objectives, 
such as political hegemony or modernisation. Next, one must outline the 
ways this action is implemented, such as via education or an official 
government policy. This allows for a basic framework of analysis which 
defines all the key players and their respective agendas.
Language planning can be further broken down to flesh out the 
basic outline established above. Status planning implies a change in the 
attitude and probably usage of a language by a given population, such as 
raising the number of speakers or attempting to discourage the usage of a 
language by referring to it as a dialect. Corpus planning involves changes 
to the basic structure of the language itself. This type of planning may 
have several functions, such as purification, revival of an archaic 
language, reform, standardisation, or lexical modernisation.^^ Acquisition 
planning affects the number of speakers and the scope of a language. 
Naturally, these policies may influence each other, and could be expected 
to occur interdependently.
Cooper's rubric of important questions provides a useful checklist of 
elements:
Haugen, quoted in Cobarrubias, Fishman, eds. (1983), p. 34.
Cooper, (1989), pp. 30-1. Cooper compiles a list of twelve definitions which appear in 
other works on the subject and seeks to include all the relevant elements in his final 
definition.
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am
I An accounting scheme for the study of
j .  ^ . r Language planning:
k I. what actors (e g. formal elites, Influentlals,) ^  \   ^Û
II attempt to influence what behaviours  ^V -
A. structural (li^ iils tic ) propertiésof jplanned behaviour |9
B. purpo^sffu^ohs for which planned behaviour is to be used
C. desired leveljofadoption (avw W #^, proficiency, usage) ■ 
p.,Incentives of taiget to reject plarmi# behaviour
III of which people v "
A type of target (individuals, organisation)
% opportunity of target to learn planned behaviour * „
C. incentives of target to leam/use planned behaviour., iir
Di incentives of target to reject planned behaviour ^  ^
W  for what ends? _ >  .  \  *
A. overt (language-related behaviour)
IB. latent (noh-language rëlàt&l behaviours )
V under what conditions? "
A situational (events, transient conditions)
B. structural 
1. political
' 2. economic 
3. social/demographic/ecological
C. cultural ^
1. regime norms
2. cultural norms
D. environmental (influences from outside system)
E. informational (data required for a good decision)
VI by what means?
A. authority
B. force ^
C. promotion *
D. persuasion
VII through what decision-making process 
A formulation of problem/goal 
B formulation of means ^
VIII with what effect?^i;: %
Still other questions arise as a result. A change in status or 
expanding the scope of a language implies both a starting place and a 
goal. Here previous work presents the problem of terminology, with 
perhaps too many options available. Kloss outlines one way of classifying 
languages:
• only official language
• joint national language
• regional official language
Nahir, quoted in Eastman, (1983). p. 43
Cooper, (1989) p. 98. This chart is adapted from the basic outline given by Cooper as a
framework of analysis.
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promoted language 
tolerated language 
proscribed language^®
These categories reflect the official stance towards the language. 
The level of development of the language itself must be considered, for 
which Kloss creates an additional rubric. Using the criteria of origin with 
respect to speech community, developmental status, juridical status, and 
ratio of users to general population, Kloss subdivides languages into the 
following types:
• modern mature standard, characterised by up-to-date terms, 
which can be used for university-level instruction
• a small group standard, which displays limited interaction
• an archaic standard, which flourished before the development of 
modern technology
• a young standard, recently standardised for a purpose
• non-standardised language
• pre-literate language
Stewart suggests several other means of classification for languages. 
First, in a multilingual society, each language may fit into a particular 
category. He uses criteria such as the degree of standardisation, the 
degree of autonomy, the presence of a language tradition, and the vitality 
to label languages as standard. Creole, classical, or artificial. He suggests 
that the function of a language may help to further categorise it, listing the 
possible usages as official, provincial, wider communication (LWC), 
international, capital city, troupe, educational, school subject, literary, or 
religious.^®
Besides the language itself, the status of the speech community, 
and the status of the group attempting to enforce language change should
Kloss, quoted in Eastman, (1983), pp. 44-5. These categories fall under what he refers 
to as the juridical status of a language.
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be taken into account. Those in a position to influence language policy 
have several options, ranging from a negative approach which seeks to 
wipe out or neglect a language, to a benevolent one that hopes to 
preserve or expand the language.^^ For much of Ukraine’s history, 
linguistic change came from an outside source which was not always 
friendly towards the language, in contrast to the attitude of many in present 
Ukraine who would like to preserve, promote, and expand the usage of 
Ukrainian language in Ukraine.
For the purposes of this research, the preferred term for the current status 
of Ukrainian language will be official language, one which is endorsed by 
government policy, for use inside the boundaries of that government’s 
jurisdiction. This avoids the ambiguity which can occur using state 
language, defined as that language which is spoken by a political entity, 
which ignores the possibility of multilingualism; or by choosing national 
language, the means of communication for an ethnic group, which 
discounts Ukrainian nationals or ethnic Ukrainians who may be bilingual, 
or speak only Russian fluently.
Diglossia or Multilingualism?
This distinction in terms addresses another topic for consideration 
when examining the position of Ukrainian, especially compared to the 
position of Russian in Ukraine. Diglossia refers to a scenario where “two 
varieties of a language exist side by side throughout the community, with 
each having a definite role to play’’ ®^; multilingualism, in contrast, is 
understood as the co-existence, in whatever pattern, of two languages in a 
speech community. Which term more accurately defines the language
Stewart, quoted in Eastman, (1983), pp. 44-7. 
Lewis, (1983), p. 314.
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situation in Ukraine? This may seem obvious, as Ukrainian and Russian 
are generally held to be distinct languages, but several factors must be 
considered. The example presented by Greek illustrates what may be a 
possibility for Ukrainian. In Greek, written and formal communication were 
carried out in the katharevousa, which is a distinct variety of the language, 
and differs from the less formal demotic, used for other purposes. 
Diglossia could exist between written and spoken Ukrainian, encouraged 
by the influence of regional dialects. Russification, the incorporation of 
Galicia, or the influx of international vocabulary. However, it may be that 
diglossia does exist between Russian and Ukrainian.
Ferguson describes diglossia in terms of the relationship between a 
low variety of a language, which could be less standardised than the high 
variety. He makes the point that in the low variety, choosing which dialect 
to use as the standard is often a problem. Diglossia is usually 
characterised by a functional specialisation between the two varieties, so 
that either one or the other is felt to be appropriate, not both. The high 
variety has more prestige in the minds of speakers, which affects the 
choice of occasion. The high usually has a literary heritage, while the low 
may not, and the low variety may be either less standardised or 
standardised more recently. Speakers learn the low variety orally at home, 
and have to be taught to use the high variety. Usually the situation is 
stable, but there may be some borrowing from the high into the low. 
Grammatically, the high usually has structures the low lacks. In the 
lexicon, since there is specialisation, each has words the other does not 
need, but phonetically, some sharing may occur as speakers will have
Ferguson, (1959), p. 325.
Browning, (1969), pp. 103-33.
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command of all the phonemes which are required to pronounce both the 
low and the high varieties.
This distinction between high and low varieties is different from the 
opposition of standard language to a dialect in that there are generally no 
regular users of the high variety for all occasions, and diglossia is not 
limited by geography or social status.
Diglossia is likely to appear when the high and low are closely 
related languages, especially if the low version does not have its own 
literature, and with the passage of time. This situation creates problems 
when literacy becomes more widespread, or there is wider communication, 
so that the speakers of the low variety want a unique literature and more 
autonomy.^^ When this happens, usually those promoting the high version 
will cite its beauty or perfection, and its appropriateness for certain 
functions, while advocates of the low variety will insist it is closer to the 
people and more effective for communication.^^
Another possible label for the language situation of Ukraine is multi- 
or bilingualism. This term incorporates diglossia as one form of 
bilingualism, but also includes as potential pairings; oral vs. literary 
language, elitist vs. mass, and vehicular (communication) vs. cultural 
(literary or religious). '^^ Bilingualism may be temporal in nature, such as 
when a child learns his ethnic language at home and acquires a new 
language in school, or a worker or student who uses one language at 
home, and another with his peers for communication.^® Often, the use of
Ferguson, (1959), pp. 327-336. 
Ferguson, (1959), pp. 336-7.
^  Ferguson, 0959), , p. 338. 
Ferguson, (1959),, pp. 338-9. 
Haarman, (1985), pp. 318-9. 
Haarman, (1985), p. 328.
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another kind of bilingualism, ethnic language paired with an administrative 
language, hides a discrepancy in status or power. This could occur where 
some segments of the population are mono-lingual and others speak two 
or more languages. Closer examination shows that the monolinguals are 
part of the language group which may enjoy dominance, so that other 
groups must learn their language to function in society. This type of 
bilingualism occurs in France (such as Bretons who must also speak 
French) and Finland (mono-lingual Finns and bi-lingual Swedes), and also 
occurs in many parts of the Former Soviet Union.
Such situations are often quite complicated. Language and ethnic 
identity may pose a problem for those who operate with two languages, as 
Anderson notes:
If the linguistic factor is usually important for most ethnic 
groups, it is not always important, much less the only 
component of ethnic identity. The variable significance of 
language, religion, and diverse customs as components 
of ethnicity can be very complex.^^
If the language is felt to be essential in defining ethnicity for a 
group, then loss or decline in usage will be seen as an erosion of 
identity, or as an indication that assimilation into the majority is taking 
place.^® The other option for many functioning in societies such as those 
previously mentioned is accommodation: those not in power or not 
members of the majority can learn the language and become bilingual in 
order to function successfully. In order to prevent accommodation from 
progressing into assimilation, the minority or otherwise threatened group 
must have a solid sense of awareness of its identity. More importantly 
perhaps, some work suggests, the languages must not share the workload
^  Haarman, (1985), p. 313, p. 324. 
Anderson, (1979), p. 67. 
Anderson, (1979), p. 68.
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equally; that is, there must be functional differentiation.
Ukrainians usually react to such suggestions with hostility. Though 
one can make a case for considering Ukrainian, or Belarusian, as a dialect 
of Russian encouraged to develop by nationalists, the key criteria for such 
an assertion are absent. Ukrainians themselves do not consider their 
language a Russian dialect, any more than they consider themselves 
Russian. Although much of the justification for such a division is rooted in 
Romantic ideas, it is justified by Ukrainians with a separate historical myth, 
territorial claims, differing customs, and most importantly, a developed 
national identity as something ‘non-Russian’. In time, this may lead to a 
more positive formulation of what Ukrainian’ means apart from 
comparisions with Russia. Most importantly, Ukrainians consider 
themselves a distinct nationality, and this self-awareness and 
consciousness alone is enough to merit classification as a separate entity.
The question of bilingualism and diglossia must be further explored 
in the field. What is the division of labour between Russian and Ukrainian, 
and has this changed significantly since 1991? What functions does each 
language fulfill? How does a speaker who can use either language 
choose, and what influences this choice? From these questions, an insight 
into the status of Ukrainian may be gained.
If ethnic identity can depend on one’s native language, the next 
question must be how to define one’s mother tongue. Furthermore, is it 
possible to have two equally native languages, and what does this mean?
Skuntabb-Kangas uses data from the Finnish language community 
where there is widespread bilingualism among Finnish Swedes. One can
Anderson, (1979), p.78.
^  Skuntabb-Kangas, (1981), p. 30.
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define a native language by several criteria, each related to a particular 
discipline, and then use this information to describe what would make a 
speaker bilingual according to each.
Discipline - , iGfiterion , De#ition ..' - ' " i
Sociology origin the language learnt first
Linguistics competence the language best known
Sociolinguistics function the language most often 
used
Social Psychology/ attitudes the language others identify
Sociology one as a native speaker of^ ^
If these criteria define a native speaker, then it is likewise possible 
to describe what characteristics would make some one bi-lingual. For 
example, by origin, a bi-lingual would have learnt two languages from an 
early age, and used these languages in communication from the 
beginning. By function, some one could be called bi-lingual who had near 
or complete mastery of two languages, or near-native control of both 
languages. Possibly, a bi-lingual can use either of two languages 
according to personal desire and the demands of the community, or 
according to what is felt to be appropriate in each situation. Another 
possibility is that one is a bilingual if others identify a speaker equally with 
two ethnic groups. Finally, a bi-lingual may be some one who identifies 
personally with both ethnic groups.
Again, the situation in Ukraine must be analysed with the goal of 
describing the language situation in terms of bilingualism or diglossia, and
Skuntabb-Kangas, (1981), p. 18 
^ Skuntabb-Kangas, (1981), p. 91.
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discovering what prompts speakers to use either language. An analysis of 
the motives for using Russian or Ukrainian, and the functional load of 
each, will allow some conclusions to be drawn about the relative status of 
both languages in Ukraine. It will also indicate how successful promotion 
of Ukrainian language, and language planning attempts, have been. In 
order to understand what the main characteristics of language planning in 
Ukraine, it may be helpful to examine various aspects of similar attempts 
in other countries, both within and outside of the former Soviet Union.
Language planning cases occur in many languages under a variety 
of circumstances. Since the working definition of Ukrainian allows that this 
language is a literary language in a relatively standardised form, one need 
not dwell on the selection of an appropriate code (though lexicon is still an 
issue, as later chapters will show). In Ukraine, the main issues concern the 
later stages of planning: diagnosing the current level of usage and 
proficiency, identifying problems, devising a policy designed to solve these 
weaknesses, and implementing the plan. As is the case in many areas, the 
question of language is not only linguistic, but social, political, ethnic, and 
national as well. Those seeking to implement language planning in 
Ukraine have not only corpus and status changes in mind, but extra- 
linguistic goals of ethnic self-determination, political independence, social 
unity, and nationalism. Other societies have been in similar positions 
before, and have also used language planning to try to meet their linguistic 
and non-linguistic goals.
One case where a nation found itself in a position similar to that of 
Ukraine is the Welsh. In the early 1970s, the language seemed to be in a 
near-irreversible state of decline, in spite of attempts to maintain it among
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the Welsh-though not out of lack of interest. However, earlier policies had 
dictated that English alone could be the language of official business, 
meaning the educated classes migrated literally or symbolically to London. 
There was a fear that Welsh would degenerate into dialects, as it is a rural 
area, but the new translation of the Bible created a standard for 
comparison. Starting in the Nineteenth Century, interest in preserving the 
language arose, but was thwarted by increasing industrialisation, 
intermarriage, increased television and radio broadcasting-many of the 
same factors which effected the decline of Ukrainian. The situations are 
similar in many other ways: Welsh is more commonly spoken that written, 
it is common in areas of compact settlement of Welsh people, it is most 
common among older people, and in rural areas.
The report which served as a source for the information about 
Wales provided an example of how demographic research can be used to 
profile language behaviour, and furthermore, to show areas of desired 
expansion of usage. In this case, the examiners wanted Welsh in legal 
proceedings, government meetings, administration, and government 
offices, some of the same areas under contention in Ukraine. Further 
areas for expansion included more educational facilities, church services, 
broadcasting and recording, and festival/folk events.
This report is particularly useful for defining what makes an official 
language, and therefore, what direction policy should take to elevate the 
status and usage of a language like Ukrainian. The following functions 
were listed as key:
• Court proceedings
• Public enquiries and tribunals
• Official documents (both English and Welsh)
• Public signs and notices
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• Administration and business
• Elections
• Correspondence, especially with the government
• Local authority documents
Similar recommendations exist for other spheres of a c t iv i t y T h e  
overall result would mean in Wales, or in Ukraine, the language the state 
speaks to its citizens would be not only English or Russian, but also Welsh 
or Ukrainian.
French-Canadians also share a number of concerns with the 
Ukrainians and the Welsh. The language situation among French 
Canadians has been well-studied in other works.^ This community shares 
Canadian citizenship with its English-speaking compatriots, but feels its 
culture, including language, is different and furthermore under threat by 
the majority. When speakers of a national minority such as the French 
Canadians are in a position where either assimilation into the majority, or 
accommodation by bilingualism seem to be the only alternatives, language 
planning may be used to bolster a threatened language. Here, planners 
took many of the same steps taken in Wales, including external signs, 
schooling, and administration, all in an attempt to ensure that French 
would not lose ground or status to English.
What characterises a language planning success story? For this, 
one could chose Swahili, especially as it is used in Tanzania and 
Zanzibar.^® Like Ukraine, Tanzania, Zanzibar, and Kenya, as in other 
areas of Africa, were left with colonial languages as administrative
^  The Council for Wales and Monmouthshire report on Welsh Language Today, (1963). 
^  One of many available sources is A.B. Anderson, The Survival of ethnolinguistic 
Minorities: Canada and comparative research', in Language and Ethnic Relations, 
(1979).
Information cited is from an interview with C. Hanlin, freelance translator in Daar-es- 
Salaam, November 1996. Further information may be found in Nurse and Speere, The 
Swahili.
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languages. English had been the language of the colonisers, while Swahili 
had emerged as a lingua franca among traders, based on Bantu dialects, 
English, Persian, Arabic, and German. When these countries gained 
independence, a language had to be chosen which would unite speakers 
of different languages. For Tanzania and Zanzibar, Swahili was a natural 
choice: spoken as a common languages, yet not the language of the 
former colonisers. One dialect was chosen as the standard, which was 
then further ‘cleaned up'. This standard now serves as the basic language, 
though there are higher varieties (those with more elements from Persian) 
and lower varieties. In Tanzania, it is the language of all official functions 
from court to government, as well as a common language learned as a 
first or second language (sometimes the tribal language is first) by all. As 
in Ukraine, there is bilingualism among older generations, who were 
educated under the old system. Young people study under a Swahili- 
based curriculum which is expanding to include more and more of the 
emergent Swahili literature. Language planning not only widened the 
sphere of usage, but also reformed the lexicon, which still allows some 
foreign borrowings (especially computer or technological vocabulary) but 
has replaced many of such terms with new coinages.
What are the components of the successful planning in Tanzania? 
First of all, efficient planning meant emphasis on changes in education, 
including a language requirement for entrance into university. Second, 
there is a great deal of national pride. Young people take pleasure in 
coining new slang terms, which are often colourful and imaginative. 
Though most of the educated classes are comfortable in English, it is 
viewed as a mark of respect if foreigners use some Swahili, and
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knowledge of the local language helps greatly in business.
To examine another aspect of the language situation in Ukraine: 
what about other areas of Ukraine, where Russian is not the only minority 
language to contend with? Multi-lingual areas present problems of their 
own, as there is more than one or two possible languages of inter-ethnic 
communication from which to chose. One could look to the revival of 
Hebrew in Palestine for one possible solution. As mentioned before, a 
Soviet objective was to establish Russian as the only possible language of 
inter-ethnic communication, a prestigious function which enhances the 
language that serves this purpose. In Ukraine, this function is now 
desirable for Ukrainian. A similar situation existed in Palestine, where 
immigrants from all over moved there to form Jewish communities, each 
group speaking their own language. The only language they all shared 
was Hebrew, which had not been recently utilised in the vernacular 
sphere, but nonetheless inspired a movement to revive it as the language 
of everyday conversation. Led by Eliezer Ben Yehuda, from Russia, the 
language revival introduced Hebrew as a language of instruction in newly- 
founded Hebrew schools, so that with each generation Jews spoke more 
and more natural Hebrew, and finally knew only Hebrew. In this case, the 
motives were not only pragmatic, but strongly nationalistic, in that they 
were the result of a desire to use the language of their forefathers, a 
powerful symbol of the Hebrew nation. Though modernisation was 
required, Hebrew flourished as a common language for Jews from all over 
the world in Palestine.^® This type of planning pragmatically enabled 
people of different nationalities to communicate, and also served to 
activate a potent symbol which could unite people of a common culture.
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This kind of planning would be equally useful in Ukraine.
In the Soviet Union, language planning had an added dimension. 
The totalitarian government forced compliance with its policies on 
language and could actively promote Russian while seriously debilitating 
national languages, or promote national languages for the purposes of the 
regime. For the Soviets, change and planning constituted the basis of a 
modernisation drive, and involved not only policy and various agencies, 
but also economic and social movements. Lewis asserts that only in such 
a regime could language be part of the national plan, and that without 
centralised power the impetus for language change would come from 
political or social movements alone.^^ Her emphasis is on modernisation 
as a primary goal of the Soviets, which was in turn linked with the 
development and spread of socialism. While social and political changes 
need not necessarily bring about linguistic change, they can aid one 
another. Language planning could therefore provide a platform for the 
spread of socialism and modernisation, which had previously failed to take 
hold due to the relative backwardness of society in the Soviet Union as a 
whole.3*
Language planning in the Soviet Union manifested the effects of a 
number of intencf factors. While policy-makers were aided by the 
perceived prestige of Russian as the language of the ruling elite, and the 
dominance of Russia politically, conflict occurred as a result of nationalism 
and ethnic self-esteem in non-Russian areas. Policy towards Russian in 
non-Russian republics, and towards national languages changed and
^  Cooper, (1989), pp. 11-4.
Lewis, (1983). p. 309.
^  Lewis. (1983), p. 309-11.
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evolved over the entire Soviet period.^^
During the 1920s and 1930s, national languages were the primary 
focus of planning. Selection of dialect, alphabet reform, codification, and 
standardisation took place during this time, as part of the Korenizatsiia 
policy. This approach was instrumental, asserting that national languages 
represent a tool to be developed to make socialism accessible to all, and 
formed the basis for a mass literacy campaign."^® Stalin's rule saw a 
reverse in policy which began the promotion of Russian and the effective 
attempts to purge national languages which characterise later 
governments. Though leaders varied from the pragmatic approach of 
Khrushchev to the sentimental, love-of-Great-Russia approach of 
Brezhnev, the policy of Russification had the same aims.^^
Implementation of such policies occurred through direct and indirect 
means. Planners exerted indirect influence by encouraging migration of 
Russians into the non-Russian republics, or out-migration from these 
republics into Russia. Industrialisation and urbanisation supplemented this 
influence. Language planning for Soviets merely represented another 
aspect of social development promoting Russia and the technology, 
modernisation, and prolétarisation they wished to associate with Russian.
More direct means also served the ends of the Soviets. Planning 
which involved a minority language would promote not only the minority 
language itself, but additionally would support the economic and political 
interests of its speakers. For a time this could be countenanced, as literacy 
in any language could help spread Marxism. But continued promotion 
would spread political power around in the population, instead of keeping it
Kirkwood, (1989), pp. 2-6. 
Kirkwood, (1989), pp. 25-36.
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squarely In the hands of the Russians. Therefore, Russian had to retain 
the most prestigious linguistic functions in society for itself.^^ This meant, 
for example, that speakers of other languages would have to access world 
culture and terminology through Russian. This transitional bilingualism, 
when most of the population spoke a native language and Russian, would 
be tolerated only as long as it evolved into Russian monolingualism. This 
would not only achieve the political aims of the regime, but would integrate 
the massive empire by means of a common language and culture, and 
assimilate the minority populations.^^
Soviet language planning designed to spread the usage of Russian, 
at the expense of indigenous languages, succeeded to varying degrees. 
Russification in Ukraine and its effects, both on the actual lexicon, and on 
the usage and knowledge of Ukrainian, will be covered in detail later. 
Other examples may illustrate the action of Soviet Policy in the republics of 
the former Soviet Union.
The case of Uzbekistan can be used to demonstrate Soviet 
language planning. At the start of the twentieth century, the language of 
Uzbekistan had little modern vocabulary and no standard orthography. 
Conflicting influences of Cyrillic, Arabic, and Latin writing systems and 
cultures plus an assortment of dialects meant there was a wide scope of 
variety in the language. Korenizatsiia in Uzbekistan meant basic education 
for Uzbeks improved, by means of employment requirements for the 
number of natives in administration and other programs. In spite of 
language study requirements, many students managed to avoid courses in 
Uzbek, and the status of the language among the population at this time
Krelndler, (1989), pp. 46-69. 
Lewis. G, (1983), pp. 311-24.
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remained low.
Soviet policy had several main goals, mainly to make the population 
more literate and to minimise the influence of nearby Islamic cultures. 
Although originally in Arabic, in the twenties the language was written in 
latin script, which reduced the number of letters one had to learn. The 
writing system was changed again, this time to Cyrillic, to prevent what 
had was considered an unproductive influcence. As part of this campaign, 
borrowings were ferreted out and removed, though in the end some were 
entrenched enough to remain.
While Uzbek literacy did increase during this time, most members of 
the population failed to develop along the Russian model. Even with the 
benign neglect of the Stalinist regime, and the typical attempts at 
Russification in the lexicon and orthography, Soviet planning can not be 
called a total success. While Russian gained status in the eyes of the 
population, and became the most widespread second language, Uzbeks 
were also more educated and literate in their own language. As pride in 
the native language increases, the status of Uzbek will probably be raised 
as well. In this case, ironically, the literacy campaigns of the revolutionary 
communists laid the groundwork for a revival of the language of 
Uzbekistan.'^
A more successful campaign from the Soviet viewpoint was waged 
in Belarus. Early attempts at planning under the new regime were similar 
to others in Soviet republics:
Language-planning policy had been aimed at creating a 
language that could fulfil all communicative functions in a state 
that was technically independent. A literary language had been 
created that was by-and large accepted by all Belorussians both
^  Haarman, (1985), pp. 324-53.
^  Fierman, (1989), pp. 205-28.
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in the Soviet republic and in Poland, and was clearly 
independent of Russian.’^ ®
As in other areas, the language policy was one part of an overall 
nationalities policy which grew increasingly favourable towards Russian at 
the expense of other languages and nationalities/^ By 1933, language 
policies were obviously aimed at bringing the language closer to Russian 
in orthography, grammar, and lexicon. Even after the death of Stalin, the 
fear remained that a linguistic tidy-up would be seen as nationalism and 
treated harshly. Instead, in contemporary Belarus, the language is in a 
shaky position with respect to Russian. One key indicator of strength 
would be exclusive use in particular functions, but only Russian enjoys this 
level of status and usage, though it is argued that neither language is well- 
known by speakers."^^
While politically, such efforts may or may not have suppressed 
nationalist sentiment, the effect of the linguistic arm of Soviet policy has 
had some success. Russian enjoys greater status and usage, and 
Belarusian language has been weakened as a consequence. Furthermore, 
this case shows that functional differentiation and the perceived status of a 
language are important indicators of its strength and viability.
Soviet language planning in Ukraine followed a similar pattern to 
those described for Uzbekistan and Belarus. However, Russian was not
^  Dingley, (1989), p. 183.
^  Dingley, (1989), p 174.
Dingley, (1989), “ Given the amount of scholarly attention currently being paid to both 
languages in the USSR, together with the publication of books, journals, and newspapers, 
it may seem as if their status is assured. In actual fact there is hard evidence...that this is 
far from the case. Both languages are weak, and Belorussian dangerously so. (cited here 
Miknevich, in Biryla and Suprin, 1982, pp. 50-75.) In no case is exclusive use made of 
Belorussian, whereas there are several areas in which only Russian is used...These 
concerns should not be seen as purely nationalistic; the practical application of policies 
intended to promote Russian/national language bilingualism have led to a situation in 
which neither language is known properly; people speak a Ukrainian-Russian surzhyk, or 
a Belorussian-Russian trasianka' pp. 185-86.
36
the first language to be promoted in Ukraine, nor were the Soviets the first 
to practice language planning on Ukrainian lands. Soviet policy in Ukraine 
should be considered as part of a history of language controversy.
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Chapter 2: Language Planning in Ukraine
Soviet language planning in Ukraine followed a pattern similar to 
the kind of planning policies that had been instituted in other republics. If 
anything, efforts may have been more concentrated, due to the anti- 
Russian feeling that generally went along with Ukrainian nationalism in 
Ukraine. While the Soviets were practicing Russification^ or at least 
attempting to ensure Russian/Ukrainian bilingualism in Ukraine, a segment 
of the population also practised language planning in attempts to preserve 
and maintain the purity of Ukrainian.
Language planning had taken place on the territory of Ukraine 
before the Soviet period, however. Therefore, before analysing the effects 
of Soviet efforts, both at status and corpus planning, attempts by previous 
regimes should also be examined. This includes not only early language 
planning, comprising standardisation and codification of Ukrainian 
language, but policy after the incorporation of Galicia and the early years 
of Soviet rule, when Ukrainian was encouraged as a vehicle of socialism.
Although the focus of this research is on modern, twentieth century 
Ukraine, it is important to briefly review these early influences on the 
direction of the Ukrainian language. A survey of the emergence of a 
literary language, and the subsequent strengthening of a linguistic, political 
and national identity on the territory of Ukraine will demonstrate the 
historical basis for conflict, both linguistic and political, with surrounding 
powers.
' Russification is defined as the deliberate practice by Soviet authorities (though effective 
policies of a similar nature had been enacted under earlier regimes) designed to 
discourage or forbid the use of Ukrainian, and encourage the use of Russian. Tactics 
included punishment of Ukrainian officials and scholars, relocation of Russians into 
Ukraine and Ukrainians into Russia and the production of dictionaries which listed forms 
similar to Russian, in place of or in preference to native Ukrainian words. Bilingualism
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Before the Soviets:
The date of the emergence of a literary language in Ukraine can be 
conveniently stated as 988 AD, the year of Christianization and therefore, 
the introduction of Church Slavonic. Despite attempts to keep this 
language pure and intact, local variations were introduced either by error 
or by clergy attempting to be more intelligible to the masses.  ^ Shevelov 
explains, “Every Knizhnik tried to be as Church Slavonic in his language 
as his education, his ability and the thematic key of the text permitted; but 
the extent of the actual fulfillment of this goal varied widely.”^
The development of the language in this period was not 
encouraged by surrounding political events. Kiev fell to the Tatars in 1240, 
which caused mass flights into Galicia and Polissia, or towards the north 
and north-east. While attempts were made to maintain standards in these 
areas, by 1387 Ukraine found itself partitioned and governed by the 
administrations of Hungary, Moldavia, The Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and, 
after 1569, Poland. Ruling governments supported or were hostile to 
Ukrainians under their jurisdiction and the Ukrainian language to varying 
degrees during this time. With Ukraine thus divided, and speakers 
separated from one another, it would have been difficult for a unified, 
unique literary language to arise.
Diglossia compounded this problem. At this point, it is difficult to 
speak of 'Ukrainian' as a unified language on the lands which form 
present-day Ukraine, as it would be misleading to suggest that local 
dialects at this time should be considered ‘Ukrainian language’. Over the 
next two centuries a pattern of diglossia emerged in which certain.
throughout Ukraine is both a consequence and an encouraged middle state in this policy. 
 ^Shevelov, G., (1980), p. 144.
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generally prestigious, functions were allotted to the ‘high’ language, which 
was a mixture of Church Slavonic (for status) and the language of the 
ruling classes (such as Euthymian Church Slavonic, or Meletian Church 
Slavonic, named after one of the codifiers, Meletyi Smotryts’kyi). These 
Church-Slavonic based literary languages were used for poetry, literature 
or drama. The vernacular covered the remaining genres, such as tales and 
chronicles; as the language of the uneducated masses, it was not 
considered suitable as a basis for a literary language. This separation 
existed in varying forms through the eighteenth century. As Polish power 
spread in the west, and Russian influence expanded in the East, Church 
Slavonic forms began to fade as the languages of these ruling powers 
gained prominence in the upper classes.^
These two co-existing 'layers’ failed to merge into a common 
language in both East and West in the manner Anglo-Saxon and Norman 
French had combined. This may be partly due to the class system in place 
at that time. Nobles in Ukraine felt more kinship and loyalty to other nobles 
in nearby countries because of their common background and social 
position, and felt less attached to peasants in their own country with whom 
they shared very little culturally or socially.® Similarly, the peasants did not 
identify with anyone outside their own milieu, nor did the townspeople. The 
concept of ethnicity as a binding factor and national awareness had not yet 
influenced Ukrainian society.
Romanticism spread to Ukraine in the nineteenth century, bringing 
with it radical new concepts. Shevelov comments, ‘the road to national 
consciousness was paved with books. ’ At this time, members of the
 ^Shevelov, G., (1980), p. 145
 ^Shevelov, (1993), p. 96, also Shevelov, (1980), pp. 146-47.
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developing intelligentsia began to take an interest in local culture and to 
document what they observed, producing volumes of amateur folklore 
research. In Ukraine, these intelligentsia represented a new trend 
themselves: most of the nobility were thoroughly subsumed by imperial 
culture while members of the old Cossack nobility remained ‘Ukrainian’.® 
These intelligentsia attended universities and acquired higher education, 
which originally served as their most distinguishing feature. Shevelov 
highlights another important distinction, that the intelligentsia were the first 
to perceive society as a cohesive whole, with its classes necessarily linked 
by interdependent interests. In the West, the intelligentsia class was 
developing as well, but in a slightly different manner. Here, most members 
were educated clergy, meaning that a secular intelligentsia appeared 
much later than in the Russian-ruled part of Ukraine.
From this understanding of society as a whole, and the resultant 
awareness of unique national traits, it could not be long before an interest 
in language would likewise develop. To the Romantics, language 
embodied national soul and contained all the history and culture of a 
people. Furthermore, it could unite all the social classes into one 
nationality.^
Despite assertions to the contrary, nineteenth century writers began 
to demonstrate how the local vernacular could serve as a literary 
language. One early attempt, penned in 1798 by Ivan Kotliarevs’kyi was 
‘Eneida’®. Inspired by the literary merit of this work, other writers began to 
produce works in the spoken language. The Kharkiv Romantics, a circle of
® Subtelny, (1988), p. 222.
® Subtelny, (1988), pp. 223-34.
 ^Shevelov, (1980), pp. 149-51. 
® Subtelny, (1988), p. 230.
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writers based around Kharkiv university, produced stories which tended to 
be folksy in tone, and full of melancholy nostalgia for the lost great past of 
Ukraine.® These writers not only developed and refined the language, but 
aided in creating a sense of national consciousness and a desire for 
political self-determination, which manifested itself in the desire for a 
unique literary language for Ukraine.^® By this time, as poets and writers 
began to see themselves, and by viewed by their public, as national 
spokespersons, language in Ukraine was becoming a national and social 
issue as Ukrainians developed the beginnings of national awareness and 
identity. Interestingly, Ukraine and things Ukrainian acquired a certain 
‘trendiness’ in Russia around this time. Ukraine was not, however,
perceived as a separate entity but rather as an exotic and wild part of 
Russia itself.
The efforts of the Romantics culminated in the works of
Shevchenko. His Kobzar departed somewhat from earlier literature in the 
vernacular in its lack of folksiness, and in its unquestionable literary merit. 
His use of the Ukrainian spoken language demonstrated conclusively that 
arguments against the vernacular as a basis for literary language were no 
longer accurate. His genius inspired the younger generation of
intelligentsia, in Galicia and Russian-ruled Ukraine, to promote the spoken 
language. This brought the young Galicians into conflict with the older 
generation of scholars, who preferred to use the ‘iazychie’, an unwieldy 
mix of Church Slavonic, Polish, Russian and Ukrainian, for literature while 
speaking Polish. The older generation was disenchanted with the
Hapsburg Empire, and thus looked to the Polish aristocracy or to Moscow
® Subtelny, (1988), pp. 230-1. 
Dobriansky, L , 0979), p. 230.
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for leadership/^ In contrast, the new generation began to draw closer to 
Kyiv and figures like Shevchenko and Drahmanov. While the Western 
intelligentsia, who until very late in the century drew their membership 
mostly from clergy, found some of the decidely secular ideas of their Kyiv 
influences too radical, they nonetheless embraced ideas of national 
consciousness, ethnic identity and the place of their spoken language as a 
trait common to all Ukrainians/^
Prohibitions on the use on Ukrainian in the area controlled by 
Russia led to a shift in publication to Galicia, where the Austrian 
government was less prohibitive/^ Wexler explains.
During the period of 1876-1905, when Ukrainian cultural life was curtailed 
in the Eastern Ukraine, there was no chance for Easterners to discuss 
problems of standardization and compilation of terminologies. Many 
Eastern Ukrainian writers were obliged to publish their works in Western 
Ukrainian publications....Galicia, a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire 
became the center of Ukrainian scholarly and literary activity.
The emancipation of the serfs, the establishment of Ukrainian
schools in Galicia, and the resultant literacy contributed to the
advancement of Ukrainian culture in Galicia. Theatres, newspapers and
journals, publishing houses, societies, and political parties were among the
Subtelny, (1988), p. 231.
Magocsi explains the three factions of Austria-Hungary’s Ukrainian intelligentsia, the 
Old Ruthenians, Russophiles and Ukrainophiles in terms of their beliefs about the history 
of the Ukrainian narod, and the relationship of the Ukraine to Russia and Belarus’. 
Russophiles essentially considered themselves ‘Russians from Galicia’ and advocated 
the use of Russian as both a literary and spoken language. Old Ruthenians also believed 
the three ethnic groups shared a common source. Ukrainophiles treated this idea as 
ideological fantasy and felt that all of Ukraine was a separate entity. Later, one could add 
the ‘Populists’, who disagreed with the Ukrainophiles of the previous generation on 
linguistic grounds. Magocsi is careful to point out that these distinctions are far from rigid, 
on both ideological and historical grounds. Magocsi, (1996), pp.438-41.
Subtelny, (1988), pp. 318-19.
By this is meant the Decree of Ems in 1876, which banned the import and publication 
of Ukrainian books, a prohibition of use of Ukrainian on stage, the closing of Ukrainian 
newspapers, and a ban on teaching in Ukrainian or about Ukrainain subjects. This rather 
stringent decree was the result of accusations by a former Ukrainophile, Mikhail 
luzefovych, that Ukrainophiles were becoming subversive and antagonising the 
peasantry, and that they were in fact engaged in a German plot against the Russians. To 
get around this decree and others previous to it, publication had to move out of Russian 
Ukraine into Galicia, where the ruling govemment was not as harsh. Subtelny, (1988), p. 
283.
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fruits of awakening Ukrainian consciousness. Because of some 
concessions allowed this minority within the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 
Galician Ukrainians were able to make sufficient progress in political and 
cultural spheres to make Galicia the leading centre of Ukrainian national 
revival in the second half of the nineteenth century, amazing visitors from 
Russian-ruled Ukraine with their progress.^®
During the nineteenth century, this shift in publication and literature, and 
the influence Western Ukraine had on the literary language would cause 
another of the major discussions surrounding Ukrainian as a literary 
language: the admissibility of ‘Galicianisms’ into the s tandard . In  Galicia, 
similar debates raged. Two factions had long disagreed over the course of 
Galician Ukrainian, arguing either for a common Slavic heritage, or a 
unique and distinct Ukrainian nationality. (There were Polonised 
intelligentsia as well, but they were in the minority.) As mentioned above, 
by the 1890s, the Ukrainophiles had won the debate, but another 
argument remained between generations over the substance of the 
accepted language, whether the literary language should remain the 
religious language which already had a degree of prestige, or be based on 
the language of the common people. In the end, the vernacular base won 
out, and became widespread enough for the administrations of Galicia and 
Bukovina to use it; this language was further endorsed by the publication 
of several dictionaries, grammars, and magazines.
Ironically, when Galicians and Dniepr Ukrainians came into contact, 
the Galicians found their language disparaged by other Ukrainians, much 
as Russians treated Ukrainian. Galicians pushed for a wide range of
Wexler, (1974), pp. 39-40.
Magosci, (1983), pp. 116-17.
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acceptable dialect words, but found they were looked down upon since 
their dialect of Ukrainian contained what were felt to be foreign and folk 
elements. Ultimately, Galician speech and writing came to resemble 
Dniepr Ukrainian with some Galician elements, which meant the Galicians 
sacrificed the representative quality of a true vernacular for access to the 
prestige of a larger population of speakers.^®
Developments during this century had a number of important 
consequences for the language. Linguistic discussions at this time 
remained rather naive and rarely included professional linguists, a trend 
that would continue into twentieth century regulation and standardisation. 
Instead, language planning, particularly code selection and standardisation 
efforts were carried out by writers, scholars, lawyers or journalists.^® The 
use of Russian (in Russian-ruled Ukraine) or Polish (in Austria-Hungarian- 
ruled Ukraine) for official purposes and in urban areas adversely affected 
the status of Ukrainian at this time, especially as the nobility aligned 
themselves with one or the other of these official languages. This 
predictably meant widespread bi-lingualism and a lack of perceived status 
for Ukrainian language, as most of the prestigious functions in society 
were carried out in Polish or Russian. As for the masses, many lost 
interest in speaking Ukrainian because of the perceived stigma, or were 
ignorant of the standard. Proponents of a unique Ukrainian literary 
language found such developments worrisome. An independent language 
would prevent cultural submersion into Russian or Polish, maintain cultural 
integrity, and gain the respect of outsiders for Ukraine.^® Such advocates
Shevelov, (1980), p. 153. 
Magosci, (1978), pp. 1-17. 
Wexler, (1974), p. 40. 
Wexler, (1974), p. 42-3.
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fell into two camps: proponents of uniquely Ukrainian features ( the 
‘ethnographic’ approach), versus supporters of Ukrainian with foreign 
admissions, usually Russian, Polish, or internationalisms.
Those against foreign borrowings preferred using archaic forms to 
create neologisms, or to introduce dialect words.^^ Such additions would 
prevent the widening of the gulf between the intelligentsia and the masses 
that the use of foreign loans could cause. Others feared the development 
of Ukrainian would be stifled if it relied upon outside words. Furthermore, 
with different influences acting upon the East and the West, a unified 
Ukrainian language would be difficult to maintain if foreign words were 
allowed in from both areas. This problem hindered those advocating 
dialect additions as well, since the area of Ukrainian speech was vast and 
dialects from one side to the other varied immensely^. This active interest 
in the state and development of a literary language led to a call for 
regulators and an interest in normalisation during this time.
The presence of such arguments and the degree of interest in the 
Ukrainian language highlights its prominent place in the minds of the 
intelligentsia. Language connected social classes who previously had little 
to bind them together. Furthermore, it embodied, in the minds of these 
Romantics, all that ‘Ukrainian’ meant: culture, history and national identity. 
Shevchenko and others proved that the speech of the peasants could 
indeed serve as the basis for a literary language. The precedent had been 
set which established Ukrainian as a separate entity, a unique culture 
thereby justifying the support and development of their own language. This 
the newly aware Ukrainian intelligentsia found themselves in conflict with
Wexler, (1974), pp. 42, 47-65.
^W exler, (1974), p. 69-79.
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Russia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire in their desire for political and 
national self-determination.^^ A sufficiently strong foundation had been laid 
in Ukraine, so that by the time the Soviets consolidated their power, they 
were keenly aware of Ukrainian nationalism and felt this force must be 
controlled, and if possible channelled for their use.
Early Soviet rule, Ukralnisatlon and Stalin:
The first half of the Twentieth Century was characterised by the 
same debates as in previous years, with varying benefit to the Ukrainian 
language as a result of several shifts in policy. Socially, native speakers 
continued to hold the language in low esteem. This may be partly blamed 
on ‘Little Russianism’, the idea that Ukrainians form part of the total ruskiy 
narod, and cannot have a history separate from Russia (or indeed, 
Belarus’). Ukrainians were perceived by Russians, and to some extent by 
Ukrainians themselves as less progressive and unable to create an 
independent state. Their language, therefore, was unsuited to modernity, 
technology or world culture. '^* This hindered the spread of Ukrainian 
language into business and industry, or into science and technology. 
Greater success was enjoyed in the areas of agriculture, musicology, 
poetry, and economics. This meant that the functions appropriated by 
Russian continued to hold more prestige than those carried out in 
Ukrainian, thus guaranteeing a higher status for Russian language in the 
eyes of speakers. Even after demonstrating its ability to serve as a high 
language, Ukrainian was not widely accepted due to this lack of status, 
since ambitious Ukrainians realised they would have to speak Russian or
^  Dobriansky, L , (1979), p. 230.
Kuzio. (1997), pp. 305-08.
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Polish in order to advance socially, politically, or in their careers.^®
This time period also brought a crisis in motive, as the Romantic 
notion of national soul, and its expression in the native language, was no 
longer felt to be convincing for native speakers who were becoming 
increasingly accustomed to technology and science. Because it became 
desirable to emphasise the presence of an independent Ukrainian 
language and state, politics found its way into the linguistic discussions of 
the time. Such interest may also account for the unprecedented level of 
normalisation which took place in the first half of this century, and the 
almost universal agreement that language planning, particularly regulation, 
was needed.^®
The policy of the ruling governments of this time period changed 
several times. In the 1920s, the Communist Party realised that any 
attempts to stifle the native language of Ukraine could lead to an upsurge 
of nationalism. Furthermore, in order to better propagandize in Soviet 
Ukraine, and encourage unity through the appearance of tolerance, the 
party felt its doctrines should be taught in Ukrainian. New interest in 
expanding Ukrainian into all areas of life followed from these motives, and 
in these discussions for the first time professional linguists joined literary 
enthusiasts to shape the standard language.
As part of a Union-wide korenizatsiia policy, the Soviet government 
initiated a nationalising project in Ukraine. Ukrainianization, ‘national in 
form, socialist in content', had the appearance of genuine tolerance and 
interest, but was inwardly Marxist in its motive. This meant that policy had
Shevelov, (1989), pp. 216-7. 
Shevelov, (1989), pp. 216-220.
48
as its overriding consideration the building of a strong state.^^ The use of 
Ukrainian language reflected the intention to harness national forces in 
efforts to create a socialist state in Ukraine.^® National feelings were 
encouraged as a result of such efforts, and the desire for an independent 
state also grew, especially among the intelligentsia, whose aims, both 
linguistic and political, were not necessarily to support the Soviet regime. 
Indeed, by the end of the 1920s, only four Russian newspapers remained, 
and there was widespread translation into Ukrainian of foreign materials. 
Furthermore, orthography and lexicon had been reformed and 
standardised. The pro-Ukrainian policies of this era culminated with the 
decree of 6 July, 1927 by the All Ukrainian Executive Committee and 
Council of People's Commissars of UkSSR which declared all languages 
equal within the state, and introduced methods of encouraging education 
in Ukrainian (as part of a drive to educate children in the language of their 
nationality in Ukraine), as well as other favourable language policies. By 
the end of the twenties, not only had education and publishing in Ukrainian 
grown, but also the use of Ukrainian spread to the administration and party 
organs. This growth did not escape the watchful eye of the Soviet 
government which constantly feared nationalism in Ukraine would interfere 
with its long-term plans for unity and incorporation, and indeed the creation 
of a Russian-based culture for the Soviet Union.^®
One result of Ukrainisation was new interest in the content of the
Solchanyk,, (1985), pp. 67-8. 
Dobriansky, L, (1979), p. 230
For more information on this era and others, see Krawchenko, Social Change and 
National Consciousness in Twentieth-Century Ukraine, (1985). This book breaks the 
century down into decades, from the Revolution to the fall of Shelest’, and examines 
various components of society as Ukraine develops national consciousness, the 
awareness of its position as a separate nation. The focus on language issues is minimal, 
but Krawchenko’s political perspective is very useful in establishing the background 
against which language development occurred, and describing the cultural and social
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language. The overall tendency, therefore, in language regulation until the 
1930s was to favour the colloquial lexicon, with archaic forms introduced 
to enrich the vocabulary of Ukrainian. The presence of a literary language 
intelligible to all of the population, from intelligentsia to the peasantry, 
enabled Ukrainians to become a more literate and more educated 
population, with a growing civic awareness of themselves as a Ukrainian 
nation. These developments received mixed reactions: while some 
speakers were pleased to speak Ukrainian, others still showed apathy 
towards their native language.^® In addition, as many of these ideals and 
aspirations as well as a literary tradition had previously been established in 
Galicia, the two rival standards for literary Ukrainian would have to 
compete for dominance: Galician Ukrainians felt their language was fully 
able to serve as the literary standard while Ukrainians in the East 
(Russian-ruled Ukraine) were reluctant to accept what sounded Polonised, 
overly colloquial and non-standard to them.
In the 1930s politics took precedence over linguistics in Ukraine. 
Crowned by the incorporation of the Western half of Ukraine into the 
Soviet Union in 1939, this time period marked a strong inclination towards 
the incorporation of Russian borrowings and caiques into the language.^^ 
The purists of the 1920s were rebuked in linguistic circles, and often 
suffered political persecution or deportation for favouring what were felt to 
be Polish forms over Russian ones. Dialect and archaic words were 
replaced with Russianisms, except for stylistic purposes in literature, thus
trends which interacted with linguistic ones.
Wexler, (1974), pp. 110-37.
The terms used throughout should be understood as follows: a borrowing or loan 
refers to the incorporation of a foreign term as it is into the host language. Caiques are 
loan translations, meaning each part of the foreign word is translated. Russianisms and 
Internationalisms, quite obviously, therefore refer to loans or caiques from Russian or 
from what is considered international vocabulary. See also Chapter Six.
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minimising or even eliminating the Western dialect influence. Instead, 
‘dialect’ came to mean forms shared with Polish but not Russian. 
Furthermore, Russification permeated the language to the extent that 
compounds existing in Russian were copied using Ukrainian roots, so that 
where direct borrowing did not occur, calquing did, replacing native 
Ukrainian terms. These trends became quickly apparent in terminology 
manuals which reflected the new emphasis on similarities in Ukrainian to 
Russian.^^ This drive was reflected in society, as intellectuals and 
Ukrainian clergy were brought to trial, and ethnic Ukrainians suffered 
forced collectivisation and famine.^^ Russian became a required subject in 
1938, and ethnic schools outside of their own republics were closed.^ 
Stalin’s policy marked a sharp turn away from Lenin’s tolerance of national 
languages and cultures: the new leader was more interested in 
modernisation and industrialisation, and needed an efficient, monolingual 
work force to accomplish his goals.
Soviet language planning of this time can be classified in two ways: 
direct and oblique. On the one hand, regulators were actively seeking to 
influence terminology and lexicon by adding Russian words, and keeping 
functions with high status for Russian language. Education, publishing, 
and administration all reflected this bias. Oblique planning also had its 
effect when migration, spreading of industrialisation, and mono-lingual 
higher education and career opportunities meant that Russian became 
necessary as a skill to survive and advance.These measures ensured 
not only the start of Russification in earnest in Ukraine, but also of
^^Wexler, (1974), 157-64.
“  Dobriansky, L , (1979), p. 232. 
^  Haarman, (1985), p 314.
“  Lewis, (1983), pp. 309-24.
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persecution of the intelligentsia as the vanguard not only of the Ukrainian 
language, but also of Ukrainian culture and national identity, and therefore 
potentially of Ukrainian dissent. Indeed, though Stalin had been thorough 
in his weeding out of potentially subversive institutions and individuals, a 
new intelligentsia had arisen like a phoenix out of the remains of the old 
one, and many republican structures remained. Krawchenko summarises 
this decade by saying, “it is no exaggeration to say that Ukrainians’ 
greatest achievement during that decade was that they outlasted it.” ®^
During German occupation of Ukraine, there was a brief hiatus 
when Soviet proscription of the use of Ukrainian was somewhat relaxed. 
Some Ukrainians welcomed the German invasion as they felt their rule 
might be an improvement on the Soviet regime. As Magocsi outlines, 
German policy was quite contradictory towards Ukraine, so that while 
schools, churches and publishers were allowed to function with some 
freedom, and in Ukrainian, at the same time Ukrainians were to be kept 
submissive and under the control of the German occupying authorities.^^ 
However, as soon as the war was comfortably over, and the Germans had 
been driven out, Stalin quickly clamped down on Ukraine. The principles 
which had dominated in the 1930s were once again espoused, and those 
who had supported a return to ideals popular in the 1920s were criticised. 
This meant the Kyiv/Poltava dialect was affirmed as the basis of the 
literary language, and Western Ukrainian features once more were singled 
out as unacceptable variants. The ethnographic approach to enrichment 
again fell from favour as regulators opened the language to Russian 
borrowings and caiques by orienting away from rural speech and towards
^  Krawchenko, (1985), p. 152.
Magocsi, (1996), pp. 625-29.
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urban.^® Those familiar with Ukrainian history will recall certain 
concessions, such as the use of names of Ukrainian heroes (Bohdan 
Khmel'nyts'kyi medal), and the incorporation of Galicia into the territory of 
Ukraine, but behind such superficial allowances Stalin’s government 
advanced Russification full speed ahead on both the ideological and 
linguistic fronts.®®
Until 1950, Stalin advocated the Marr theory, which called for 
unification of ethnic minorities into a Soviet Man as part of the process 
envisioned by Marx and Lenin towards a class-less and nation-less 
society. Under this ideal, philologists and linguists were brought to trial 
with other alleged nationalists amidst public discussions of the merging of 
all the languages of the Soviet Union. The aim of wiping out ethnic 
distinctions would continue to find support until this theory fell from 
favour.^®
Even when the Marr theory no longer had the support of Stalin’s 
regime, the idea of a Soviet man did not vanish entirely, and would re­
surface in the seventies in an attempt to encourage political, if not ethnic, 
unity.This naturally caused a great deal of concern among ethnic 
minorities in the Soviet Union, as Chopyk relates.
The recent publications from Soviet Ukraine are reflecting the trends and 
struggles of other non-Russian nations of the Soviet Union. The drive of 
Soviet leadership to produce the “new Soviet Man” has frightened many 
Soviet nationalities mainly by its unrelenting pressure of Russification, by 
which Russian culture projects itself as superior and all other purely national 
cultures, languages, and social peculiarities as inferior. It is baffling that the 
Soviet ideological leadership, in putting Russian achievements as models to 
follow and to look up to, should not realise that looking up to someone 
implies looking down at someone, thus providing grounds for dissatisfaction, 
frustration, and hostility. The inception of the Soviet Union originated, we are 
told, to solve deep-seated national problems, yet to this day they have not 
been solved.
38 Wexler, (1974), p. 183.
Magocsi, (1996), pp. 645-49.
^  Dobriansky, L., (1979), p. 232.
Chopyk, (1975), p. 59.
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In this climate, Russian crept into the language in two important 
ways. First, children learned it in school from a very early age, and then 
grew up surrounded by Russian in media, literature, and public life. 
Secondly, because of earlier policies, bi-lingualism was already 
widespread. International vocabulary entered Ukrainian via Russian, and 
Russian neologisms were used instead of Ukrainian ones.^^ This debate 
continues to involve language enthusiasts in Ukraine, as discussed in 
Chapter Six. With Russification aided by intermarriage, re-location into and 
out of Ukraine, Russian schools in Ukraine, and career ambitions of 
minorities within the Soviet Union who saw Russian as the language of 
advancement and progress, some writers and linguists began to fear that 
Ukrainian would soon be reduced to a dialect of Russian.
As the presence of Russianisms increased, and with the continued 
support of the policy of Russification even after the death of Stalin, 
concern for the purity of the language re-entered linguistic discussion in 
Ukraine among linguists who were not 'Soviet' in their thinking. Often 
linguists found themselves in opposition to writers of the time as to whose 
responsibility it was to ensure the purity of the language.^^ Again, this 
argument continues in contemporary Ukraine with scholars, writers and 
politicians involved in varying proportions, as discussed in Chapter Three.
Thus, at the time of Stalin’s death in 1953, the position of Ukrainian 
may be described as precarious. Russianisms and Russification were 
taking their toll on the language of Ukraine, replacing native words with 
borrowings and caiques aided by government policy and ignorance, and
Wexler, (1974), pp. 184-5. 
^  Wexler, (1974), pp. 190-91.
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even necessity for Ukrainians to function in a bi-lingual society.The Soviets 
were not always even-handed in the application of their language policy, 
which meant that the relative tolerance in areas felt to be more loyal did 
not apply in Ukraine, long a hot-bed of ‘nationalism’ and potential 
rebellious thinking. Even where policy on paper seemed to advocate 
speaking one’s own language as a civil right, such was not always the 
case in practice.
Despite the presence of repression to a discouraging extent 
throughout the period after Stalin’s death until glasnost’, in the 1960s, 
some trends emerged which looked encouraging. The group of writers and 
dissidents later known as the ‘Shestydesiatnyky’ appeared in Kyiv around 
1962, heralding attempts to try to write and publish literature in Ukrainian. 
R. Shelest, a known advocate of national rights became the First 
Secretary of the Communist Party in Ukraine in 1963, and remained in 
power until 1972, his efforts tolerated and even encouraged by 
Khrushchev’s thaw policies. Language rights were perceived as a high 
priority at this time, as evidenced by the demands of the Writers’ Congress 
of 1962 to use Ukrainian in instruction at all levels, in business, in 
scholarship and publishing, and in arts and media.^ The journal 
Movoznavstvo (literally Language Studies’) appeared in 1967, which was 
dedicated to language questions. The driving question of this time 
concerned what actually was Ukrainian, and what needed to be pruned 
from the dictionaries and written language as foreign.'*® During the 1950s 
and 1960s, demands to declare Ukrainian the national language of 
Ukraine emerged for the first time (most notably at a conference on
44
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language in Kyiv, in February of 1963, which produced a resolution 
appealing to the party leadership to declare Ukrainian the official language 
of Ukraine), as the intelligentsia mobilised in defence of their language 
often supported by the local party leaders/^ In Moscow, policies to 
counteract this upsurge in dissidence and national awareness continued to 
be made until the era of glasnost.
As Holowinsky indicates, Soviet policy had taken a severe toll on 
the number of speakers of Ukrainian in Ukraine. The effects of 
Russification can be measured in population statistics: In Ukraine in 1979, 
the total population measured 49, 757 million. 85.5% of this population 
claimed their language of nationality as their native language, which 
showed a decline from 1979’s percentage of 89.9%. Within this figure, 
66.3% considered Ukrainian their native language, down from 69.4% in 
1970. The percentage of those claiming Russian increased from 28.1% to 
31.2% in the same two censuses. In addition, those considering Russian 
their second language rose from 28.6% to 40%. The percentage of 
Ukrainians in Ukraine suffered a decline as well. The drop in the number of 
people who considered their native language the language of their 
nationality shows that a number of Ukrainians had come to consider 
Russian their primary language. While these statistics could be erroneous 
due to flaws in polling procedure, or the uncertainty of those polled as to 
their nationality or native language, it nonetheless becomes apparent that 
Ukrainian language over the decade 1970-1980 declined in position, 
especially with reference to Russian.^^ Statistics from 1993 still show the 
large percentage of ethnic Russians (11.3 million, or 22.1%), and
^  Krawchenko, (1985), chapter 5.
Solchanyk, (1980), pp. 272-73. Statistics are taken from the 1970 and 1979 Soviet
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Ukrainians who feel Russian is their first language (4.6 million, 12.3% of 
Ukrainians).**®
In spite of Soviet efforts to the contrary, Ukrainian language still 
existed and was still spoken by many Ukrainians. How had the language 
survived such consistent and heavy-handed attempts to wipe it out? One 
theory suggests ancient nations tend to be more stable, and therefore 
more resistant to such attempts to assimilate them."^ ® Another suggestion 
included the presence of the Institute of the Ukrainian Language in the 
Academy of Sciences as a positive force in preserving the standard, even 
though the long-time director Bilodid has been accused of Russification.®® 
It has been suggested that self-identity is often enough, when language, 
culture, and a separate political state are not available to form national self 
-perception. In any case, there were enough nationally-conscious 
Ukrainians to preserve the language, and the culture around it, until such 
time as it could be freely used again.
In the years immediately previous to and after independence, 
Ukraine faced two major problems, both of which were reflected in the 
lively linguistic debates of the time. Arel explains, ‘Language politics can 
be so intense, at times, because they play on the symbolism of unequal 
group standing, make people fear for their jobs or careers, and affect the 
institution of cultural socialisation par excellence, the school. To 
pronounce a single langauge ‘official’ implies that the people speaking that 
language have greater political rights than others.’®”*
Censuses.
^  Solchanyk, (1993) p. 2.
Nepyvoda, interview, August, 1996, Kyiv. This viewpoint was echoed by P. Dobriansky
(1995).
Ermolenko, interview, August 1996, Kyiv. 
®^Arel, (1995b), p. 1.
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First, the new nation suffered an identity crisis, especially in relation to 
Russia, which challenged its self-image and sense of unity: could Ukraine 
define itself, or its language, except in contrast or comparison to Russia? 
This could have important linguistic consequences, if forms perceived to 
be Russian in origin were suddenly very unwelcome in the language, or if 
Russian speakers found themselves socially second-class citizens. If 
Russian indeed became adopted as a second official language, the 
reverse might be true: Russian forms could go nearly unnoticed except by 
a few linguists, and Ukrainian could lose status as a language only 
regularly used by part of the population. This relates in turn to the second 
major cause for concern.
Decades of Russification meant heavy linguistic casualties in a 
number of areas, which affected not only the use of Ukrainian, but its 
purity as well. Particularly in the South and East of Ukraine, a number of 
‘necessary’ conditions have been met which produce linguistic 
assimilation, causing the number of Ukrainian speakers to drop. These 
include exposure, urbanisation, migration and the linguistic closeness of 
Ukrainian and Russian.®  ^ Furthermore there have been problems of 
perception, both among Ukrainians and among Russians in Ukraine, which 
created the impression that Ukrainian language may not offer the same 
opportunities to speakers as Russian. Others feel, as Solchanyk explains, 
‘that Ukraine is really part of Russia and that the Ukrainian language was 
invented by ‘separatists’ in the nineteenth century,’®^ which justifies both to 
Russians in Ukraine and to Russian-speaking Ukrainians a policy of close 
integration with Russia. This topic is explored in more detail in Chapter
“  Silver, (1974), pp. 45-66.
“  Solchanyk, (1993), p. 2.
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Three, which explores Ukrainian national identity. Suffice it to say that 
these past perceptions are beginning to change in favour of Ukrainian.
Contemporary policy: Independence and beyond
This struggle over the position of Ukrainian language has 
characterised the last forty years of this century in Ukraine, especially in 
relation to Russian language. Language policy on the law books of Soviet 
Ukraine and the reality of the language situation were two different things. 
This unfortunately could also be said for current, post-independence 
language policy. While legislators succeeded in declaring Ukrainian the 
sole official language in Ukraine, there is still discussion about the role of 
Russian. From the start of glasnost' through independence, policy has 
evolved in an effort to satisfactorily respond to the needs of the population, 
starting with the tenets of the 1989 Law on Languages. (Note the plural 
ending of ‘languages’, evidence that lawmakers were considering at least 
Russian and Ukrainian as potential official languages at that time). This 
law stated that Ukrainian would be the sole language of administration, 
that it would be mandatory in all Russian schools as a second language, 
that the higher education institutions would eventually have to instruct in 
Ukrainian, and that public signs would be in Ukrainian, or at least in both 
languages.^
In 1991, the Verkhovna Rada adopted the ‘Declaration of the Rights 
of Nationalities’ which allowed the development of all the languages and 
cultures present in Ukraine.®  ^ One of the biggest differences between 
these two documents, as Arel observes, is the criteria used. The first
^Arel, (1995a), p. 600.
“ Arel, (1995b)p. 13.
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document suggests basing the use of a second language on an ethnic 
criterion, i.e. where a nationality was ‘compactly settled'. The second 
switches to a linguistic criterion, suggesting the use of whatever language 
is acceptable to the population of an area. The Law on National Minorities 
reverted to the ethnic criterion, although the Constitution uses the linguistic 
one in an attempt to remove ethnicity as a component of Ukrainian 
nationality. This distinction is particularly important given the number of 
Ukrainians who speak Russian as a first language, and as a means to 
encourage ethnic Russians to learn to speak Ukrainian. As Arel rightly 
observes, implementation of such a law could mean not only ethnic conflict 
between Russians and Ukrainians, but also language conflict between 
Ukrainian speakers and Russian speakers, including ethnic Ukrainians.®® 
Other relevant laws focus on the sovereignty of Ukraine, and 
respect the rights of minorities who live there. The July 16 1990 Law on 
the Sovereignty of Ukraine allows cultural rights to all groups in Ukraine. 
The October 1991 Law on Ukrainian Citizenship guarantees that all 
residents of Ukraine at that date are considered citizens, regardless of 
ethnicity. The Law on National Minorities of June 25, 1992 guarantees 
instruction in one’s native language.®  ^ The newly ratified Constitution 
grants only Ukrainian official status, but allows for educational and other 
rights in several of the prevalent minority languages, including Russian. 
This would mean, in some areas (particularly in the South and East, and in 
the Autonomous Republic of Crimea), that education and public business 
could be carried out legally in Russian, as the population density of
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Dobriansky, P., (1995), p 38.
Arel, (1993), p. 131.
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Russian speakers is higher than that of Ukrainian speakers.^® If these laws 
can indeed be taken as evidence, there appears to be a large degree of 
tolerance for other languages in Ukraine, combined with a desire to see 
Ukrainian language preserved. The effectiveness of such policy will be 
examined later, as well as the cost-effectiveness and the ability to 
realistically implement even the best-designed incentives within a strained 
budget.
While Ukrainian has been declared the official State Language, 
difficulties arise in making the desire of nationalists and patriots meet the 
realities of contemporary Ukraine, especially given the legacy of decades 
of influence by Russia. The reversal of this trend will not occur 
immediately. Most likely to blame for the delay in the implementation of 
the new policy are inertia resulting from Russification and reluctance of 
party functionaries still in their positions of influence who do not see 
supporting these measures as advantageous.®® Furthermore, policy 
concerning official usage of Ukrainian ratified pre-independence was 
sufficiently loosely worded to allow Russian to remain a de facto official 
language, as there were no penalties built in for those who do not comply 
with the requirement to learn Ukrainian on the job. An alternative is to 
emphasise the provision of incentives to learn and use Ukrainian, such as 
a tax on publications not in Ukrainian, the lack of advancement for those 
who do not speak Ukrainian, or requirements that exams for further 
education be given only in Ukrainian. Such ideas espouse the idea that the 
right to be educated in one's ‘mother language’ and the right to be served 
in that language are the two most central language rights. Enforcing this
“  Article 53, paragraph five. 
Holowinsky, (1994), p. 17.
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notion would mean that anyone wishing to participate fully in the new 
state, especially in the public sector, must have good command of its 
language.
However, such changes must be slow and not forced. Even with 
language and culture goals in mind, money and day-to-day necessities of 
administration, repairs to buildings and roads and the limits imposed by 
the budget mean that linguist changes, a low priority in a country suffering 
the economic and political growing pains Ukrainiane is experienceing, will 
take time. Despite the slow pace, however, changes are taking place. 
Kuzio cautions against several common errors in interpretation made by 
those interested in the Ukrainian situation:
• Language cannot be the only marker of ethnic identity, though it 
is important,
• Russian will be nearly impossible to eradicate or make entirely 
foreign in Ukraine, and
• Russian speakers do not necessarily have a ‘little Russian' 
mentality or identity.®®
He summarises, ‘Debate will continue surrounding language proficiency, 
but disdain and hostility towards the Ukrainian language, which existed 
until the late Gorbachev era, have all but disappeared’.®^ Since Russia and 
Ukraine historically share similar cultures, language may continue to be an 
important distinguishing factor.
The reality of the situation seven years from independence is that 
difficulties remain in making the desire of nationalists and patriots meet the 
realities of contemporary Ukraine, especially given the historical and
Kuzio, (1997), p. 262.
Kuzio. (1997), p. 264.
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continuing presence and influence by Russia. While it is in theory 
desirable for Ukrainians to speak Ukrainian, many members of the 
intelligentsia class were educated in Russian and still use it daily at work 
and in official capacities. However, to allow Russian to stand alongside 
Ukrainian as a State Language, while positively affecting relations with 
Russia, would be too great a concession to the influence of Russian 
under the Soviets, and could hinder the spread of Ukrainian. Too often 
demands for a second state language may be accompanied by other less 
palatable demands, for greater ties with Russia, dual citizenship, or a 
federated structure within Ukraine.®  ^ Nonetheless, a special reference to 
Russian occurs in the recently adopted Constitution:
The state language of Ukraine Is the Ukrainian language.
The State ensures the comprehensive development and functioning of the 
Ukrainian language in all spheres of social life throughout the entire territory 
of Ukraine.
In Ukraine, the free development, use and protection of Russian, and®^  other 
languages of national minorities of Ukraine, is guaranteed.®^
One could interpret such a mention as a compromise to speed the 
already slowed process of ratification of the Constitution, but it also reflects 
competing sentiments about language politics in Ukraine. Assertions that 
Ukrainian should function undisputed as the language of Ukraine are often 
countered by equally vocal claims that this is penalising Russians or 
Russian-speakers in Ukraine. While an extensive review of such opinions 
would be out of place in this work, the political counterpart to linguistic
®^ Solchanyk, (1993), p. 2. Arel supports this view, but Kuzio is reluctant to equate 
linguistic Russification with political sympathy. ‘Little Russianism' is defined and 
discussed in Chapter Three.
®® This ‘and’ was a matter of contention, and does not appear in the Ukrainian language 
version of the Constitution. Russian speakers did not like to include themselves in the 
category of national minority, and wished the Constitution to separate them from that 
group.
The Constitution of Ukraine, official English translation, 1996, Article 10.
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debate centres on social behaviour of the ex-majority, namely Russians, 
and the new national ‘indigenous’ or ‘titular’ group in Ukraine and 
represents one aspect of the problem. Arel describes this angle of the 
conflict as follows;
The nationalizing intent of the Ukrainian state, however, is not directed at 
national minorities, but at the most important linguistic minority, (which, as 
we will see, may currently be a majority)-the group which, irrespective of 
ethnic background, primarily identifies with the Russian language and 
culture....This makes the national question in Ukraine as much a family 
squabble, or a case of /nfra-ethnic discord, as an /nfer-ethnic political 
struggle.®®
In any case, steps towards total changeover to Ukrainian in all 
aspects of professional life cannot be immediate due to lack of knowledge 
on the part of the populace, and simple practical concerns including 
finance. This aspect of the position of Ukrainian, while it has been nearly 
resolved in policy, may take some time to become a tangible reality. The 
language people use, while certainly not the main issue, has become 
enough of an issue that one scholar remarks that Ukrainians are not 
Russian if they speak Russian, and that nationalist sentiment must not be 
confused with fact. Arel notes the opinion that Russian is viewed as an 
imperialistic language, and that Russia’s ties with Ukraine are now being 
presented as historically imperialistic and given to encouraging 
Russification at the expense of Ukrainian culture.®®
This kind of reaction is hardly surprising given the extent to which 
Russification was practiced in Ukraine. Several problems arose during that 
time which still vex policymakers and language enthusiasts alike. Overt 
terrorist threats to known intelligentsia are perhaps the best-known means
Arel, (1995b). Arel defines a nationalizing state as one which ‘despite being ethnically 
heterogeneous, nonetheless see themselves as nation-states, i.e. as if their borders 
coincided or nearly coincided with the territorial distribution of the politicized ethnic 
community'». Arel is quoting Connor, W., Ethnonationalism. The Quest for Understanding, 
(1994), p. 96.
^Arel, (1995b), p. 19.
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of ‘encouraging’ citizens of the USSR to follow linguistic and political 
unification goals, but often other tactics were as damaging. During the 
course of Soviet rule, stereotypes of Ukrainian as a language of the 
village, unfit for technological or scientific discussion, were aided by the 
literal and linguistic exodus of talent to Moscow® .^ Bilingualism, long touted 
as a positive influence for Ukraine, meant that Ukrainian words were 
replaced with Russian counterparts not only in dictionaries but also in the 
minds of speakers who could not keep the two linguistic codes separate. 
Russian was supported as the general lexical fund for all Soviet 
languages, and as a language of unity and Union-wide participation.®® 
Gradually, using such policies, Russian came to replace Ukrainian in most 
social functions, including government and education. Since many people 
spoke Ukrainian at home, a surzhyk emerged-a mixture of the two 
languages, intelligible to speakers of both but lacking the status of either 
language.®®
Goals set by those in power are ambitious. Ihor Ostash, academic 
and a member of the Verkhovna Rada, wrote in 1991 a list of areas for 
advancement. He includes elevating the prestige of Ukrainian, introducing 
Ukrainian studies departments in well-known world universities, research 
in and about Ukrainian, the ‘computerisation’ of the language (meaning the 
adaptation of programmes and fonts so that computers may be used in 
Ukrainian rather than English or Russian, which has since been 
accomplished), a renovation of the standard and the provision of good 
teaching materials including modern technology to students of Ukrainian.
Dziuba, (1992), p. 62.
Ostash, (1995), pp. 132-36; and Masenko, (1995), pp. 69-72.
For more information on formation of such mixture languages see Fontaine, S., Pidgins 
and Creoles, (1988).
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Some of these goals are met, or on their way to completion, but others are 
very much a dream for the future/® As with other plans in the new state, 
economics prevent the realisation of such ambitions without first solving 
pressing political and financial issues.
Politics and linguistics cannot help but affect the choice which faces 
Ukraine today; a nationalist approach, which would place high value on 
Ukrainian language as a tenet of Ukrainian ethnicity, or nationism, which 
would again emphasise Ukrainian language, but as a practical tool 
necessary for surviving in a multi-ethnic so c ie ty .T h is  dichotomy is 
reflected socially and culturally in other debates. Should the Constitution 
state ‘Ukrainsk’iyi Narod’ or ‘Narod Ukrayiny' (Ukrainian people or people 
of Ukraine)? Furthermore, nationalism itself can serve either as a means 
to bind the newly-independent society together by emphasising common 
statehood, or it can create schisms by emphasising language, thus 
alienating Russian-speakers of whatever ethnicity, or by placing 
importance on ethnicity itself, thus alienating other groups in the 
population.^^ It must also be remembered that Russian living in Ukraine 
supported the independence referendum in large numbers, mostly for 
economic reasons: they believed their own interests would best be served 
in an independent Ukraine whose economy would improve once separated 
from Russia. Economic problems already stretch the loyalty of this group, 
and penalising language policy could only alienate them further.
Ostash, (1991), pp.141-142.
Eastman, (1983), p. 14. The choice can also be expressed according to UNESCO 
guidelines, as a decision to use an LWC (ianguage of wider communication) for access to 
international materials, or to adopt a national language, (pp. 12-13). Furthermore, other 
considerations abound: Is developing the national language cost-effective; will linguistic 
homogeneity be helpful to society, for example to provide cohesiveness to a newly- 
independent country? (pp. 62-75)
Dobriansky, P., (1995), p 36.
^  Dobriansky, P., (1995), p. 39-40.
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The Cultural Interpretation: Imported ideas, imported words?
Several conclusions from the past history of language planning in 
Ukraine may be helpful in the assessment of current regulatory and 
language promotion policies. First, in Ukraine, language at the lawmaking 
level at least, has always been a political and a national, issue. Speaking 
the language is not only a matter of communication, but a statement of 
ethnicity and an indicator of political alignment for some. Second, the 
perceived status of Ukrainian by speakers can either aid or hinder 
attempts to create a Ukrainian-speaking state. Foreign rule and influence 
has long elevated the status of Russian, and more recently European 
languages and English, above that of Ukrainian in the eyes of the general 
public, who may now be unwilling to believe that speaking their national 
language will not lower their clout with others. Finally, while debates rage 
in linguistic circles, and between devout nationalists, over what is good 
Ukrainian, and how much other languages should be tolerated, the 
average citizen of Ukraine conducts daily business and speaks whatever 
language is available and intelligible to others. The average person has 
other things to worry about in this young nation than what language to 
speak.
The following research attempts to analyse the relative status of 
Ukrainian and Russian in Independent Ukraine. One key indicator of this is 
usage: is Ukrainian used exclusively anywhere, and if so, for what 
functions? In addition, what functions are still primarily carried out in 
Russian? By examining which functions are associated with each 
language, one can assess whether the status of these functions relates to
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the language used, for example the home language versus the language 
of important government documents. In addition, it must be clarified what 
incentives have been offered to encourage the use of Ukrainian, and what 
might motivate a speaker of whatever ethnicity to choose Ukrainian, be it 
career advancement, nationalism, or national cohesiveness. Further 
evidence can be supplied by publishing figures for material in each 
language, and the subjects covered in each; education in both languages 
and the quality of schools, materials, and instruction in each; and media 
and broadcasting in both languages. Government policy and the priority 
given to linguistic concerns, coupled with attention and success in their 
implementation serve as further indicators of progress. These areas are 
the major means of language planning implementation, which measure the 
level of the success of policies designed to support Ukrainian as the 
official language.
Not all of these factors can be quantified satisfactorily. For example, 
ethnicity, as previously discussed, may or may not be related to language 
in the mind of the speaker, so that even Ukrainians who speak only 
Russian may not feel culturally assimilated. Additionally, some ethnic 
Russians may feel their loyalty is to their home in Ukraine and not to their 
ethnic culture.
A given citizen of Ukraine may feel Ukrainian when talking to his 
grandparents, part of the Slavic tradition while at church on Sunday, but 
ex-Soviet or even Russian when at work during the week when he must 
speak Russian with co-workers. He may want his children to speak his 
native language, but may feel their university careers are better advanced 
by a Russian-speaking education. Or he may observe the improving
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quality of published materials, the increased availability of Ukrainian press, 
and see the more modem television programs and feel he will have to use 
Ukrainian to function in society in the near future, but may not know his 
language well enough to use it everywhere. These are the conflicts usual 
to bi-lingual culture, and to bi-lingual speakers, and are difficult to measure 
with statistics. What the average citizen thinks may be only subjectively 
assessed, but what this citizen does that is measureable will provide 
valuable clues, and enable an accurate description of language behaviour, 
the success of language planning, and the status of both languages in 
Ukrainian society.
Sociolinguistic methods allow the study of linguistic behaviour as a 
barometer of society, so that an understanding of the former serves to 
illustrate and illuminate aspects of the latter. One would therefore expect a 
post-totalitarian society to display linguistic démocratisation parallel to 
related social and political processes. Ukraine is suffering what has been 
called ‘post-soviet puberty’, where old beliefs about the Ukrainian 
language must be challenged to aid the country in becoming a stable and 
mature world player.
One current is the de-ritualisation of Ukrainian, that is, the move 
from an idealised view of Ukrainian as the language of Shevchenko and a 
symbol of defiance to a more democratic, everyday perception of the 
language as a means of varied types of expression (a trend which is 
explored in detail in Chapter Three). New challenges face the langauge, 
but a call for pragmatism and common sense, for patriotism rather than 
chauvinistic nationalism, is emerging to compete with radical viewpoints. 
The years since Ukrainian Independence, or even since the 1989
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Language Law have witnessed changes in thinking and a pronounced 
rejection of Russian, although economics and inertia continue to be 
obstacles to the development of Ukraine as an independent state with its 
own language.
What else affects language behaviour? Policy can influence or even 
attempt to coerce, but in the end it represents ideal behaviours which may 
not reflect reality. One factor which certainly influences usage of Ukrainian 
is the perceived status of the language, or rather, the lack of it. As 
previously mentioned, this issue weighs on the minds of many. Ukrainian 
is often regarded as a village language, which if spoken in public, would 
elicit ridicule or even chastisement for the speaker. Such attitudes have 
long existed in Ukraine, and certainly were not alleviated by Soviet policy 
of keeping the most prestigious functions of official business and 
interethnic communication for Russian in the republics. Even without a 
specific policy demanding the use of Russian, and indeed in spite of the 
laws guaranteeing the usage of Ukrainian, there are social factors which 
may hinder wide acceptance of Ukrainian as a language without stigma, 
which may be neutrally used in every situation.
Some of this is an obvious ‘hangover’ from the Soviet era in which 
nationalism was strongly discouraged. Academic journals and learned 
works appeared in Russian, which helped cement the association of 
Russian language with modernity, progress, technology, and urbanity. 
More subtle threads in society regulated language usage, which may be 
harder to counteract or erase.
Social class in Ukrainian is based largely on one’s profession and 
education. Reasons for the lack of an indigenous aristocracy are no doubt
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obvious, leaving the industrial and academic elite on the top of the class 
pyramid. Loyalties in these strata depend on many things, but the 
nationally conscious academic elite tend to be aligned with Ukrainian. As 
one would imagine, the industrial elite may not necessarily follow this 
example. The working classes, which were so glorified by the Soviets, 
make up the next sector. Last are the peasants, in spite of rather nostalgic 
romanticisation in literature and folklore
Clearly, those who set language policy envisage a future where 
communication occurs in Ukrainian, where the effects of Russification 
have been reversed to a sufficient degree to allow Ukrainians to 
automatically, and without prompting or feeling self-conscious, address 
one another in Ukrainian. Putting this in the framework language planning 
for analysis, one must assess the success of these policies as language 
planning, and surmise what remains to be addressed.
One continuing problem, both social and linguistic, is the lingering 
inferiority complex concerning Russia. As a rather tongue-in-cheek Kiev 
Post article expressed it:
Nationalists are permanently on the defensive, ready to lash out at Rusia’s 
every slip-schoolyard behaviour which only undermines their 
legitimacy...Ask a Ukrainian to describe his culture, and the response is 
invariably formed as a comparison to Russia: Ukrainians are warmer, keep 
tidier houses, sing purer melodies. Enough with the comparatives.^^
However, some comparatives and even a little envy are 
understandable. Russia sports many modern and flashy accoutrements 
which Ukraine has not yet managed to acquire. As the inheritor of Soviet 
structures, Russia maintains the lead in publishing and television, for 
example, because it has taken advantage of its inheritance and has not
Callaway, (1996), p. 16.
71
been forced to start from the ground up. These problems for Ukraine can 
and will take time to solve, and will only improve when money can be 
poured into developing Ukrainian language television programming, or into 
printing all types of reading materials in Ukrainian.
Where is Ukraine on its road to linguistic and social stability? 
Opinions vary, as one would expect. After spending more than enough 
time in the company of a hopeless Moscophile, one would be tempted to 
despair for progress in Ukraine: the endless nostalgia for the order of 
Stalin’s rule, the construction and road repairs of Soviet times, and 
ceaseless compliments for Moscow’s underground, its theatre, its 
television, and even Yeltsin. Thankfully, such opinions represent only one 
end of the spectrum, and other more optimistic voices can also be heard.
Outsiders are often more optimistic than natives. Sergeant First 
Class Max Duke, serving at the time of interview in the Defense Attache’s 
department of the American Embassy in Kyiv, observed that already 
Russian-only speaking military were losing promotions to their bi-lingual 
contemporaries. While he admits that the lack of agreement in terminology 
has forced the American Embassy to use Russian interpreters, he could 
also describe the new attitude of the U S government to Ukraine as a 
valuable potential partner.Such affiliations can be welcomed as a way to 
prevent Ukraine renewing its affiliation with Russia should Russian/U.S. 
relations ever sour. Others observed a sudden change in language of 
conversation at work from Russian to Ukrainian in the wake of the 
ratification of the Constitution. This could be explained as national pride, 
or perhaps a lessening of anxiety about the potential consequences for 
speaking Ukrainian on the job.
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Several of those interviewed mentioned another trend, or even 
fashion replacing Russian as the main influence. English is becoming 
widespread enough to have a significant impact on Ukrainian culture, 
perhaps as a result of re-alignment away from Russia and a desire to join 
in European culture/^ On any street book-vendors sell English language 
course materials, books in English, as well as other foreign languages. 
Stalls which sell (illegally copied) cassettes usually have one set of 
Russian music, and one of English-language rock, both modern and 
classic pop music. Though foreign newspapers are somewhat difficult to 
find, many newsagents carry the local version of Vogue, Harper’s Bazaar, 
or Playboy. Though these are available in Russian and not Ukrainian, the 
cultural influence is almost more interesting than the language used. 
Disney, Pepsi, and Coke have recently been joined by McDonald’s, which 
is predictably popular. Most young people study English in school, and 
seem to have no trouble incorporating Western imports into their culture.
Since many of those trading in Ukraine have made an effort to 
translate their advertising campaigns into the local language {zawzhdy 
Koka Kola comes to mind), the linguistic effects of such new products may 
only reinforce the new orientation to the West. The social effects of 
Western imports, including not only American fast food, but French and 
German food and goods as well, should not be underestimated. The 
acceptance of foreign culture will mean a more ready acceptance of words 
from these donor cultures, and could therefore have significant linguistic 
consequences.
This is most readily observed already in computing vocabulary. No
Interview, July, 1996, SFC Max Duke, Kyiv.
This viewpoint, expressed by Professor Ermolenko in both interviews, is also analysed
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one really says drukhovka, but uses printer, as well as faks, kompiuter, 
vord (Word for Windows usually comes out as 'vord for vindoz') and 
others. This demonstrates the problem linguists face when trying to coin 
new terminology for Ukrainian, and find that foreign forms are already 
widely accepted and used.
Other areas manifest foreign influence as well: Ukrainians discuss 
seks, or refer to people as homoseksualhyi which are obvious borrowings. 
Such topics highlight another problem area, the open reference to sex and 
similar matters has always been taboo. With a more open culture gradually 
emerging, Ukraine is struggling to develop not only slang (a sure sign of 
democracy) but the mental attitude which accepts such things as part of 
an open society. In fact, when questioned, often Ukrainians will deny the 
presence of ‘rude’ or ‘vulgar’ slang, consigning sexual slang to the realm of 
the bedroom (where generally researchers are not welcome), or to the 
vocabulary of undesirables. Women are especially reluctant to supply 
words any stronger than the equivalent of English ‘darn’ but when pressed 
will admit that Ukrainian men have a rather extensive lexicon of curses at 
their disposal. Swearing in Ukrainian apparently tends to reflect a Russian 
influence most obviously in the young, who often simply swear in Russian, 
or to consist of folk sayings and expressions among older Ukrainians- 
which range from mild exclamations or nicknames to truly rude words.
This topic really must be addressed in further research, which could 
characterise emerging slang, if there is any, especially that which may be 
different from the Russian slang used by most young people. The 
willingness to discuss issues such as homosexuality, birth control, pre­
marital sex, or even disability or mental illness becomes less common with
in the article by Ihor Ostash in Quo Vadis Ukraino, previously cited.
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each successive age group. Here again, sociolinguistic methods would 
allow the parallel development of comfort dealing with these topics and 
new linguistic terms for them to be studied.
Particular areas of lexicon and language development are treated 
elsewhere, including media, publishing, education, and internal language 
issues (spelling, morphology, and terminology). The general language 
climate, and new questions and problems can be addressed more briefly. 
Recent work has shown that while many of the same concerns exist, 
social processes have opened the mythological box of Pandora for 
speakers of Ukrainian, and attitudes will have to change if they intend to 
discuss what they see in their own language.
Within the scope of this research, however, are general attitudes to 
terminology and the changing language, including a call from nearly 
everyone for a clean-up. Terminology has been set in every area, and a 
new dictionary is available, so it remains for the proper Ukrainian words to 
be used and adopted to replace Russianisms. Criteria for new words in 
Ukrainian seem widely shared among linguists and others concerned, 
including common-sense attitudes towards the lexicon and a widely- 
shared desire to eliminate or at least minimise Russian influence.
Everyone admits that language is, out of sheer necessity, a 
peripheral issue, a symbol of the national struggle. The economy is 
struggling to improve, and there are still many people below the poverty 
line. The language situation, therefore, is not only a reflection of other 
battles, but is also directly related inasmuch as it cannot improve until 
social problems are resolved.
With that in mind, significant progress has been made. Several
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years ago, many people were not aware that Ukraine was not part of 
Russia. Now Ukraine is able to compete on a world stage, as at the 
Olympics. As national morale improves with achievements internationally, 
the language problem can also improve.
At this stage, it is crucial that children begin to hear and speak 
Ukrainian so their ear and sense of the language can be restored. For 
older people, the ‘codes’ which are confused can be distinguished with 
teaching, so that people can be aware of what is Ukrainian and what is 
Russian. Furthermore, Ukrainians will follow the example of their leaders, 
in government and at work. If ‘bosses’ and MPs make an effort, as the 
President did, to speak Ukrainian, people will notice and use the language 
themselves. Finance exerts an influence on progress in all areas, as 
people need a motive, some kind of incentive to speak Ukrainian when 
many find speaking Russian easier. Such initiatives could be, as Arel 
admits, the threat of losing one’s career without the ability to speak the 
state language, or the possibility of failing an exam to enter university 
without competency in Ukrainian/^
These disparate threads of the current situation can be woven 
together to describe what is very much a work in progress. Some of the 
legislation is ambiguous, or gives attention to Russian when such 
references only highlight the divide that is present culturally, politically, 
regionally, and linguistically. While language is on one hand a mirror of 
problems present in other areas of society, it could, if adequate 
encouragement, planning, and initiative were present, be a powerful tool to 
bind the peoples of the new nation of Ukraine together.
77 Arel, (1995b), pp. 20-23.
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Chapter Three: Language and State-building in Ukraine
Six years after independence, Ukraine is still fighting a two-front war 
on its territory. The nagging problems of bilingualism, and the lack of total 
acceptance of Ukrainian as the state language linger, lurking behind every 
election campaign, education policy and media profits report. On the other 
side, the still-new Ukrainian state must find a way to bind its diverse 
population together into a cohesive and self-aware body, state-minded in 
its interests and reliably Ukrainian in its mentality. The second obviously 
compounds the first, exaggerating the linguistic divide between ethnic 
Ukrainians of different language orientations into a cultural divide, and 
potentially alienating ethnic Russians on Ukrainian soil who are citizens of 
the new republic. Language in Ukraine as one facet of nation-building 
could fulfil one of two contradictory functions: it may serve as a potential 
cement to bind together a multi-ethnic state, or conversely, the language 
issue may be the wedge that forces the nation apart. Thus, while language 
in education or in the media may not be as pressing an issue as actually 
funding either of these cultural institutions, the importance of language as 
a tenet of national identity, and further, national loyalty cannot be 
underestimated. Language is unavoidably a key player in the process of 
state-building in Ukraine, with potentially mixed consequences 
surrounding linguistic activity.
Language and National Identity:
The natural question arises, what makes up national identity? What 
makes citizens of Ukraine feel ‘Ukrainian’? First, one must distinguish 
between an ethnos and a nation. ‘Nation’ for the purposes of this 
discussion extends the definition of ethnos (effectively a group of related
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peoples with shared characteristics) to include self-consciousness and 
according to Arel, politicization^ This is an important distinction, as there 
need not be any dependence on territory: After all, there are many 
Ukrainians who do not live in Ukraine itself, and for many years the 
Ukrainian people did not have a state at all. This also preserves the 
distinction between nation and ‘state’, which is a political body and may be 
mono- or multi-ethnic. Secondly, one may identify various components 
which make up the identity of an ethnos, and consequently, the nation this 
group may form.^ These need not be universal, as some peoples place 
greater emphasis on religion, or homogeneous bloodlines or the presence 
(or absence) of a monarch. One problem with this idea in Ukraine is the 
persistent use of comparatives, and negatives in self-definition: one finds 
Ukrainians are ‘more’ this or that than the Russians, or that they are ‘not’ 
Russians and ‘not’ Poles.^ Walker Conner emphasises the importance of 
self-definition in classifying nations.
The state is the major political subdivision of the globe. And as such, it is 
readily defined, and... it is easily conceptualized in quantitative 
terms...Defining and conceptualizing the nation is much more difficult 
bcause the essence of a nation is intangible. This essence is a 
psychological bond that joins a people and differentiates it, in the 
subconscious conviction of its members..Even when one restricts nation to 
its proper, non-political meaning of a human collectivity, the ambiguity 
surrounding its nature is not thereby evaporated...Since the nation is a self­
defined rather than an other-defined grouping, the broadly held conviction 
concerning the group’s singular origin need not and seldom will accord with 
factual data.'*
Ukrainoznavstvo would seek to establish what Ukrainians are, only 
in reference to themselves. According to the definition of ‘Ukrainoznavstvo’ 
(literally, study of Ukraine) the national identity of Ukraine includes
 ^Arel, (1995b), p. 1.
 ^For a more complete discussion of ethnos as this concept relates to language, a good 
source is ‘Mova i Etnos’, by Svitlana Ermolenko, (1996).
 ^See further discussion of this use of comparatives in Chapter 2.
 ^Connor, (1994a), pp. 36-7.
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language, literature, religion, history, culture (material culture, folklore, and 
fine arts) and education®. Motyl suggests ‘shared belief in certain defining 
myths may be the best way of coming to terms with what a “Ukrainian” is 
or is likely to be’.® Language directly influences areas such as literature 
and education, but also has an affect on history, politics and the image of 
Ukraine abroad that may in turn resonate in other areas of culture. In the 
wake of Communism, there is ample ideological space for a new identity, 
but first terms must be re-defined in the language of democracy, and not in 
Soviet speak. However, this space means the Ukrainian ‘elites’ may forge 
whatever identity they chose, using whatever historical and culture 
symbols appeal.^
The task will not be easy. Motyl states, ‘Post-Soviet elites must 
therefore not only refashion neglected ethnic identities, but also forge 
thoroughly new national ones involving popular allegiance to myths and 
symbols that are neither narrowly ethnic nor conceptually vapid’.® Instead 
of two sides to the argument, there are at least four. First, there are ethnic 
Ukrainians who speak Ukrainian, whose position in favour of promoting 
their language is predictable, though the extent and nature of their support 
is not as is later explained. Second, there are Ukrainians who speak 
Russian as their native language, with some knowledge of Ukrainian either 
passively or as a second, foreign language. These citizens of Ukraine 
would fit any ethnic criteria had such been established by the Constitution, 
but may not be reliably pro-Ukrainian language, or anti-Russian for a
® Taken from a poster on the wall of Petro Petrovich Kononenko’s office, located in the 
Taras Shevchenko University in Kyiv. Ukrainoznavstvo is viewed as a tree with branches 
in all of these areas.
® Motyl, (1993), p. 7 
 ^Motyl, (1993), p. 76.
® Motyl, (1993), p. 79.
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number of reasons. Although many of these people voted for 
independence, their current voting behaviour and political/national loyalty 
is not predictable, especially if they begin to feel discrimination in the face 
of pro-Ukrainian language planning.® Third, one must count ethnic 
Russians who were relocated to Ukraine, or in some areas, whose families 
may have lived in Ukraine since the steppes were colonised. This group 
also may begin to feel alienated by pro-Ukrainian policy, which may in turn 
be compounded by loyalty to their ‘fatherland’. Finally, one must include 
Ukrainians in diaspora, who while not wielding any obvious political power, 
have certainly exercised financial and linguistic power in recent debates. 
Certain areas of Ukraine have high concentrations of other minorities, 
including Jews, Turks, Poles or Gypsies who will decide to use whichever 
language grants them the greatest opportunities in Ukraine. This further 
mixed group may eventually figure in the debate as both Russian and 
Ukrainian vie for dominance as the language of inter-ethnic 
communication in Ukraine. With such a disparate group of citizens in the 
new state, creating a national identity to suit them all must necessarily rely 
on linguistic or political/national criteria and not ethnicity, though language 
as an issue may prove difficult as long as Russian remains prevalent.
History and historiography may be profoundly affected by language 
policy, as language beliefs may in turn affect the view taken concerning 
one’s national history. Many historians, including Riasanovsky and 
Zenkovsky, refer to the early state centred in Kyiv as ‘Kievan Russia’, 
when Ukrainian historians refer to this state and time period as ‘Kyivan 
Rus” . Here language highlights a deeper issue, since Russia would like to
® March 1998 election results as available.
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claim an ancient origin, and has in the past co-opted Kyiv as the birthplace 
of the Russian state. One scarcely need remind historians that Kyiv was, 
and continues to be, in Ukraine. Ukrainian historians continue to assert 
that Muscovy had its origins in the thirteenth century, and cannot be 
counted as a nation before that time, while Russian historians assert that 
the Slavic peoples began as one group that branched into three nations, 
the Russians, the Ukrainians and the Belarusians. One could argue that 
the historical origins of each nation are not directly relevant, but with age 
comes legitimacy in the eyes of the Ukrainians, and ancient origins help 
justify the existence of Ukraine as an independent state, with its own 
separate language and culture. Connor adds that the belief in a separate 
origin and evolution forms an important aspect of national psychology. 
Ukrainian historiography, separate from Russian, Polish, or Soviet 
assertions can be traced to Kostomarov, author of ‘Dve Russkie 
narodnosti', and the serious challenges presented by Hrushevs’kyi’s major 
work, and also the work of earlier nineteenth-century historians such as 
Antonovych, Vladimirskii-Budanov, Bantysh-Kamenskii and Markevych. 
Their work began to erode the belief that the more ancient Russian 
population had migrated out of its Ukrainian homeland, or that the Poles 
had exerted a civilising influence on the otherwise barbaric ‘Ukrainian’ 
tribes.W ithout dwelling at length on the treatment of Ukrainian history, 
and indeed archaeology and political history, suffice it to say that the 
Ukrainian version of events places distinctly Slavic, even proto-Ukrainian 
peoples as the settlers of the territory of Ukraine, and as successful state- 
builders capable of interacting with the various tribes and states which
Connor, (1994a), pp. 36-7.
Historical assumptions encouraged by the Soviets, and previously the Poles and the
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surrounded and invaded this land throughout its prehistory and early 
history
This disagreement leads to another in foreign relations. Arel asserts 
that the perception of Ukraine’s history as ‘exclusive and victimized’ 
means that any relations with Russia will cast Ukraine as a victim: if one 
assumes the Ukrainian state is older, this must mean the Russian state 
conquered and exploited it and would continue to do so. Those of this 
opinion believe Russia will never view Ukraine as independent and 
equa l .Par t  of this is due to Russification, which encouraged Ukrainian 
language and Ukrainians themselves to become more Russian; 
additionally, Soviet policy furthered ‘denationalisation’, the loss of
peculiarly national traits while encouraging this merger with Russian. One 
could trace the sense of victimisation by Russia back as far as the 
Zaporozhian Sich, and its leader Bohdan Khmel’nyts’kyi. At the time of the 
Sich, Khmel’nyts’kyi first gained victory by defeating Poland, but was then 
made a vassal of Moscow. This provides enough evidence for some that 
union with Russia had been forced upon Ukraine before, and that no 
relationship was possible that did not involve force and defeat of 
Ukraine.
For Ukrainians, the loss of ‘Ukrainianness’ is as damaging and 
demoralising to the new state as Russification had been to the old Soviet 
republic. Writing in the late 1960s, Dziuba describes the effects of Stalin’s 
policies on the Ukrainian national consciousness:
A taboo has weighed upon them [Ukrainians, JEPT] for some thirty-five
Russian Empire are explored in depth in Magosci’s A History of Ukraine, (1996).
Magosci, (1996), especially Chapters 1-4.
Arel, (1995b), pp. 25-6. This is Arel's interpretation of the relevance of this dispute over 
the origins of Russia and Ukraine.
Armstrong, (1990), p. 4.
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years, so it is not at all surprising that they [nationalist sentiments] are so 
little developed among a considerable mass of the Ukrainian population, to 
the point that some Ukrainians, just as in pre-revolutionary days, know 
nothing of their national membership, and for a fair number, the concept of 
‘the Ukraine’ is nothing but an administrative-geographical term....a good 
number of Ukrainians are ashamed of their nationality and their language, 
and consider it rustic, ‘uncultured’, and third-rate...Even worse, how many 
Ukrainians have given up their native language and their national self- 
knowledge as proof of their ‘loyalty’ so as ‘not to stand out’, ‘not to be 
different’?^ ®
Ukrainian national policy, as supported by Ukrainian nationalists and 
patriots, would not only attempt to prevent further Russification, and undo 
the effects of the past, but must also attempt to encourage national 
characteristics and unique aspects of Ukrainian culture as they re-emerge 
and are reaffirmed by the public. The Russian government could be seen 
to support bilingualism or even Russification in Ukraine even at present by 
its policy of protecting not only ethnic Russians living in other countries 
and republics, but also Russian speakers.^® From the Russian side, this 
doubtless appears as concern for civil rights. For Ukrainians, this may 
arguably be seen as interference in their state affairs.
As both a national and nationalist issue, language policy has an 
unlimited ripple effect in Ukrainian society. Therefore, any measures 
adopted to increase the use and to spread the functional load of Ukrainian 
will eventually influence all aspects of daily life. Language laws and 
policies may start in the Institute of Ukrainian Language at the Academy of 
Sciences, or in the Verkhovna Rada. Newspapers and journals may 
independently undertake the use of Ukrainian, or may have to be nudged 
in that direction by laws and other incentives. Schools can choose their 
language of instruction based on both government dictates and the 
population of the area in which they are located. At any or all of these
Dziuba, (1968), pp. 53-54.
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levels, a number of outside forces act on public opinion and the resultant 
policy and legislation which in turn shape the linguistic climate in Ukraine.
One may summarise the overall effect of language choice as one of 
cultural loyalty. In theory, speakers may be expected to display some 
degree of loyalty to the culture of their native language. As discussed 
below, reasons for pressuring or encouraging Ukrainian citizens indicate 
that this belief holds among most supporters of Ukrainian language. For 
speakers of Russian, not only is local news about their own state 
available, but channels on television, and newspapers from Moscow. 
These Russian speakers may easily keep abreast of current events in 
neighbouring Russia, and become involved in political and social issues 
there as a result. Obviously this makes sense for ethnic Russians living in 
Ukraine, who may have family and friends on the other side of the border, 
(although given the extent of Soviet relocation practices, this is true for 
many nationalities including Ukrainians). For ethnic Ukrainians who speak 
Russian, only a subjective assessment is possible. One may look at their 
voting behaviour, or interview them about their cultural ties and identity. 
Further work could show that their Russian language loyalty may indeed 
translate into cultural or even political loyalty to Russia, but this remains an 
assumption. Given the proximity and shared history, those who wish to 
embrace European culture and politics may find any loyalty to Russia 
distressing. Thus, on a social and psychological level, language relates to 
more pragmatic concerns in foreign policy and ultimately to the success of 
Ukrainian independence.
In this as in other areas of language policy, interpretation of the
Taranenko, (1996b), p. 24.
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threat, posed by Russia and Russian language is entirely subjective. Arel, 
for example, believes the Ukrainian language is in less danger than 
Ukrainians imagine. Besides the ‘exclusive and victimized’ theory, he also 
suggests Ukrainians use this imminent threat as one defence of stringent 
language policy and so-called Ukrainisation. He characterises language 
politics as the ‘politics of threatened identity’.Karavansky, in contrast, 
comments ‘The language question in Ukraine is a question of its 
independence’."*® From this, it is apparent that those who feel a greater 
sense of encroachment and danger will be more adamant in their support 
of the promotion of Ukrainian, while others, most likely including Russian 
speakers, would not see the need to pass laws protecting Ukrainian or 
against the use of Russian.
Once one assumes language promotion is needed or desired, then 
further divisions in opinion occur as language policy may be guided by 
different approaches. In Ukraine, these are characterised by differing 
motives for the promotion of Ukrainian, and different bases for these 
motives. Among those bodies which may influence future language policy, 
and the enforcement of those laws already passed, two definite trends can 
be observed. First, a neo-Romantic movement is gaining momentum 
which places equal emphasis on the ‘mentalitet’ of the people, and the 
uniqueness of Ukrainian culture in the world. This viewpoint suggests that 
Ukrainian history, poetry, literature and indeed, the entire ‘destiny’ of 
Ukraine as a nation are inaccessible to those who do not speak Ukrainian. 
Believers in this ideology campaign for Ukrainian studies in foreign 
universities, and have as one goal the creation of Ukrainian schools in
^^Arel, (1995a), p. 597.
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Arel, (1993), pp. 176-
Russia.^®
In the neo-Romantic approach, one finds the concept of ethnos 
somewhat mythologised. Language is related to soul or spirit, or as 
Lyzanchuk states, the single greatest source of national spirit 
(dukhovnosf) is the native language^®. This outlook suggests speaking 
one's language is a patriotic duty, as is knowledge of history and literature, 
and a fervent patriotism or even nationalism. Language is also a mystical 
connection to one’s ancestors and their accomplishments in state-building, 
literature and culture. The mainstream of this movement comprises literary 
and historical scholars who consider themselves patriots first and 
foremost. Prokopiv, one scholar who falls under this category, writes that 
parents should encuiturate their children with Ukrainian national soul by 
teaching them their language, and that ‘real’ Ukrainians speak Ukrainian.^^ 
Scholars holding the same ideas as Prokopiv have devoted a great deal of 
effort to researching the origins of Ukrainian (and proving that it is older 
than Russian) and to finding ways the languages are not only different, but 
that Ukrainian is superior, either in its beauty or in its inherent morality 
(Russians zhenits’ia na nei, Ukrainians odruzhytysia z neiu, proving for 
these linguists that Russians do not respect their women as equal partners 
while Ukrainians do.)^^ This group enjoys both high-level support and 
popular appeal, as it quite rightly generates support and enthusiasm for 
national symbols including language and presses to create a national 
perception to apply both in Ukraine and abroad. At the time of writing, the
This relates to the notion of language rights, which minorities enjoy in Ukraine. In an 
area of compact settlement, a minority group may ask for schools in their language. 
Russians in Ukraine have this right; Ukrainians in Russia do not. (Ukrainain constitution, 
article 53).
Lyzanchuk, (1992).
Prokopiv, (1996).
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scholar Petro Petrovich Kononenko, the de facto leader of the 
Ukrainoznavstvo movement which encourages this kind of idealistic 
thinking, is an advisor to the President.
There is a small faction who also espouse more extreme views. 
Their ideas include Ukrainian origins for the ancient Aryan tribe, or that 
Ukrainians first domesticated the horse, or a unique view on the origin 
and antiquity of the Ukrainian language. One could mention Krasuskii, who 
theorises Ukrainian is older than Sanskrit,^^ or Zaharychuk, the author of 
the pamphlet. The Ukrainian Alphabet’ which suggests divine origins for 
the Ukrainian language "^ .^ Their works and others sharing their opinions 
influenced the radical elements of the Neo-Romantics. The presence of 
such opinions is tolerated by the mainstream, but only their patriotic zeal is 
ever praised. In fact, other scholars, both Neo-Romantic and Pragmatic in 
thought, express great concern if a foreigner begins to look interested in 
these radicals. Some of the more extreme members of this radical group 
are former dissidents, and have been detained for their activities so one 
cannot doubt the seriousness of their beliefs nor the extent to which they 
will support their ideology.
Some of what has been absorbed into Neo-Romantic doctrine in 
the past typified these dissident Ukrainians. Farmer notes ‘Ukrainian 
nationalist dissenters have articulated the belief that the Ukrainian
^  This example is given by O. Taranenko (1996b), p. 28.
Krasuskii’s discussion was originally printed in 1880 in Odessa and entitled ‘Drevnost’ 
Malorossiskogo iazyka’, reprinted in Indo-Evropa, No. 1,1991. Krasuskii is not alone in 
these assertions, as one interviewee suggested English had arisen from ancient 
Ukrainian, and that words could be found to support this theory such as umbrella' from 
'brillia’ (overhanging rock), or that ‘the same’ arose from Ukrainian te same. There is a 
canon of similar examples used by these linguists, most of which do not survive closer 
examination and are easily discredited with a knowledge of Indo-European or Latin.
Zaharychuk, (1961). Zaharychuk believes attempts to unite Russian and Ukrainian by 
origin are a vicious plot on the part of Russian speakers to deprive Ukraine of its heritage 
and history.
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language is an integral part of the Ukrainian national moral patrimony. 
By ‘moral patrimony’ one may assume Farmer means dissidents consider 
the language a vital sign of ‘Ukrainianness’, and as such, guaranteed by 
moral right to ethnic Ukrainians to be guarded and passed onto their 
children as an inheritance. Oddly, Stalin’s theories partially supported this 
moral’ claim by supporting Lenin’s national determinism policies on paper. 
His theories suggested national languages could serve as vehicles for 
communication, and as such merited language planning efforts in their 
support. The other element of Stalin’s minority language policy was not as 
conducive to the survival of national languages, as he predicted that 
national languages would give way to, rather than merge with, Russian. 
This controversy formed the basis for much of the protest and dissent 
surrounding his language policies in practice, as what he granted with one 
hand, he took away with the other.^®
While the proponents of Neo-Romanticism support an emotional 
and moral justification for their policy, which is formulated essentially on 
ethnic and cultural grounds, a second approach guides other scholars of 
Ukrainian language and culture and policy-makers, which can be called 
simply ‘Pragmatism’. These scholars concern themselves with the 
statistical balance of Ukrainian and Russian newspapers or schools, or 
with the content of dictionaries, or how correct the Ukrainian is that one 
hears on the street. This emphasises language as a political or 
sociological (and potentially expedient) means to unite a diverse and 
fractious country into a nation, as well as preserve the heritage of an 
ancient ethnos. Russian on the streets of Kyiv is not considered an anti-
Farmer, (1978), p. 125.
Farmer, (1978) p. 125.
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Ukrainian infraction as much as an aesthetic wound or a refusal or inability 
to participate fully in the new state. In this camp one finds campaigns for 
wider use of Ukrainian, and for an increase in the number of speakers who 
have an intimate grammatical knowledge of their language. This attitude 
incorporates much of the patriotism or nationalism one finds among neo- 
Romantics, but has its basis in political aims and ambitions for the new 
state, with sociological and nationally-minded justifications for the 
programme. Rather than adopt the view that Ukrainian is an ethnic 
marker, a necessary criteria for anyone who wishes to be considered 
‘Ukrainian’, Pragmatists consider the language a national trait, a political 
and social rather than ethnic criterion to mark who is ‘Ukrainian’, 
supported by language laws and the new Constitution.
Professor S. Ermolenko of the Ukrainian Faculty, Academy of 
Sciences comments that for a long time the view of Ukrainian held by 
native speakers was romanticised and idealised, with the beauty and 
purity of the language emphasised most. She feels such a non-objective 
view of the language disagrees with the social and sociological functions 
of Ukrainian, and that respect for the language should be built on what she 
considers the more solid grounds of common understanding and practice 
and the social prestige of a state language.^^ She continues by saying the 
strength of a state is in its national idea which is in turn bound to the status 
of its state language and an increase of civic awareness of this 
relationship. Her thoughts on Ukrainian folk songs and the history of 
Ukraine are less romanticised than those of the neo-Romantic school of 
thought. Ukrainians should hear these songs and know their history, in
Ermolenko. (1997b), pp. 1-2.
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order to feel at home in the Ukrainian state: 'Dim ioho Ukrayina, i mova 
ioho derzhavy—ukrayins’ka’.^ ®
Scholars espousing a pragmatic approach target areas which 
suffered particularly under Russification and plan practical ways to 
introduce more Ukrainian, or develop language policies which will redress 
the imbalance between Russian and Ukrainian schools and newspapers, 
which are out of proportion with the ethnic composition of the population. 
Above all, these Ukrainians wish to avoid what has been termed the ‘Irish 
variant’, when an independent state still speaks the language of its former 
conquerors and has no widely accepted language of its own.^®
Pragmatists are realistic concerning the global climate and 
international relations. Ermolenko comments that integration need not 
mean denationalisation. Ukrainian culture has a place among world 
cultures, and Ukrainian technical and scientific contributions may add to 
world knowledge. She asserts that individuals may speak as many 
languages as they choose, but whole societies must remain officially 
monolingual. This allows for individualism within integration, participation 
on the world stage without sacrificing national identity and integrity.®® One 
journalist adds to this idea by saying that the United States remains a 
cosmopolitan and international culture, but began as an Anglo-Irish culture 
which remains the basis for modern American culture. In Ukraine, a base 
culture is needed as well, allowing for this kind of internationalism and 
cosmopolitanism without incorporation.®^ Although the Canadian or 
Belgian model could serve for Ukrainian language planners, allowing two
‘His home is Ukraine, and the language of his state is Ukrainian’ (translation mine.) 
From Ermolenko, (1997b), pp. 1-2 
Taranenko, (1996b), p. 36.
^  Ermolenko, U997b), p. 5.
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State languages, such an approach would not promote Ukrainian as a 
state language. Especially as bi-lingualism in Ukraine is not totally regional 
in distribution, this could mean speakers would adopt the path of least 
resistance, or choose the language understood by all rather than part of 
the population. By following a British, or American or French model and 
supporting only one national language (official monolingualism), Ukrainian 
planners can support Ukrainian in a climate conducive to its spread and to 
the improvement of its status in the minds of speakers.
One finds scholars following a practical approach in the Academy of 
Sciences Ukrainian Language department. Among their recent writings. 
Department Head Professor Oleksandr Taranenko, the department head, 
and Professor Svitlana Ermolenko have analysed the new edition of the 
orthographical dictionary (the pravopys) and examined the changes made 
in the dictionary. Here the pragmatic approach is particularly useful: the 
new edition of the dictionary contains many compromises, and is overall 
an attempt to further correct earlier, Russified versions while not reverting 
to the archaic (but still popular in the diaspora) 1928 edition. Controversial 
spellings and forms are quantifiable, definite problems which require 
careful consideration to produce a work that is both accurate in its 
reflection of modern Ukrainian, and also user-friendly, simple and stable. 
These scholars are no less patriotic than their more vocal counterparts; 
rather their ambitions for the language lead them to produce examples of 
good Ukrainian for the public to read and hear and to promote Ukrainian 
while highlighting areas which still need improvement.
One can also surmise from reading a number of papers by
Vecherny Kyiv., online, 3 May 1997.
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members of both camps that much of the ‘radical’ writing occurs around 
the time of Ukraine’s independence, when patriotic zeal ceased to be 
controlled by Soviet censorship. Karavansky, whose diagnostic work can 
be called Pragmatic, at this time writes poetry and civic-minded 
discussions about the Ukrainian state with a more radical tone than his 
later works. Writing in 1991,1.B. Usenko connects language problems with 
related issues of national rebirth and civil rights. Opinions and writings of 
earlier scholars are presented in light of independence as guides for those 
seeking to improve the status of Ukrainian at this time.^^ Another article 
from the same year adopts a very serious and religious tone, calling for 
linguistic patriotism and freedom of speech. He laments the 'padinnia 
kurtury (dumbing down) in Ukraine, encouraged by post-Soviet inertia and 
a lack of knowledge of Ukrainian. While this article does contain Biblical 
references and a nod to Shevchenko (Traditsii Shevchenko—traditsii 
zdorovoho opozytsiinoho dukhu), it would be difficult to determine if the 
author indeed belongs to the neo-Romantic ideology, or if his interest 
remained in linguistic problems rather than keeping the words of 
Shevchenko alive in Ukraine.^^
Usenko, (1991), pp. 51-5. It is interesting that the following article in the same issue of 
the Visnyk is entitled ‘Returning to the Source’, a profile of the Academy of Sciences in 
Ukraine and its task concerning the Ukrainian language. Perhaps the editor feared the 
readership had forgotten the existence of the Academy as a reguiatory or linguistic 
advisory body in Ukraine.
^  ‘The tradition of Shevchenko is a tradition of healthy opposition’, from Sverstiuk, 
(1991), pp. 456-63.
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Key traits of Pragmatism and Neo-Romanticism:
Found in the National Academy of Associated with Taras Shevchenko 
Sciences University
Political and social criteria determine who Ethnic and linguistic criteria determine 
is Ukrainian who is Ukrainian
Evoke national identity, survival of the Evoke the unique history and spirit of the 
state, official status of the Ukrainian Ukrainian nation, the ‘dusha narodu’ and 
language as justification ‘dolia narodu’ as justification
Most prominent member: Professor O. Most prominent member: Petro Petrovich 
Taranenko, Ukrainian Language Kononenko, head of Ukrainoznvstvo 
department of National Academy of movement 
Sciences
Main goal: to promote Ukrainian language Main goal: to promote Ukrainoznavstvo at 
as the state language of Ukraine home and abroad, to ‘win back’ Russian-
speaking Ukrainians
Although the preceding discussion highlights the contrast between 
Neo-Romanticism and Pragmatism, these distinctions between 
ideologies/theories are not absolute, by any means, laremiichuk, writing in 
1996 when one expects more moderate comments from Pragmatic 
authors nevertheless makes several statements which could place him in 
the Neo-Romantic camp. He says. Raise onto the highest pedestal the 
NATIONAL IDEA’, and ‘We must cease to fear the expression UKRAINE 
IS FOR UKRAINIANS’. Read out of context, these remarks and others 
suggesting a department of Ukrainian ideology, Mr. laremiichuk sounds 
like many of those writing under the auspices of Ukrainoznavstvo. Yet he 
adds that love for one’s nation (narod) is no longer the stuff of negative 
Soviet propaganda, and that ‘Ukrainian’ should mean all citizens of 
Ukraine, regardless of their ethnic origins. Here, he establishes himself as
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a pragmatist of liberal ideals.^ Radicals still exist, of course, in both 
sectors but time has tempered the Pragmatists for the most part so that 
most of the writings one finds after 1992-3 are less oratory in nature, and 
more factual or descriptive/prescriptive. Those writing in connection with 
Ukra^inoznavstvo, however, often include the potted histories and 
references to Shevchenko, Franko and the Cossacks in their more recent 
publications.
Another author suggests that Russian language need not be a one­
way ‘bridge’, leading Ukrainians away from Ukrainian culture. Instead it 
may also act as a means of bringing Ukrainians who speak Russian back 
into Ukrainian culture. The author goes on to lament the presence of 
atheists in Ukraine and suggests religion as a means of support for the 
language, along with following national traditions. One would expect to find 
romantic musings in an article entitled ‘Movne samostverdzhennia 
ukraintsiv na tii istorychnoho dosvidy narodiv svity\ but the author 
includes several pragmatic points in his discussion. He ends the article by 
encouraging both ethnic Ukrainians and non-ethnic Ukrainians to embrace 
and strengthen national traditions and culture, especially the language, for 
the sake of unity and cooperation,^® further evidence that the distinction 
between Neo-Romanticism and Pragmatism is not absolute. More 
investigation may establish regional, age-related or other criteria which 
may predict the viewpoint a given author would most likely espouse. It is 
more reasonable to suppose that as in every field and ideology, there are 
extremes at both ends and a great many people in the middle.
Both of these trends influence language and social policy in Ukraine
^  laremiichuk, (1996,) pp. 15-19. Translation mine. 
Tkachenko, (1993), pp. 56-64.
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and shape the perception other countries have of Ukraine as a state. It is 
difficult to trace this influence, however, as both schools are connected 
with institutions which are officially consulted by the President and the 
Verkhovna Rada on language policy, but it is impossible to discern which, 
if either, are able to push their policies forward. Both camps must be 
mindful of the picture their policies and recommendations generate. 
Internally, there is the danger of alienating Russian-speakers of either 
Ukrainian or Russian ethnicity, instead of convincing these people to ‘buy 
into' the state. Abroad, enthusiasts of the Neo-Romantic approach may 
find their policies coolly received by foreign scholars and politicians who 
distrust what may be interpreted as extremism or nationalism. However, 
the Ukrainian language may well serve as a useful banner to fly as a 
rallying point for those who wish to express support for their nation, when 
later it may simply be another mark of uniqueness for a more secure and 
nationally self-aware state. For this reason, foreign observers must not be 
too quick to ridicule or criticise those writings which seek to enshrine the 
dusha naroda’ or the ‘mentalitet i dolia’ of Ukraine; rather one must 
remember that new states need this kind of fervour to generate 
enthusiasm in the populace. It is possible to praise the practical, solution- 
oriented approach of the pragmatists without wholly decrying the excesses 
of the Neo-Romantics in their nationalist enthusiasm.
As stated above, both camps display support for the new Ukrainian 
state and what they refer to as ‘nationalism’. Before discussing nationalism 
in Ukraine, and its relationship to language policy, the term must be 
clarified. Armstrong adopts a political definition of the term: the doctrine 
that persons of a distinctive culture should constitute an independent
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state.^® He dates Ukrainian nationalism from the eighteenth century, 
culminating with Taras Shevchenko as the main spokesman by the middle 
of the nineteenth century. Political nationalism in the form of political 
groups appeared later, at the start of the twentieth century. Though the 
politics of nationalism are best left to political scientists, Armstrong's 
analysis does merit some comment, as he writes in 1990 when these 
aspirations had not yet reached fruition.
He seeks to discover what stimulates nationalism in Ukraine. The 
Ukrainian Orthodox Church is not a reasonable source, since it was 
founded as the result of Ukrainian nationalism. Another possibility is the 
distinctiveness of folk customs in Ukraine, including differences in village 
organisation compared to Russia. In Ukraine, repartition (the periodic re­
distribution of land belonging to a village amongst the peasants, commonly 
practiced in Russia) was not practised, so one could theorise stronger ties 
to the land, and a more developed sense of individual ownership could 
qualify as distinguishing traits in Ukraine. Armstrong dismisses language 
as a factor, mostly because Russian was familiar to educated Ukrainians 
even though Ukrainian existed as a literary language and was also used 
exclusively in villages.
Armstrong settles on historical tradition as the banner of Ukrainian 
nationalism. Shevchenko remains torch-bearer, assisted by other poets 
and writers including Kostomarov and Franko, though title of ‘Father of 
Ukrainian Nationalism’ goes to Mikhail Hrushevs’kyi. Historical tradition 
emphasises Ukrainians’ heritage from Kyivan Rus’, which is now lost or 
co-opted by Russia. Perhaps even more important is the Zaporozhian
Armstrong, (1990),p. 1,
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Sich, previously mentioned as a source of resentment towards Russia, but 
also a significant example of Ukrainian independence and early attempts 
at state-building.^^
For an English speaker, the term ‘patriotism’ might better express 
what Ukrainians would term ‘nationalism’, since the English word 
‘nationalism’ has inherited a negative semantic connotation in this century, 
particularly after World War II. Nationalism in the Ukrainian sense would 
be better defined as loyalty to and support of one’s nation. This includes 
an ethnic component that one would not necessarily associate with 
patriotism, which implies loyalty to and support of one’s state regardless of 
the ethnic origin of its citizens. Dobriansky comments on Nationalism in 
Ukraine as follows:
That is, after being subjected to decades of the sameness—with all creativity 
being suppressed by the state— many felt the need to manifest in both 
positive and negative ways, their own uniqueness and differences. This is 
one of the fundamental reasons for the blossoming of ethnicity and many 
versions of nationalism on the continent.^®
Dobriansky distinguishes between ‘good’ nationalism, ‘a unifying 
force which can reinforce a country’s sovereignty and identity, as well as 
instil a strong sense of community and patriotism’ or ‘bad’ nationalism, 
which is
inherently ethnocentric and, consequently, threatens ongoing democratic 
consolidation...can cause “extreme” or “malignant” social and political 
consequences, suppressing, often brutally, other cultures for the sole 
purpose of strengthening its own.®®
Nationalism in Ukraine has many faces. Rukh, the ‘Popular 
Movement of Ukraine for Restructuring’, means to encourage solid
Armstrong, (1990), pp. 3-5.
®® Dobriansky, P., (1995), p. 36.
®® Dobriansky, P., (1995), p. 36.
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national identity while promoting tolerance of minorities and democratic 
growth. There are political extremists among Ukrainian nationalists, such 
as the Ukrainian National Assembly (UNA) and its military arm, the 
Ukrainian People’s Self-Defence Organisation, UNSO, who believe that 
Ukraine is for ethnic Ukrainians a!one."^ °
Ukrainian nationalism can be looked at from a variety of viewpoints. 
Obviously, Ukrainians, particularly Ukrainian-speaking ones, will not feel 
threatened by policies which encourage the use of their native language 
as a state language, and which promote it over other languages. For 
Russian-speakers of any ethnic origin, such policies may appear 
discriminatory. Some Russian speakers feel alienated by the hostile tone 
in some of the Ukrainian press towards Russia (though this is generally 
hostility towards the Russian state, and only veiled hostility towards ethnic 
Russians, if any at all is present), and consider themselves members of 
both cultures. Arel comments on the view taken by some Ukrainian 
nationalists of Russian-speaking Ukrainians:
Ukrainian nationalists, who, by definition, identify with the Ukrainian 
language and culture, treat Russophone Ukrainians as “victims” of Russian- 
Soviet policy at best. Increasingly, however, the Russophone Ukrainians are 
being referred to as “denationalized” beings who do not know who they are, 
or as “Little Russians”...who like to defer to and be dominated by the “elder 
brother” the Great Russians. Nationalists are convinced that their “Russified” 
brethren will “re-acquire their national consciousness only throuoh the 
I 'krainian language, i.e. only if they t-eg'n to “re 'dentify” with Ukrainian
Russian speakers who are ethnic Ukrainians must not be assumed 
to hold this opinion of themselves. They may resent Ukrainian speakers 
referring to Russian as a foreign language in Ukraine, and would prefer a
Dobriansky, P., (1995), pp. 39-41. Additional information on the subject of Ukrainian 
nationalist organisations may be found in Motyl, Dihmmas for Ukraine (as previously 
cited) chapter 3, or in writings by the groups of pef$'onaWies themselves, such as 
Krastorfy iMeQfiem. by Dmitry Don+sov, or Political Thaijgt&of the Ukrainian. 
Underground, 1943-1951 (OUN), eds Potichnyisnd Shtendera,(i986).
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political or territorial interpretation of the term ‘Ukraine’, with a national but 
not ethnic criteria for membership in ‘Ukrainian’ citizenry. The language 
issue has appeared in elections as a plank in the platform of most Eastern 
and Southern candidates for Parliament, not necessarily because Russian 
speakers wish to gain political influence for themselves or Moscow, but
L t
because many of them have expressed ‘not feeling at home’ in Ukraine.“^  ^
For these people, Ukrainian nationalism is interpreted as pro-Ukrainian, 
anti-Russian.
The Russian-speaking population influences policy and the 
linguistic climate by merely being present. Most universities and schools 
have staff who have taught for many years and are talented teachers, but 
who are Russian-speaking. This puts directors of educational institutions 
in the tricky position of deciding whether to allow a teacher to continue to 
lecture in Russian, or to remove a teacher for not speaking Ukrainian 
when there may be no acceptable replacement. There are special classes 
which for retraining which re-educate personnel and increase their 
knowledge of Ukrainian, and some pedagogical institutes now operate 
solely in Ukrainian, but this problem will take at least a generation to solve. 
In the classroom itself, teachers are faced with students who have 
Russian-speaking parents and may not feel comfortable reciting in 
Ukrainian, or who are baffled by Ukrainian translations after years of 
reading in Russian. Therefore, in lessons one may hear Russian from 
students or teachers even in Ukrainian schools purely by necessity and 
not as the result of any Moscophile or anti-Ukrainian leanings.
Because of such ethnic and linguistic differences, controversy still
Arel, (1995b), p. 3. 
“^ Arel, (1995b), pp. 11-12.
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plagues language law in Ukraine, including the Constitution. It is expected 
that language policy will once again play a key role in the upcoming 
elections, though at present the Russian population is too thoroughly 
scattered in Ukraine to unite and present a collective voting bloc. Russian 
speakers do make up a dense segment of the population in the South and 
East, and as such, are able to get their opinions heard and their demands 
noted. Even with Article 10 hammered out in the Constitution, the 
Ukrainian language may not be safe in its position as the single state 
language. Already two drafts of the language development policy sent to 
the Parliament by linguistic advisors have been rejected, with the rejection 
of the third draft looming as it does not make many concessions to 
Russian-speakers.^^ There is still room for the acceptance of Russian as 
the second state language, or as an ‘official’ language which would be 
essentially the same, and would allow teachers, media personnel and 
state workers to continue their use of Russian with no incentive to change. 
In Kharkiv, for example, a resolution was passed allowing the city 
administration, media, businesses (in their offices and advertisements) to 
use Russian along with Ukrainian. Current statistics show 69.9% of the 
inhabitants of this city consider their native language Russian, while 
28.96% consider their native language Ukrainian. This refusal to uphold 
the Constitution and use Ukrainian in all the functions associated with a 
state language shows why it is difficult to enforce even the best language 
policies in Ukraine."^ By not taking decisive action in support of Ukrainian,
Although the author has not seen this third draft (nor has It appeared in print as of the 
time of writing), Professor Taranenko was in possession of the document in October 1997 
and although he was reluctant to discuss the text of the draft law, he was very clear that 
he did not expect it to be approved by the Verkhovna Rada.
^  The linguistic situation in Kharkiv is discussed at length in Murometseva and 
Murometsev, (1996). It is also discussed with reference to the city council’s decision to
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the president has left the floor open for such liberal interpretations of the 
law. In short, the Kharkiv city council has been allowed to ignore language 
laws and the constitution and instead endorse the status quo."^ ® Indeed, 
the lack of a response by the Verkhovna Rada may be taken as tacit 
approval for what appears to be an attempt to force a re-think of the 
language policy enshrined in the Constitution. Part of the blame for the 
mixed situation in Kkharkiv thus lies with the Verknovna Rada, who have 
passed legislation on language without also instituting a means of 
enforcing their policy."^ ®
The presence of Russian occurs in a largely predictable pattern, so 
much so that one can almost quantify its influence in a number of spheres, 
and therefore predict where changes in language policy may cause 
greatest tension or generate greatest resistance. For example, 
linguistically the South and East were more Russified than either the West 
or the Centre under the Soviets."^  ^ One also expects more Russian- 
speakers in cities than in the countryside in all of these areas. Politically, 
there are more Russian speakers in the Communist party (which is almost 
exclusively mono-lingually Russian speaking) regardless of region.*^ ®
The Catholic Church, the Ukrainian Auto-Cephalous Orthodox 
Church and the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow patriarchy) all use
allow Russian to function as a de facto official language in ‘Syndrom menshovartosty, 
abo lak Kharkivs’ka mis’ka rada zrosiishchue Ukrainy’, in Shliax Peremohy, 3(229), 16 
January, 1997.
Some positive changes have occurred in schools, with more Ukrainian schools 
opening. At the city administration level, the authors express concern and dismay at the 
support for Russian over Ukrainian as the language of business and city governance. 
'^^Muromtseva and Murometsev, (1996), pp. 19-22.
There is sometimes disagreement about this area of Ukraine, as originally the steppes 
were colonised by a variety of ethnic groups. In such cases, one usually finds an 
international community will communicate using the most prestigious language available 
to them. In this area, this language was Russian. This does not mean these areas were 
exempt from the same Russification efforts practised elsewhere.
Taranenko, (1996b), pp. 36-46.
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Ukrainian (though the Russian Church may use some Russian, particularly 
in Russian-speaking areas), and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv 
patriarchy) uses either Russian or Ukrainian, depending on the region."^ ® 
This division is more substantial than it may appear. The Uniate Catholic 
church in Western Ukraine served for two centuries as an important aspect 
of Ukrainian identity, as it is preserves orthodox rite, and therefore 
distinguishes Ukrainians from Catholic Poles in that area. It further 
separated Ukrainians in Western Ukraine from Russians, since the Uniate 
church is subordinate to the Pope. In the East, the Uniate church has not 
had a historical presence, mostly due the powerful influence of the 
Russian Orthodox Church. The Ukrainian Orthodox church was absorbed 
into the Russian Orthodox church in the eighteenth century, though a 
Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox church was founded in 1920. After its 
liquidation in the USSR by the Soviets, it was re-established in 1990. 
Additionally, the Russian Orthodox Church in Ukraine re-named itself the 
Ukrainian Orthodox Church, and in Kyiv merged with the Autocephalous 
Church. At present, this means that the West is largely Uniate, while the 
East remains Ukrainian Orthodox.
Theoretically, all universities are Ukrainian, and all dissertations 
must be submitted in Ukrainian, though this is not universally true. Lower 
schooling is conducted in the language of the area, which means that 
Western schools are predominantly Ukrainian, while Southern and Eastern 
areas have fewer than half of their schools operating with instruction in
One should note that the use of Ukrainian by the Russian Orthodox Church may not be 
as generous as it first appears. This church obviously feels the influence of Moscow- 
based policies, and may be of the opinion that its interests will be better served by using 
the local language rather than Russian to get its message heard and received as non- 
hostile.
Motyl, (1993). pp. 8-9.
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Ukrainian.®^
Language usage in the media is more complex in its distribution, 
though one can assume state stations on radio and television broadcast 
mainly in Ukrainian-and have vastly improved in quality even in the last 
twelve months. Private stations generally broadcast in Russian. Some 
stations are multi-lingual, particularly in multi-ethnic areas where one may 
find Hungarian or Polish for several hours a day in addition to Russian or 
Ukrainian broadcasts. The picture becomes even more complex when one 
examines the total hours broadcast in Russian or Ukrainian, when it 
becomes clear that Russian is still dominant especially on the radio. ORT 
is no longer the first channel, and Ukrainian television presents a number 
of popular imports translated into Ukrainian which may help to increase 
the number of hours of Ukrainian-language television. Journals do not 
demonstrate such a poor record in adopting the state language, though 
there are still more Russian-language journals available per capita for 
Russian speakers that Ukrainian ones. Advertisements in public places 
tend to be in Ukrainian, as are product labels, though there are some 
Russian signs and plenty of English logos.®^  While one could surmise 
Ukrainian is gaining ground in some areas, Russian remains prevalent in 
all areas of life.
The Autonomous Republic of Crimea merits examination, as it 
represents a thumbnail sketch of linguistic problems nation-wide for 
Ukraine. Although this area originally was the home of the Crimean Tatars, 
it was conquered by Russia in the eighteenth century. Consequently, the 
Tatar population dropped sharply from 83% in 1793 to only one-quarter by
Education is covered at length in Chapter Five.
“  Most of this information is readily apparent to the casual observer, though for more in-
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the 1920s. This area was granted the status of an autonomous republic 
under Soviet rule, but suffered deportation of the native population for 
allegedly collaborating with the invading Nazis. Then, in 1954 Krushchev 
gave Ukraine the Crimea as a gift, marking the anniversary of Bohdan 
Khmel'nyts'ky's ‘surrender to’ or ‘union with’ (depending on whose 
version) Tsar Aleksei and Russia. This area remains a linguistic hotspot 
for a number of reasons. Post-war settlement patterns mean that the 
current population of Crimea is two-thirds Russian and one-fourth 
Ukrainian, while Tatars themselves have only recently begun to return. 
With such a mixed history and a mixed pedigree, and given its special 
status within Ukraine, this territory cannot help but complicate any 
attempts to forge a national identity, and to institute Ukrainian as the 
language of daily life and official business alike.
The effectiveness of Soviet language planning policy, and 
subsequent reluctance on the part of Ukrainian policy-makers to ‘dé­
colonisé’ (ie, deport or absorb the Russian population) after provides 
another reason for the continued prominence of Russian. Sorokowsky’s 
profile of discrimination in Ukraine shows that more Russians were 
promoted to high positions in their jobs and in the government, more 
Russians received higher education and more Russians entered the ‘non­
productive’ sector of employment (health, education, science and art). 
Ukrainians who did complete their higher education degrees tended to 
work outside Ukraine, including over a third of Ukrainian scientists.^ In 
1997, this pattern appears to have continued. Vecherny Kyiv cites figures 
as follows: In the army, 90% of top officer positions and 60% of senior and
depth information one could consult Taranenko, (1996b). 
”  Motyl, (1993), pp. 10-1.
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middle officers are ethnic Russians. Only one of every seven directors of 
Ukrainian companies is Ukrainian. Even the Academy of Sciences has 
only seventy-six Ukrainians employed as academics, out of a total of over 
two hundred academics. These recent figures show that out of every one 
thousand people in national groups in Ukraine who have received higher 
education, eighty-five are Ukrainian and one hundred fifty-eight are 
Russian. Among Jews, this figure reaches over three-hundred fifty. 
These figures show that the Soviets were thorough in their ‘weeding out’ of 
alleged Ukrainian nationalists, while the government of independent 
Ukraine has thus far been very tolerant of Russians present in Ukraine, 
thus preserving these imbalances. The success of Russians in Ukraine in 
business and education indicates that the higher social status of many 
Russians may lead to their influence. Even if they remain an ethnic 
minority, or become a decisive linguistic minority (which Arel feels they are 
not®®) ethnic Russians have managed to keep positions of relative 
authority in Ukraine and may dictate to their subordinates more directly 
than the President or his linguistic commission may ever hope to.
When listing influences and trends in Ukrainian social and linguistic 
thinking and policy-making, one must not forget the Ukrainians who live in 
other countries but continue to wield considerable financial power in 
Ukraine itself. One must consider when forming a definition of ‘Ukrainian’ 
whether these members of the diaspora community qualify as ‘Ukrainian’ , 
and if so, what their input into the building of a new identity and new state 
should be despite their absence from the country itself (ie, should there be 
a political weight given to the ethnic heritage of the diaspora). This raises
^  Sorokowsky, (1985), pp. 184-95.
Babylchuk, (1997).
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the important question of residence as a component of national identity, 
and with the size and collective influence of the Ukrainian diaspora to 
consider, it is likely that this problem will not be immediately resolved.
Tension remains between diaspora Ukrainians and indigenous 
Ukrainians, as many Ukrainians in Ukraine feel the diaspora deserted their 
country, and have failed to return, bringing their profits and businesses 
with them. In contrast, some diaspora Ukrainians consider those who 
remained in Ukraine heavily Russified, their language tainted by 
association with Russian during the Soviet period. Others are shocked and 
upset that Ukraine has changed during their absence, while indigenous 
Ukrainians are baffled that the diaspora appear to expect to be greeted in 
peasant dress with traditional bread and salt.^  ^The cultural consequences 
of this difference of opinion are obvious, though the linguistic effect of the 
diaspora is complex and not as straightforward.Many of those who left 
Ukraine, especially before World War II in the earlier wave of immigration, 
originated in Western Ukraine, which means that their spoken Ukrainian 
differs from the Kyiv-Poltava standard in a number of features. Compound 
this with many years in a foreign country, and one finds two fairly distinct 
versions of Ukrainian. However, one must contrast problems differences 
create with the usefulness of Ukrainian language press and printing in 
Europe, Canada and America during the Soviet era, when Ukrainian 
language printed matter was very hard to find indeed in Ukraine itself. 
Furthermore, Ukrainian language press and printing still receive a great 
deal of financial and technical support from the diaspora, where over the
“ Arel, (1993), pp. 600-02.
Interview with S. Ermoienko, October 1997. She voiced common complaints heard 
among Ukrainains in Ukraine.
“  Linguistic traits of diaspora speech, which is usually assumed to be based up on
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years scholars developed textbooks and dictionaries far from Stalin’s anti- 
Ukrainian activities.®®
This introduces another influence on language policy that carries 
over into other areas of state policy as well-the whole-hearted rejection of 
all things Russian. Politically, one may observe Ukraine’s interest in 
NATO, the Council of Europe (of which it is now a member), and the 
European Union, while at home this trend manifests itself in the lexicon, as 
anything that suggests Russian is susceptible to pruning by linguists 
working on dictionaries.®®
In previous years, the greatest foreign influence indisputably came 
from Russia and the Russian language. With Russia still a close 
neighbour, and still noteworthy as a political influence (particularly on the 
Left), Russia’s influence on Ukrainian culture and society has hardly 
faded. Even so, European and America culture has a substantial impact 
due to its increasing popularity. Ukraine imports goods from France, 
Germany, and English-speaking countries and often imports vocabulary 
along with the products. Though Russian still looms large in the media 
and in politics, English is gaining strength as a donor language, with a 
relatively weak purist reaction (or at least an ineffective one) against these 
imports. For one thing, signs on public buildings which used to be in 
Ukrainian and Russian now appear in Ukrainian and English. McDonald’s,
Galician Ukrainian, are discussed in Chapter Six.
One could mention here a study discussed in Bohdan Azhniuk’s "Dvomovnist" u 
diaspori: konflikt chy symbioz loial’nostei?’ in Movoznavstvo : Tretii Mizhnarodnyi Kongres 
Ukrainistiv, Kharkiv, (1996), pp. 3-13, concerning the attitudes of the diaspora and their 
dual identity. An interesting contrast occurs in a 1914 issue of Svoboda, reprinted in the 
Ukrainian Quarterly, Vol. L, no. 1 Spring 1994. Guidelines for Ukrainian parents are listed, 
including The Ukrainian child should associate exclusively with Ukrainian children and 
speak only Ukrainian when in their company’. Every family should try to bring back those 
members who have fallen away from Ukrainian traditions’, and The family should read 
Ukrainian books in unison during the long winter evenings’.
A discussion of purism, the trend against Russian and other internal language issues
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Coca-Cola, Pepsi and Levi’s have decorated the capital with their 
advertisements and logos (though content labels appear in Ukrainian). 
Probably 50% of popular music played on the radio is English or 
American, with the rest being mostly Russian and some Ukrainian, French 
and Italian. Even foreign products from Germany or Turkey such as 
chocolates use English on their labels. What may eventually translate into 
an advantage over Russian is the fashionable lure of English, coupled with 
a desire to seem more European and less Slavic on the part of the 
younger generation®^
Here stereotypes and perceptions play a large role in attracting 
young people towards foreign imports and away from Russian.
Nearly all of the interviewees comment that one expects the babushka and 
didushka generation to speak Russian in cities, as they have probably 
been relocated to work there by the Soviets and are now too old to learn 
Ukrainian. One frequently hears the complaint that everyone can 
understand Ukrainian but simply cannot speak it. Those who have not 
benefited from higher education often converse in Russian or in the 
surzhyk, as they associate Ukrainian with the peasants who flock to the 
markets, and with village life and wish to distance themselves by sounding 
as Russian as their knowledge will allow, or using only as much Ukrainian 
as they need to do business. Their refusal to use Ukrainian in turn angers 
or offends the educated, who consider their fluency in Ukrainian a mark of 
patriotism, refinement and loyalty- and a sign of their willingness to 
support their new state. For the educated and the young, English is seen
occurs in Chapter Six.
This occurs not only in terms of fashion or new vocabulary. Politically and in the eyes of 
the world community, one hears rhetoric firmly planting Ukraine in Europe juxtaposed 
against the threat of Russia and the East.
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as a passport to the world community, led by America on the financial and 
industrial fronts and Europe on the cultural front. There are more 
textbooks of business English than Russian, German and Ukrainian 
textbooks combined on the streets of Kyiv, which testifies to the 
importance learning this foreign language has for ambitious Ukrainians.®^ 
Another facet of this apparent susceptibility to foreign influence is 
the desire on the part of those creating Ukraine's foreign policy to 
participate fully in the world community as a respected member. Generally, 
this means Ukraine would like to be associated with Europe, and not with 
Russia or the East. Rhetoric on this topic often concerns the strategic 
importance of Ukraine for nuclear powers like the United States, but it can 
also include Neo-Romantic historiography on the common origins of 
Ukrainian and European languages.®®
Does this acceptance of foreign words and slang indicate that a 
trend towards the de-ritualisation of Ukrainian may manifest itself? While 
there is a great deal of emphasis on the purity of Ukrainian (hence the 
anti-Russian sentiment) and its integrity as the language of Shevchenko 
and Franko, the younger generation will hardly be induced to embrace a 
language that will not allow the discussion of homosexuality, sexual 
liberation, contraception, disability and modern culture® .^ Although as 
previously stated, it is next to impossible to convince a Ukrainian to 
divulge such ripe language, an observant researcher may notice in 
addition to Russian words, Ukrainian and imported slang' adorns public
Ermoienko, (1997b), and (1997a).
Dobriansky, P., (1995) pp. 34-43; or Holowinsky, (1994), pp. 13-20. Both show this 
kind of thinking. Dobriansky in particular is quick to assert that Ukrainian nationalism 
poses no threat to the West and has been misunderstood and misrepresented in the
past.
This discussion appears in Chapter 2.
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walls, suggesting Ukrainian may be employed in a variety of situations. 
Though some may bemoan the sullying of Ukrainian, slang and modern 
terminology both indicate the vibrancy and wide appeal of a language, and 
as such, are a positive sign. This process has consequences for society, 
when new concepts produce a demand for a new word, which in turn 
establishes the acceptability of new ideas. The more modern and viable 
Ukrainian becomes, the more it is able to reinforce Ukrainians' perception 
of themselves as modern, cosmopolitan citizens of the European 
community, a dramatic shift in identity from the idealisation of Ukraine as a 
peasant-homeland full of beautiful folk melodies and waving fields of grain. 
It also means a shift away from the East, and Russia’s influence. For now, 
the tension continues both culturally and linguistically between the ‘folk’ 
(narocf) and international/European elements in Ukrainian.®®
What role must the Ukrainian language play in a modern Ukrainian 
state? Clearly, there are issues yet to be resolved concerning the status of 
Russian and widespread bilingualism. This shows that some segments of 
the population remain to be convinced that their future success is 
inherently linked to their knowledge and active use of Ukrainian in every 
situation. Therefore, the first step to uniting the population on the linguistic 
front is the provision of incentives to speak Ukrainian, and only Ukrainian. 
Already students at Lyceum level are cautioned that their Russian will not 
be tolerated at university level, though the same students may be 
bemused to hear lectures in Russian once they enrol. Perhaps lecturers 
and teachers also need stronger incentives than Ukrainian-speaking 
headmasters and mistresses, though this also works well.
Taranenko, (1996b), p. 32.
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Given the enthusiasm young people show for English, a sensible 
incentive could be a financial one. If speaking Ukrainian were seen as a 
career asset, or if obtaining a good job were difficult without Ukrainian, 
then the youth of Ukraine might display a similarly keen attitude towards 
learning their state language. Already in the army promotions are linked to 
Ukrainian-language ability, and Russian monolingualism is looked down 
upon in some government circles. Particularly if industry and business 
heads show a willingness to speak Ukrainian, this trend could spread.
The media remains one of the most problematic areas, particularly 
in the South and East but not exclusively in those areas. One recent 
unofficial statistic suggests eight Russian language papers exist in the 
state for every ethnic Russian reader, compared to less than one 
Ukrainian paper per ethnic Ukrainian. Although this statistic ignores 
Russian speakers of Ukrainian ethnicity, it still shows the balance is hardly 
proportional. Again, finance might be an effective incentive. If there were a 
tax for publishing in Russian, more papers might discover they preferred to 
print in Ukrainian.
The suggestion of financial incentives annoys many Ukrainians of 
both camps, and quite understandably so. Funds are low enough that 
scholars in the Academy of Sciences cannot always count on their 
government employers to pay them regularly. Teachers who would 
perhaps willingly re-learn methodology to be able to teach in Ukrainian 
may not be able to pay for the re-qualification course, or do not have one 
available for financial reasons. Newspapers and private television and 
radio have to rely on sales to remain solvent and therefore have to print in 
the language that will sell the most copies. Though government policy
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could be a powerful tool in influencing language usage, the government 
itself is democratic and as such accepts representatives from many 
fractions, not all of which are friendly to Ukrainian statehood and 
independence.
Even among alleged allies, disagreements occur over the reason to 
support Ukrainian as a state language, or the extent to which enforcement 
of language laws must be taken. Ukrainian law, however, appears less 
strict in comparison to the language policy in effect in Estonia, for 
example, with the rights of any significant minority enshrined in the 
Constitution. This means that any programme accepted by the Verkhovna 
Rada must not ignore or infringe on the rights Russian speakers claim for 
themselves, no matter how detrimental such appeasement policies may 
be for Ukrainian identity and national cohesiveness in the long-term. Any 
suggestion offered by the Academy of Sciences to expand Ukrainian’s 
functional load or to develop the language’s potential and educate more of 
the populace seems to be met with suspicion or reluctance on the part of 
Deputies who wish to keep their seats representing Russian-dominated 
constituencies.
This resistance on the part of ethnic Russians and Russian- 
speakers may not look like fair play to an objective observer. Motyl offers a 
reasonable approach, which may or may not appeal to non-Ukrainian 
speakers:
Ukrainian elites surely are not being extreme in requesting that 
passport Russians (ethnic Russians) and passport Ukrainians learn 
and, perhaps, even use Ukrainian in public activities and at the 
workplace—all the more so since these two Eastern Slavic tongues 
are sufficiently similar as to make each language comprehensible to 
speakers of the other. Learning Ukrainian cannot be any harder for 
Russians than learning Russian is for Ukrainians, which is to say, not 
hard at all. And just as linguistic similarity encouraged the
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Russification of Ukrainians, it must surely facilitate the use of
66Ukrainian by Russians.
Professor Taranenko of the Academy of Sciences summarises the 
language picture in Ukraine on a rather bleak note. Firstly, the use and 
knowledge of Ukrainian in not mandatory at present for state workers. 
Secondly, Ukrainian is rarely heard in larger cities in Ukraine. Thirdly, 
literary, standard Ukrainian is used freely and competently by only a small 
portion of the population of Ukraine.®^
What can one conclude with such a mixed picture submitted for 
analysis? Essentially, the future of Ukrainian does not depend on laws 
passed for its protection or development, or on academics who may 
provide excellent examples and teaching materials. Nor does it entirely 
depend on schools and teaching personnel, no matter how effective their 
use and encouragement of Ukrainian. One cannot count on the media, 
whether encouraged by a sense of duty or the possibility of severe 
penalties for broadcasting or printing in a non-state language. This leaves 
only the public.
For Ukrainian language to not only thrive and expand, but even to 
survive in Ukraine the population must recognise its importance. Enduring 
Ukrainian statehood requires a sense of national consciousness in its 
citizens, who must identify themselves as Ukrainian and see their interests 
linked to the success of the state. The population must agree on one 
language to use to communicate privately and publicly, and if that 
language should eventually be Russian the very real threat exists of 
increased influence from Moscow on the new state. At the same time, a
Motyl, (1993), p. 13.
Taranenko, (1996b), pp. 24-34, assesses a the total picture in Ukraine in a variety of 
areas, using two main points of reference: the general traits of the language situation and
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new bilingualism espousing English may align Ukraine with Europe but will 
not help to create a national identity accepted by Ukrainian citizens. 
Language is an unavoidable tenet of state-building, a requirement for 
national unity and one of the most controversial issues in Ukraine today. 
As such, the question of language and of state-building in Ukraine must 
necessarily remain unanswered for the present.
the overall tendencies for development the language appears to be following.
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Chapter Four: Media in Ukraine: The Language Indicator
Nowhere is the language problem more clearly illustrated than in 
the media in Ukraine. For every 100 citizens in Ukraine, there are 7 
Ukrainian and 54 Russian-language publications in Ukraine.^ Furthermore, 
the presence of Russian media (not just Russian language, but Russian in 
origin) can cause other problems. For one, Russian companies have 
employed predatory marketing practices by forming fake joint ventures 
with Ukrainian media companies to avoid tax, thus denying the Ukrainian 
media sector this revenue. There is also some evidence that the Russian 
press used its influence during Kuchma’s election and the development of 
the Crimean situation to sway public opinion. The newspaper Den’ is 
rumoured to receive money from Gazprom, and therefore will be 
influenced in its coverage of candidates during elections.^ The other 
substantial effect this Russian presence has is simple competition. Not 
only must the media and publishing^ industries compete against the 
stereotype of provinciaism with limited funds and un-helpful or un-enforced 
government policies to aid them; but the most direct competition comes 
from Russia, where Soviet-era resources are already in place and do not 
have to be generated from the start. New issues such as the place of 
private media and publishing alongside old state-owned bodies only add to 
the complexity of the situation.
Linguistically, this means efforts to rejuvenate Ukrainian-language 
media have mixed results. The problem is not simply a language issue or
 ^Holos Ukrainy, 6 May 1997.
2 Kuzio, (1997), p. 370-71.
 ^Publishing should be taken to include predominantly books other than dictionaries, 
grammars, and textbooks unless special mention is made by a particular source. These 
items are better dealt with in a discussion on language development and standardisation 
of terminology.
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even a language purity issue, though this too is under discussion; rather 
the funds needed to support a viable local media, covering television, 
radio, and printed matter are not always available. Beyond finance, 
journalists and press organisations in Ukraine must strive to prevent 
censorship, and to guarantee free access to information."^ Futherthermore, 
even products generated in Ukraine are not necessarily in Ukrainian, 
though there are measures being suggested which would encourage more 
Ukrainian-language materials. The public cannot agree on what it wants to 
read, hear, or see any more than policymakers seem able to agree on 
what should be available.®
Most of the issues facing media and publishing in Ukraine are not 
new. Tension with Russian-language press began almost as soon as 
Ukrainian-language press appeared in Ukraine, and the large percentage 
of Russians in Ukraine only keeps the debate alive. In order to analyse the 
language debate as it is played out in the arena of the media and 
publishing, it is helpful to examine the roots of contemporary problems 
where they began, and to follow developments under the Soviets and 
under glasnost' as both sides address the question of what language 
should dominate in this aspect of public life.
 ^This is still a concern for many. Articles offering the press viewpoint on free speech 
include Kontseptsiia zakonodartel’stva o SMI v post-totalitamyx gosudarstvax’, 
November 1996 Ukrainian Media Bulletin (hereafter referred to as UMB), pp. 12-4, and 
‘Zakonodavstvo pro presy ta inshi zasoby masovoyi informatsiyi v SSSR i Ukrayini’, 
Suchasnisf, May 1991 pp. 81-4.
® Tax measures suggested by Ihor Ostash in a conversation in Kyiv in July 1996 are 
echoed in UMB of September 1995, p. 11, calling for tax on Russian language media 
products. A quick glance at the current media laws involving registration of periodicals, 
papers, television channels and the like shows ample opportunity for such measures to 
be enacted as part of this process. Ivanenko, (1991), pp. 81-4. Kuchma again mentioned
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Brief Historical Overview:
The development of media and publishing in Ukraine has been 
treated elsewhere thoroughly enough to merit only a brief summary of 
events and the issues which continue to face these industries in 
independent Ukraine. The fullest treatments consulted for this research 
were Shevelov (1989), Krawchenko (1985) and Wexler (1974). With the 
amount of work already available on the subject, it is only necessary to 
trace key developments to find that the problems which confronted 
Ukraine under the Bolsheviks have not disappeared with their regime.
Shevelov states that ‘there was no Ukrainian periodical press in the 
Russian Ukraine’ in 1900.® The part of Ukraine governed by the Austro- 
Hungarian empire fared somewhat better. Here there was a Ukrainian- 
language press, though Shevelov considers it to be insignificant when 
compared to the Russian or Polish press of the same area. He counts a 
total of 25 Galician and 6 Bukovinian periodicals, the latter of which were 
sometimes Muscophile and aimed at producing language closer to 
Russian.^ Krawchenko adds that the lack of Ukrainian press cannot be 
blamed entirely on government policy preventing the use of Ukrainian in 
(Russian) Ukraine. He notes that the social structure of Ukraine did not 
encourage publishing or press, as Ukrainians were under-represented in 
the educated, upper classes and those who did belong to this stratum 
were often Russified. This meant that when journals did occur, they were
the need to adapt the language law in a speech mentioned by OMR! on 9 December 
1996.
® Shevelov, (1989), p. 8.
 ^Shevelov, (1989), pp. 12-13.
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financially unstable, or unable to reach the illiterate and mistrustful 
peasantry.®
By 1914, Shevelov notes the press at least in Galicia had begun to 
diversify, not only along political lines as before, but along the lines of 
speciality. Periodicals could be found which specialised in economics, 
agriculture, trade, sport, humour, or the church, as well as periodicals 
targeted for children and women.® Even with this development, the press 
remained largely targeted at peasants or intelligentsia who worked with 
peasantry; working class press and technical journals remained 
proportionately under-represented. This reflected not only the composition 
of society at that time and the state of the intelligentsia, but also the 
absence of scholarly or very technical terminology in this part of Ukraine. 
Shevelov explains.
Rudimentary technical terms were used in everyday life, but the use of 
specialized terms in periodicals was very limited; their low representation in 
the press, in turn, did not foster their development, creating a vicious circle.
In Russian Ukraine, where the language was prohibited, by this 
time pamphlets appeared in Ukrainian which were able to get around the 
censors. These were written in good literary Ukrainian, and were intended 
mainly for peasant readership. Such brochures marked the start of 
publishing and press in this part of Ukraine.
Belles lettres were one of the few forms of literature not prohibited 
under the Tsarist regime, so many debates about the usage of Ukrainian, 
and about what kind of Ukrainian should be used were carried out in this 
form. During this time the intelligentsia was taking shape in Ukraine, and
® Krawchenko, (1985), p. 27. 
® Krawchenko, 0985), p. 22. 
Krawchenko, (1985), p. 22. 
Ibid, pp. 29-30.
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with its development into a self-conscious class came a crisis in motive: if 
Ukrainian could justify itself as a language understandable to the peasants 
which made up the majority of the population, what would justify the 
language as it evolved, became more modern, and consequently better 
suited to the developing intelligentsia than the peasants they idealized?^^
1905 brought about the repeal of draconian censorship and 
prohibitions on Ukrainian language publications in Russian Ukraine. This 
meant a ‘rebirth of Ukrainian periodical press' which had been dormant 
earlier in the century, and the appearance of legal political papers. Though 
the repeal was followed shortly by heavy-handed press regulations, 
closing many of the periodicals which had sprung up, a total wipe-out was 
not achieved. During this time, Shevelov describes the appearance and 
flourishing of the periodical press even under difficult circumstances-but 
problems which continue to linger appeared at the same time. First, these 
publications appeared in small circulations. Second, they were rarely 
published at a profit and were continually in poor financial condition.
Here language would already be a problem. Not everyone 
possessed sufficient skill in Ukrainian, through Russification or plain 
illiteracy, to read the new periodicals. Furthermore, those publications 
which appealed to the intelligentsia would not be popular among peasants, 
and vice-versa. Though Galicia and Bukovina escaped this particular 
problem since there had long been a Ukrainian education system and 
intelligentsia in place, Ukrainians there used a written language that was 
sufficiently different from Russian Ukraine-Ukrainian to cause problems of 
mutual unintelligibility.
Shevelov, (1989), p. 33, see also Krawchenko, (1985), pp. 27-8.
Shevelov, (1989), p. 40.
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Krawchenko and Shevelov both detail the parallell growth of the 
periodical press and publishing industries at this time. In 1914, however, 
compared with Russian publication (25,526 books total) Ukrainian lagged 
behind at only 242 publications, many of which were pamphlets and 
popular editions. Second in population, Ukrainians were only a distant 
eighth in publ icat ions.Some of these editions were grammars and 
lexicons, published throughout the twenties, though the publication of 
these books is better dealt with as part of a discussion on terminology and 
standardisation.^®
Press in Ukraine assumed an important additional function after 
World War I. The concern for, and efforts aimed at the development of the 
Ukrainian language in one or the other Ukrainian territories expanded to 
include the development of a unified language after Galicia and Bukovina 
were occupied by Ukrainians from Russia. The press, and indeed, any 
literate Ukrainian, began to assess new terms which appeared, accepting 
some and rejecting others. While the acceptance of Galician terms was 
favoured at this time as a step away from the language of the peasant, 
and a step towards the language of the intelligentsia (and as a result, a 
positive assessment of Ukrainian as a potential intellectual vehicle for 
thought) this precedent of opening the language to outside, even, as in 
this case, to Galician-Ukrainain enrichment, continues to be a source of 
dissension among those who desire to update, enrich, and expand the 
lexicon.”*®
Despite difficult political changes at the start of the Twenties and 
into the Thirties, press and publishing in Ukraine flourished. New
Shevelov, (1989), p. 41.
Shevelov, (1989), pp. 40-43, Krawchenko, (1985), pp. 94 -8 .
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periodicals appeared, marked by both diversity in area of interest and 
régionalisation, two traits which continue to characterise the industry in 
Ukraine. A new trend was the publication of bulletins by political parties. 
Ministries, branches of the service, cooperatives, professional 
organisations, and even individuals. Book publishing increased 
substantially over previous figures during this time, up to 747 titles in 1917, 
1084 in 1918, and 665 in 1919 (Shevelov’s figures). Substantial numbers 
of these were textbooks or books about Ukrainian language. Publishing 
had become lucrative enough to interest some who would publish just 
about anything, meaning these publications were not all of a high quality 
or long-lasting; furthermore, many of them were insufficiently well written 
to counterbalance the positive effect of others in the acceptance of the 
language.^^ Krawchenko states in contrast, that the works of this time, 
before Ukrainisation, represent a high period in quality due to the lack of 
censorship in the relatively liberal climate. He notes books were 
purchased (from any of the new Ukrainian bookstores springing up all over 
the republic) not out of a sense of duty but ‘because of their artistic merit 
or orininality of research', which gave the language and culture a new 
sense of prestige.^®
Consolidation of Soviet power in Ukraine over the next decade 
brought first tolerance of Ukrainian, and then Ukrainisation as a distinct 
policy. Shevelov profiles the effect of this change on press and publishing 
in Ukraine. Newspapers in Ukrainian over the years 1918-1924 hovered 
between 1/2 and 1/5 the number of Russian language papers (Shevelov 
gives several sets of data which do not always agree with each other).
Shevelov, (1989), pp. 58-61 .See also Wexler, (1974). 
Shevelov, (1989), p. 78.
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Journals in Ukrainian, including almanacs, showed little growth before 
Ukrainisation. Book publishing in Ukrainian even dropped during this time 
in relation to publication in Russian, for a number of reasons (low status of 
Ukrainian and financial problems in the private publishing sector for 
example).”'®
On the eve of Ukrainisation, Shevelov assesses the state of 
Ukrainian printed matter as follows:
By the end of the Soviet pre-Ukrainisation preiod, in the press, in periodicals, 
in publications, in scholarship and in literature, a new, Soviet-minded 
intelligentsia had begun to press against the locks which were intended to 
confine the Ukrainian language to the countryside.^®
Ukrainisation, launched as a specific policy to increase literacy and 
education (not any longer as a means to placate restless peasant 
elements), meant the sharp decline of Russian in the press, in publishing, 
in theatre-and the growth not only in percentage but in quantity of 
Ukrainian language varieties of all of these, not only in titles but in 
circulation. By 1930, for example, there were only three major Russian- 
language papers remaining.^^ Krawchenko notes that while in 1925 there 
were 116 papers published in Ukraine, 31 in Ukrainian (21% of 3.1 million 
copies), by 1929, there were 54 Ukrainian papers and only 20 Russian 
language editions. This time period witnessed a corresponding growth in 
national consciousness among the intelligentsia, who used the press to 
reach peasant masses with these ideas. Consequently, those involved in 
developing the press wished to prevent their local newspapers from
Krawchenko, (1985), p. 96. 
Shevelov. (1989), pp. 99-100. 
Shevelov, (1989), p. 106. 
Shevelov, (1989), pp. 117-18.
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becoming second-rate versions of Russian papers, and instead hoped to 
direct local press along uniquely Ukrainian lines/^
The next decade, however, would be a time of famine and forced 
collectivisation, causing the destruction of peasant culture and creating 
peasant unrest especially in Ukraine, where the efforts of the agricultural 
sector were intended to finance most of Stalin’s industrializaion elsewhere. 
Starting in 1930 Ukrainian nationalism, as the Soviets saw it, was a threat. 
The persecution of scholars and academics who had supported 
Ukrainisation (and the liberation movement the decade before) was 
mirrored in a similar purge of the printed word.^^ These show trials and 
subsequent censorship of Ukrainian books brought on an immediate drop 
in their production. Books were found to contain major ideological errors, 
or to be of poor quality by those suspicious of the authors’ intentions. 
Moscow decided to further centralise the publishing industry to remedy 
this and other perceived ills. So thorough was the purge of Ukrainian 
language materials that by 1940 newspapers in Ukrainian lost 20% of their 
share of the market to Russian, from 89% to 69%; the number of journals 
fell from 85% (261) to 45% (144).^“
Book publishing peaked in 1930, with Ukrainian works appearing in 
significantly greater quantities than Russian ones, especially technical 
books and textbooks. This was due to the success of Ukrainisation, and 
also to the need for a literate, technically educated workforce. From 25% 
of all technical titles in Ukrainian, the percentage rose to 61% in 1929, as 
well as 80% of textbooks used at technical schools. Overall, Ukrainian
^  Krawchenko, (1985), p. 98.
For a detailed account of who felt the brunt of these attacks see Shevelov, (1989), pp.
122-71, and Krawchenko, (1985), pp. 135-51. 
Krawchenko, (1985), p. 139.
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language titles commanded 79% of total printed works by 1929/^ 
Krawchenko states
Industrialization itself, however, greatly contributed to this development. A 
large number of Ukrainians were entering industrial employment. To deny 
them the right to learn in their own language how best to use modem 
equipment connected with industrialisation would have meant slowing the 
tempo of industrialisation.^®
A change in policy in the early thirties shifted emphasis away from
Ukrainisation and towards an emphasis on Russian language and culture
all over the USSR. These policies caused a drop not only in the production
of Ukrainian books, but of books in general. Ukrainian titles totalled 6,394
in 1930; by 1939 this had dropped to 1,895, or from 79% to 43%.^^ As
publishing was still centrally managed, this represents not a decay but a
specific policy. The lack of material published in Ukrainian meant that this
language could not be the source of up-to-date information, and that
knowledge from abroad would have to be accessed via Russian.^® Once
again the status of Ukrainian fell, re-acquiring the stigma of provincialism
and backwardness.^®
Stalin and those around him clearly felt that Ukraine had to be
taught that it could only achieve with the help of Russia, and that any
achievements would be trumpeted as Soviet accomplishments, and not
Ukrainian ones. Krawchenko notes, ‘It is no exaggeration to say that
Ukrainians’ greatest achievement during that decade was that they
outlasted it.’ °^
Krawchenko, (1985), pp. 139-40.
®^ Krawchenko, (1985), p. 139.
Shevelov, (1989), p. 152.
Krawchenko, (1985), p. 140-41.
Developments in Western Ukraine during the late thirties and the war varied slightly 
from those in Russian Ukraine. Shevelov (1989) details those processes in Chapter 7, pp. 
170-213.
Krawchenko, (1985), p. 218.
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After a brief wartime respite, the decline of Ukrainian language in 
Ukraine continued after World War lP \ The effects of heavy Russification, 
slipping status in the eyes of Ukrainians, and ‘the strength of the Russian 
apparatus’ all combined to reduce the amount of printed matter and media 
in Ukraine over the decades preceding glasnost’. Krawchenko profiles this 
decline: in 1945, Ukrainian books and brochures made up 61% of the total 
published in Ukraine. In 1950, this number had dropped to 45%; with a 
brief respite after Stalin’s death the figure reached 60%. Khrushchev’s 
policy change caused a further drop to 49%. By 1975, after Shelest was 
removed from his post as head of the Communist Party of Ukraine, books 
and pamphlets in Ukrainian made up only 30% of all works published. As 
before, Russian dominated in scientific and technical works, while 
Ukrainian held its own only in belles lettres and social sciences.^^
Newspapers fared slightly better over this time period. Krawchenko 
cites figures claiming that in 1971, 70% of all titles and 68% of total 
circulation in newspapers were in Ukrainian.^^ He also mentions the 
complaints made by the reading public, not only of the lack of sufficient 
Ukrainian press and other media, but also against the quality of the work 
produced.^
In the 1970s, only two scientific or technical journals appeared in 
Ukrainian-Dopowd/ Akademiyi Nauk Ukrayins’koyi RSR and Ukràpns’kyi 
Botanichnyi Zhumal. The Ministry of Health published three monthlies in 
Ukrainian, which were the only medical journals in that language during
It should be noted, however, that the efforts of Ukrainian publishing in Lviv, then part of 
Poland, aided in creating an intellectual climate favourable for the growth of national 
awareness and consciousness when this part of Ukraine was united with Russian 
Ukraine after the war (Encyclopedia of Ukraine, vol 4, pp. 200-13).
Krawchenko, (1985), pp. 237-38.
“  Krawchenko, (1985), p. 240 quoting Presa Ukrains’koi RSR, tables 83-4.
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that time. Attempts were made to show Ukrainian language could handle 
scientific discourse, and thus justify a shift from Russian as the language 
of science and technology. Kibemetychni Systemy z Kombinovanym 
Keruvanniam (1963) and Entsyklopediia Kibemetyky (1973) appeared in 
Ukrainian demonstrating the versatility of that language and its viability as 
a medium of discussion even of complex scientific research.^®
Glasnost’ in Ukraine meant a lessening of Party control on the 
press and publishing. Besides well-known information releases during this 
time, old editors resigned and a union of journalists was formed in 1990. 
New publications with new, previously forbidden viewpoints, opened up in 
the relaxed climate of free speech and free press. Most of the new 
publicatons were short monthly newspapers with press-runs of 1000 to 
10,000, including over 50 works generated by Rukh, the Popular 
Movement of Ukraine, and over 25 by the Ukrainian Republican party. In 
addition, over 30 new youth publications appeared.^®
Figures given by the Encyclopedia of Ukraine show a gradual 
increase in the number of newspapers, journals, and periodicals over the 
period from the death of Stalin to 1990, five years into glasnost. The ratio 
of newspapers in Russian to newspapers in Ukrainian (by circulation, not 
title) decreased from 3 to 1, to closer to 2 to 1 by 1990, showing that free 
press has not necessarily meant more press appears in Ukrainian. In 
journals and other periodicals, the figures show that while in titles, Russian 
and Ukrainian works appear nearly even, the annual circulation figures for
^  Krawchenko, (1985), p. 241. 
Krawchenko, (1985), p. 240.
36 Encyclopedia of Ukraine, vol. 4, p. 209.
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Ukrainian are higher, though publication in both languages has increased 
even given a drop in overall circulation after 1975.^^
Radio and Television in Soviet Ukraine;
The Encyclopedia of Ukraine states bluntly, ‘Radio broadcasting in 
Soviet Ukraine and in the USSR as a whole served the interests of the 
Communist state and P a r t y .A s  with written press and media, radio was 
subject to central control and monitoring. The first high-powered stations 
were constructed in 1925, and by the end of the 20s there were stations 
for Kyiv, Odessa, Dnipropetrovsk, Donetsk, and others. A radio network 
formed in 1928, and grew in the 1930s as the Soviets became more adept 
at Jamming foreign frequencies by a number of methods (including 
constructing radios which only picked up certain frequencies).
Early radio in Ukraine was dominated by Moscow, with only limited 
transmission in Ukrainian-and even this was mostly political, agitational 
matter which devoted only a few hours to culture or literature. The next 
substantial increase in radio broadcasting occurred after World War II, with 
a corresponding leap in Ukrainian-language programming. In the 1980s, 
there were three state networks, broadcasting news. Party issues, 
economy, literature, culture and one weekly Ukrainian radio journal.^®
The first television broadcast in Ukraine was in 1939. Television 
began to develop and spread as a medium in the 1950s, with one channel 
from Kyiv and a second (added in 1962) from Moscow. A Ukrainian 
programme began in 1965, which covered 200 hours weekly. Ukrainian 
television could not really figure as an impacting factor until after
Encyclopedia of Ukraine, vol. 4, pp. 207-09. 
^  Encyclopedia of Ukraine, vol. 4, p. 301.
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independence, as earlier broadcasts either originated in Moscow or were 
produced in Kyiv with central approval-and then mostly in Russian. 
Programming included typically music or entertainment programmes, film, 
as well as propaganda or informative programmes. The Encyclopedia 
characterises Ukrainian television as ‘insignificant’, and indeed it is this 
very lack of development that continues to plague Ukrainian television, 
and continues to ensure that a significant quantity of Russian or foreign 
material goes out on Ukrainian airwaves."^ ®
Contemporary Press Climate: an Overview
As in previous years, the importance of the media in Ukraine cannot 
be overstated. Where once the press was a tool for Soviet propaganda, it 
now serves as a means to increase linguistic awareness, shape national 
consciousness, and support nation-building. One journal stated.
Let us note that in postcommunist Ukraine governmental support of the 
national press Is one of the pre-requisites for shaping national awareness 
and information security of the state as such. Otherwise the prospects of the 
Ukrainian national statehood look doubtful.
The subject matter covered in print in Ukraine continues to vary. In 
1990, the most popular subjects for periodicals (excluding newspapers) 
were culture/ education/ scholarship, technology, politics/ society/ 
economics, and natural sciences/ maths, in order of popularity 
(Encyclopedia of Ukraine figures). The Ukrainian Media Bulletin listed 
figures for 1995 showing general politics gained the lead as the most 
popular subject for periodicals, followed by science/ technology, 
economics, and art/ literature. The total number of registered publications
Encyclopedia of Ukraine, vol. 4, pp. 301-02.
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as of June 1996 totalled 5,325: 3,953 newspapers, 1,025 magazines, 148 
newsletters, 116 collections and 49 almanacs^^.
As during glasnost', other bodies besides the state issue periodicals 
and papers which compete for a share of the market. The Ukrainian Media 
Bulletin lists fifteen categories of ‘founders’ for periodicals and papers, 
some of which can be further divided (as in state or non-state publishing 
companies): The Council of Peoples’ Deputies, State Executive bodies. 
Industrial enterprises, collective and state farms, commercial bodies, 
educational institutions, trade unions, creative unions, political parties, 
public organisations, religious organisations, labour collectives, private 
persons, research institutions, and publishing houses.**^
Two further areas of press and publishing should be mentioned. 
First are the various bodies, state, professional and other, which regulate 
Ukrainian printed media, and second, the laws which exist or are in the 
pipeline to govern language usage. The situation with television and radio 
is infinitely more complicated, as the industry is run on a number of levels 
by channels/stations, broadcasting companies, production companies, 
advertising agencies, state companies, private companies and translators- 
-which means language decisions are taken at a number of levels and not 
as part of a coherent policy for many companies. And as with so many 
other things, finance is a great concern, making pragmatic concerns 
outweigh nationalist, linguistic, or even legal issues.
Now that the state apparatus has legal competition in Ukraine, 
other bodies have formed which participate in the media as a whole. The
^  Encyclopedia of Ukraine, vol. 5, pp. 183-4.
Kostenko, (1994), p. 154.
UMB, September 1996 citing figures from June 1996 Ministry of Press and Information. 
^  UMB, January 1995, p. 14.
129
government has organs such as the National Council on TV and Radio 
Broadcasting, the Ministry of Information and Press, the State Committee 
on Television and Radio, and the Permanent Committee of the Supreme 
Soviet of Ukraine on Legislative Protection of Freedom of Speech and the 
Mass Media."*  ^ Non-state bodies include the Journalists' Union, the 
National Press Club, and the Ukrainian Association of Non-State 
Publishers/^ These committees concern themselves mainly with the 
development of the press and the protection of journalists’ rights in the 
free speech climate.
The language issue concerns all areas of media, both broadcast 
and print. Sources do not agree on the overall strength of Russian- 
language media versus Ukrainain-language media in Ukraine. The 
February 1995 issue of the Ukrainian Media Bulletin stated, ‘...yet people’s 
interest in Ukrainian-and Russian-language publications as well as in 
material published in Russia, does not break down along lines of 
nationality. The language of a publication does not affect its popularity."^® 
More recent commentary in the Ukrainian Media Bulletin suggests that the 
Ukrainian readership is more interested with making a living than politics 
or other subjects, as magazines and advertisement/information press are 
increasing and developing more than other kinds of printed press. This 
article states that at the time of writing, 50% of all publications are in 
Russian, 18% in Ukrainian, and 16% in Russian and Ukrainian/^
However, in a media survey published in Political Theory, it was 
stated, ‘In real terms, a tendency of linguistic de-Ukrainisation of the
^  UMB, January 1995, pp. 10-11.
^  Data on specific television or radio stations and companies may be found in the section
of this chapter on those media. 
UMB, p. 6, February, 1995.
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Ukrainian national press has been outlined in the period since the 
proclamation of Ukraine’s independence...Therefore, the thesis about a 
language related pressure on Russians in Ukraine is totally groundless, 
and the position of state institutions obliged to enforce the Law on 
Languages is irresponsible, to put it mildly.’*^® In the same issue of the 
Ukrainian Media Bulletin differing opinions appear:
• The suggestion that the Ukrainian-only language policies of national TV
channels have a negative effect on their ratings has been confirmed.
With the exception of the Eastern region and the Crimea which favour 
Russian-language broadcasting, the majority of respondants approve of 
broadcasts in both Russian and Ukrainian. In addition, in all but three of 
the eleven regions, those who favour exclusively Russian-language as 
opposed to exclusively Ukrainian-language broadcasts are in the 
majority.
• As is the case with telelvision, the most popular publications among
Ukrainian readers are Russian-language, such as Komsomolskaya 
Pravda.
•  Subscription results also confirm the trend of a diminishing market share
for the Russian publications. Three years ago they controlled up to 62% 
of the newspaper market in Ukraine-presently their share does not 
exceed 5%.
Clearly, the truth is out there. But, as with any sensitive issue, 
speakers of each language are likely to feel a threat against their own 
language and therefore downplay its successes in the media. This touches 
upon not just Russian-language media which originates in Ukraine, but 
also on Russian imports, such as CRT or Komsomolskaya Pravda, which 
enjoy significant popularity amongst Ukrainians.
Legal measures are in place, not only to govern the behaviour of 
media companies, but to promote use of Ukrainian in the media. In Kyiv, 
the city administration has developed a plan to encourage the
Budko, (1997), pp. 16-8.
^  Kostenko, (1994), p. 154.
UMB; first two quotes from Yuri! Kogutyak, ‘Growth amidst decline-the Ukrainian 
media in 1994’, p. 4-5. The third from ‘Subscriptions in 1995 give grounds for optimism’ 
by Oleg Krouk, p. 6.
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development of Ukrainian and its functioning in all spheres of life in the 
city. This plan includes media, calling for a means of regulating the use of 
the state language and an examination of problems relating to this. 
Cooperation with civic organisations to this end is encouraged.^®
The language issue and minority rights issues cannot help but be 
played out in the media, not only in printed media but also in television and 
radio. Though television and radio do not yet serve a similar function to 
that of the BBC in twentieth century England as language regulators, as 
with printed matter what is heard and seen cannot help but influence what 
is spoken and written by Ukrainians-both in lexicon and in kul’tura movy.
Media falls under the requirement that minorities in compactly 
settled areas have a right to use their own language. Article 9 of the 
Television and Radio act states that programmes should be in the state 
language, though again allowances are made for minorities compactly 
settled. A ‘problem’ area like Crimea, which is heavily settled by Russians 
and other minorities of Ukraine, shows figures like the following for air time 
for 1995:
Cnmean-Tatar language Television 208 hours V Radio 234 hours
Armenian Television 39 hours % Radio 52 hours
Gemrian television 13 hours
Bulgarian '3 =; - .Television 13 hours >
Zarkapattia, another area populated by a variety of ethnic groups, 
has figures like these for the same year:
Hungarian language Television, .^73 hours_:A4|^tRadio 364 hours^ 
Romanian language : Television 37 hours / #  Radio 37 hours  ^ .
German language “ Television 18 hours !  ” ^
Vechernly Kyiv, 5 February, 1997, p. 2.
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other areas, such as Chemivtsy, Mariopol’, and Zhytomir show 
substantial allowances made for minority languages in air time on radio 
and television as well.®^
The Ministry of Statistics offers the following data for State 
television and radio in 1995, in percentages of hours of broadcasting time:
Television Radio
Area Ukrainian Russian Ukrainian Russian
Ukraine 66 33 83 13
Crimea 2 84 4 80
Vinnitsia 100 — 100 ——
Volyn 100 — 100 —
Dnipropetrovs’k 70 30 65 10
Donetsk 30 70 50 10
Zhytomyr 98 — 82 —
Zakarpattia 83 — 50 —
Zaporizhzhia 26 74 71 29
Ivano-Frankivs’k — — — —
Kirovograd 83 17 91 9
Luhans’k 48 52 45 55
L’viv oblast’ 100 100 —
Mykolaiiv 69 31 58 42
Odesa 25 71 56 40
Poltava 100 — 100 —
Rivne 100 — 100 —
Sumy 100 — 100 —
Temopir 100 — 100 —
Kharkiv 100 — 100 —
Kherson 87 13 85 15
Khmel'nytskyi 78 22 100 —
Cherkassy 100 — 100 —
Chemivtsy 82 - 94 —
Chemihiv — — 100 —
(percentages not equal to 100 indicate the presence 
Ukraine)
of other national languages in
Judging from these numbers, state radio and television better 
represent the ethnic make-up of their listening and viewing public than 
private stations thus far have managed to do.
Khomenok, (1996), pp. 1-3.
“  Chart ‘Obsiahy mictsevoho teieradiomovlennia derzhavnykh teieradioorhanlzatsii u 
1995r’ in Statystychyni Shchorichnyk Ukrainy, 1995, Kyiv: Tekhnika, 1996. p. 477.
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Post-Independence Trends: Newspapers
The Ukrainian Media Bulletin cited in 1995 several trends in 
Ukrainian print media. For one, the overall number of subscriptions is up, 
indicating the bottom of the press recession has been reached and the 
upward climb has begun.(This is debated by some sources, who suggest 
that the majority of newspaper and periodical purchases are now made 
not via subscription, but at kiosks, and that furthermore copies pass 
through several sets of hands making popularity difficult to measure.) As 
the economy improves, so too should the press industry. Second, even 
though old Russian favourites linger, the Ukrainian market is 
overwhelmingly once again Ukrainian. This does not necessarily mean 
Ukrainian language, but Russian papers receive less attention as the 
Ukrainian readership concentrates on its own problems and news.
However, since independence it should be noted that Russian- 
language papers have not suffered in popularity, nor can it be shown that 
the language of a publication affects its popularity. N. Kostenko et al cite 
that as of 1994, the number of Russian language national papers has 
increased (5.7% to 12.7%), while the number of Ukrainian national papers 
has dropped (59.8% to 27.4%). Other papers are available in both, or in a 
local minority language. Locally, Ukrainian papers dropped from 55.7% in 
1992 to 46.8% in 1994; Russian local papers remained at approximately 
the same level, roughly 30%.®  ^These figures would not support the case 
advanced by some Russians in Ukraine that forced Ukraininization is 
occurring in the press.
N. Kostenko, O. Kryvenko, I. Slisarenko, Y. Shkarlat, V. Bebyk., and M. Tomenko, 
(1994), p. 154.
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Another reason for the increase in Ukrainian press is the 
corresponding increase in its quality. Commercial non-state publications 
are cited as the best, with access to the best quality staff and information. 
This is partially because good reporters do not necessarily go to Moscow 
any longer.
Press in Ukraine is shifting to the local level, with two of every three 
publications in Ukraine serving a local or regional area. Local papers have 
improved in quality, and have access to recent quality news and 
information.
The following table shows figures for 1994 and 1995 for highest 
circulations. This can be compared to the profile presented in the chart 
below it. It should be noted that Ukrainian Media Bulletin considers the 
Russian-language Komsomol’skaya Pravda the most read paper of 1994, 
but exact figures were unavailable.
.TMe: 1995: From ,1994: _____
Holos Ukrainy 506300 up 143800
Silski Visti 337200 up 97500
Robitnycha Hazeta 207000 up 162400
Uriadovyi Kur’ier 195800 up 40000
Argumenty i Fakty 164400 up 48000
Kiyevskiye Vedomosti 146000 up 16500
Trud 99800 down 400
Pravda Ukrainy 70000 up 11700
Hovoryt’ 1 Pokazuye 49800 down 15000
Izvestiya 46800 down 11400
Osvita 45900 down 6100
Molod’ Ukrayiny 45700 up 5500
Nezavisimost’ 44800 up 1660
Ukrayina Moloda 36900 down 2300
Figures for 1996 appeared as follows:
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Language 2 ^Circulation ’vî
KievskiyeVedomosti Ukrainian, Russian 400,666
Holos Ukrainy Ukrainian 312,070
Silski Visti Ukrainian 300,000
Uradovyi Kur’ier Ukrainian 163,200
Rabochaya Gazeta Ukraina Russian 150,889
Ukraina Molodaya Ukrainian 150,000
Robitnycha Gazeta Ukrainian, Russian 140,000
Vechemy Kiev Russian 130,000
Donbass Russian 107,000
Vysockyi Zamok Ukrainian, Russian 100,000
Za Vil’nu Ukrainu Ukrainian 100,000
Zakon i Bizness Ukrainian 100,000
Zaporozhskaya Pravda Ukrainian 98,000
Nezavisimost Ukrainian 79,000
Selo Poltavsko Ukrainian 75,000^
A 1997 profile of Western Ukraine shows regional differences which 
reflect linguistic ones:
Most Popular papers In Western Ukraine:
:"Paper; „ - A  r p o * ....... . ■ CirculationL_^ _
Express-Weekly L’viv 215,000
Vysokyi Zamok Western Ukraine 60,0000,
Saturday, 215,000
Volyn’ Volynska oblast’ 44,500(3x/week)
Tyzhden’ Western Ukraine, centre 100,006(weekly)
Sribna zemlia Zakarpattia 21,850 (weekly)
Vilne zhyttia Ternopilska oblast’ 45,096(3x/week)
Moloda Halychyna L’viv, Western Ukraine 33,000(3x/week)
Novyny Zakarpattia Zakarpattia 23,000(3x/week)
Svoboda Ternopils’ka oblast’ 35,000
Saturday,98,000^®
Contrast these to the list of popular publications in Crimea, with the large 
number of Russian titles: (in percentages of those polled who read the 
paper)
54 These figures are compiled from a variety of sources including UMB, January 1995 p.
6 the Internet, and from The Media Guide, CIS Information Publishing, 1996. 
Natalchenko, (1997), pp. 6-7.
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PSPftrNewsRapens in Crimea: f  , ■ ■ .
Krymskaia Pravda 61.6%
Krymskie Izvestiia 50.1%
Krymskoe Vremia 32.7%
Krymskaya Gazeta 30.6%
Flag Rodiny 25.3%
Kommunist Kryma 15.4%
Narodnaya Tribuna 14.6%
Business Express 9.7%
Respublika Krym 7.1%
Flot Ukrainy 3.5%
Krymska Svitlytsia 3.3%“
The discrepancy in various figures can be accounted for in a 
number of ways. The chart does not allow for frequency in either case, so 
dailies and weeklies are counted the same. The second chart is for 
overall circulation , which takes into account the trend towards buying 
papers from a kiosk, and not just subscription figures, as in the first chart. 
Furthermore, as previously explained, papers are often shared by several 
readers. Still, relative popularity of both Ukrainian and regional papers is 
evident, as evidenced by the list of popular papers in Western Ukraine 
which differ considerable from national figures.
Using data from several ‘Press Guides’ as well as an online list of 
Ukrainian publications, 271 titles could be documented for this survey. 
This is well below the Ministry of Press’s figures, (The Ministry of Press 
showed in 1994 a total of 2,368 publications registered, of these 1,986 are 
newspapers, 126 magazines, 221 bulletins, 13 almanacs, 4 collections, 
and 18 supplements.^^ The more recent 1996 data shows the number has 
increased to 5,325, with 3,953 newspapers, 1,025 magazines, 148
“  Lakashyna and Khomenko, (1997), pp. 14-16. chart p. 15. The poll questioned a 
sample of Crimean residents, all members of the intelligentsia in various positions. 
Cited in UMB, January, 1995.
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newsletters, 116 collections and 490 almanacs.^®) But for the most recent 
data taken in 1996 from these sources, which provides at least a fair 
sample of the overall press picture in Ukraine, the following figures apply:
Ukrainian Only 149
Ukrainian and Russian 47
Russian Only 51
Other 8
Total Newspaper 271
The data also indicates that expectations of region-language 
distribution hold out for the most part®®. In addition, the distribution of 
weeklies, dailies and others indicates the following pattern:
Frequency Language Number Percentage
Monthly U 7 4.69
R 1 1.96
UR 5 9.80
2/Month U 7 4.69
R 1 1.96
UR 3 6.38
Weekly U 70 46.97
R 27 52.94
UR 22 46.80
2/Week U 13 8.72
R 3 5.88
UR 4 8.51
3/Week U 21 14.09
R 4 7.84
UR 2 4.25
4A/Veek U 2 1.34
R 11 21.56
UR 4 8.5
Daily U 8 5.36
R 8 15.68
UR 5 10.63
According to these figures, even though there are more Ukrainian 
newspapers in Ukraine than in any other language, over half of these 
appear once a week or less. In contrast, over 35% of Russian papers
^  UMB, September 1996 citing figures from June 1996.
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appear at least four times a week (Ukrainian papers in that bracket make 
up only 6.7%).
A variety of subjects are covered in both languages. Russian 
papers addressed topics including news, politics, gossip, youth culture, 
business and economy. Ukrainian papers covered the same topics, and 
nationalist platforms as well. Regional papers tend to appear in Ukrainian, 
except for the industrialised, and therefore Russified, regions of the 
Southeast. The Crimean papers also appear more often in Russian. Kyiv 
has a number of papers in both languages on a variety of topics.
It can therefore be surmised, both from the topics covered and the 
popularity of papers in both languages that Ukrainian has made some 
headway in the newspaper industry. Readers will take news read in 
Ukrainian seriously, and cover ‘serious’ topics such as politics, economy, 
and social commentary in both languages. However, because the number 
of daily papers in Ukrainian is significantly lower than the number of daily 
Russian-language papers, this is an area for improvement. Still, the 
Ukrainian-language media has experienced a great deal of growth. 
Figures again vary, but despite claims from several sources that overall 
production has suffered from financial problems, the Ukrainian Media 
Bulletin cites a drop from 62% of the market to only 5% cornered by 
Russian-language publications-and the same article forecasts an 
improvement in subscription and circulation figures as the market 
improves from its present ‘bottomed out’ state.®°
The lines between journal, periodical, magazine and newspaper are 
somewhat blurred in Ukraine due to the infrequency of some papers’
Complete database charts by language and by region for all forms of mass media 
appear at the end of the chapter.
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appearance and the variety of subjects covered by some publications. For 
example, it is difficult to categorize a publication like Perets\ which is a 
satire magazine, in the same genre as Lel\ an erotic magazine or 
Suchasnist\ a reputable academic journal. Yet all of these fall under the 
heading of ‘journal’ in the Ukrainian Internet digest used as a source for 
newspapers. Even from the somewhat erratic sampling included there, 
one can observe a real majority of Ukrainian-language publications over 
their Russian competition, even in the scientific/technical sphere so long 
dominated by Russian. Western imports, such as the fashion magazine 
Vogue appear in Russian, as they are imported directly from Russia and 
not produced in Ukraine.
Publishing in Ukraine:
Publishing in Ukraine has dramatically changed since Ukrainian 
independence. Where only state publishing houses, regularly funded by 
the government, existed before, a number of private publishers have 
appeared as competition. The number of books published in Ukraine 
overall, and the number published in Ukrainian, has dropped over recent 
years.®^
The following comparison of the last year of state control in 
publishing In Ukraine, and 1993 shows the drop in publishing in Ukrainian:
• 1989 8,449 total titles 50% in Ukrainian
• 1993 5,013 total titles 27% in Ukrainian
UMB, January 1995, p. 6.
Koval, (1995), pp. 3-8.
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Koval estimates that the presses in Ukraine operated at only 39.1% 
of capacity for 1993. There are a number of reasons for the decline of 
publishing, including a generally poor economy, poverty of the populace, a 
state policy which does not encourage culture and several structural 
problems in the industry itself.
For one thing, most printing houses are still state owned. These 
serve not only Ukrainian clients, but other CIS and Russian clients as well, 
making the Russian-language market more profitable at five times the size 
of the Ukrainian market. Publishing houses themselves have other 
problems. Currently there are 750 total, with 24 of these are book 
publishers owned by the state (the number of state publishers before 1989 
numbered 23, with 4 private), 23 state publishers which are run at the 
oblast’ level, 17 newspaper and magazine publishers which are under the 
Ministry of Press and Information, 128 run by scientific organisations, 
educational bodies, or museums, 60 owned by public organisations and 
16 religious publishers. There are a total of 4000 private publishers which 
are limited and joint ventures. Yet despite the growth of the number of 
publishing houses, the total output has declined.
Another problem that concerns Ukrainian publishing is the quality of 
materials generated.
Intent only on quick profits, they (private publishing houses) must be 
censured for a lack of social responsibility. Intent only on quick profits, they 
have flooded the book market with pirated Russian translations of detective 
novels, thrillers, provocative erotica and steamy fiction of certain Western 
writers.
Those publishing houses which concentrate on books in the Ukrainain 
language mostly bring out old literary works which were banned under the 
Soviet regime. Contemporary writings, Ukrainian and other, are ill-served. 
The thorough vetting, careful editing and professional advertising aimed at 
educated readers escape the publishers’ attention. The economics of
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publishing in Ukraine today mean that publicity costs cannot exceed 2 per 
cent of the price of a book, without infringing on profits.®^
The Ministry of Statistics offers statistics which compare the numbers 
for printed media from 1985 to 1995, thus showing changes not only in 
numbers of books, papers and journals but also the relative proportion of 
Ukrainian-language materials in this area.
1985 1990 1991 1993 1994 1995
Books
Quantity of titles 8362 7046 5857 5002 4752 6109
Number of copies 155 170 136 88 52 68
In Ukrainian 78 95 73 40 21 32
Journals
Number (journals 
and periodicals)
206 185 194 522 461 604
Yeariy circulation, (millions) 170 166 95 33 19 24
In Ukrainian 151 150 86 30 13 17
Newspapers
Number of titles 1799 1787 1891 1757 1705 1877^
Yearly circulation 4438 4652 3779 2843 1593 1629
Number of copies 23 25 27 40 20 21
In Ukrainian 15 17 16 26 10 10®^
Ukrainian Television and Radio: Tune in, Drop Dead?
Ukrainian media on television and radio is very much in the 
developmental stage. For those accustomed to giants such as the BBC or 
American networks like ABC, CBS or Fox, the picture that emerges of 
Ukrainian television and radio is quite confusing. Unlike these Western 
bodies where programmes begin and proceed through to broadcasting 
under the same umbrella organisation, Ukrainian media is splintered, 
fragmented, and rather difficult to assess.
Koval, (1995), p 6.
Number of copiesand yearly circulation numbers are in thousands.
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Programmes undergo the usual stages of writing and developing, or 
are imported either from Russia or the West. They are sold and distributed 
to companies, which may be either broadcasting companies or 
channels/stations. Adverts are also bought and sold. Any or all of these 
functions may be filled by a different group, at every level. Though there 
are state television and radio stations/channels in Ukraine, a number of 
private organisations also compete for air time. This means that 
opportunities for language decisions occur at a number of levels, and that 
it is difficult to speak of an exclusively Ukrainian-language or Russian- 
language channel, station, network, company, or producer.®®
Language choice often becomes a second priority after financial 
considerations. For example, a programme may be locally made, using 
one of the studios or production companies from Ukraine; or it may be 
imported either from Russia or another foreign country. Local programmes 
obviously will be cheaper to acquire for broadcasting companies, and will 
require no dubbing, though problems sometimes arise if programming is 
not translated into Russian for the south and east regions of Ukraine.
Local programmes are not always of high quality, and fare badly in 
comparison with imports. Russian programmes may be dubbed into 
Ukrainian to please the Western Ukrainian viewership, or may be aired as 
they are. Western programmes, require dubbing into either language or 
both, and are usually more expensive to buy (which accounts for the age 
of some of the shows which are bought). In this way, Russian ends up on
^  Vypusk Knyzhok, Zhumaiiv I hazet’ in Statystychyni Shchorichnyk Ukrayiny, Kyiv: 
Tekhnika 1996, p. 475.
This explanation, and a lengthy interview on language and cost problems was given by 
Vasyl Yatsuro and Dmitri Ridko of the Centre for Media Initiatives, In Kyiv 1996.
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the air waves as dubbing is one of the few areas where money can be 
saved.
Problems occur again when companies try to make the budget 
necessary to purchase programming with advert sales. Those companies 
which have sufficient money to afford good advertising campaigns do not 
need to advertise much. Conversely, local Ukrainian goods which might 
benefit from advertising on television are produced by companies with 
smaller ad budgets who cannot afford air time. This reduces the amount of 
money a company can earn from ad sales and lowers the operations 
budget.®®
Another related problem is in the area of administration and power 
distribution among regulatory bodies. Here, situations which would be 
believable under a Soviet regime still unbelievably occur-censorship, 
curtailing of privilege of independent stations in favour of state owned 
ones and mismanagement of state properties/incompetence in collecting 
state revenues from media structures. Yet these things occur in modem 
Ukraine and may add to the lack of incentives for foreign investment in the 
media which could help provide training and revenue for local 
companies.®^ However, the government is at least passing legislation 
which may improve the situation if observed. As of June 1996, the Rada 
passed laws declaring that at least 50% of total volume of every channel 
must be locally made, by the company which broadcasts or by a company 
based in Ukraine.®®
Interview, Centre for Media Initiatives President Vasyl Yatsuro and Dmitri Ridko, Kyiv, 
July 1996.
Tkachenko, (1995), pp. 7-8.
UMB official information, p. 13-15, June 1996.
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ORT long aired illegally in Ukraine, bringing even more Russian 
language programming to Ukrainian viewers. Ukrainian stations were not 
forced to pay for the rights to transmit ORT in return for free advertising of 
Russian products which aired with the broadcasts. Recently, the ad 
climate is changing so that ORT is no longer the easiest way to reach 
Ukrainian viewers, which may in time improve the television economy.®® In 
addition, ORT lost some of its ad space, which went to other foreign 
companies (from Germany and other European countries) so that now 1/3 
of Ukraine cannot receive ORT.^° Decisions regarding broadcast time and 
channels in Ukraine are not exclusively linguistic measures, however. 
Politics and the economy dictate that a lessening of the influence of ORT 
could be viewed as advantageous for Ukrainian viewers regardless of 
which language Ukrainian channels chose to use for their programming.
A list of companies involved in whatever capacity with Ukrainian 
media follows, as does a list of the most popular programmes, channels, 
and stations. This too provides a mixed picture-Dynasfy, a soap opera 
from America made in the 1980s, is dubbed into Ukrainian and the streets 
clear visibly for every episode. But Novaya Zhertva, a Brazilian Soap, and 
Pole Chudes, a Wheel of Fortune style game show, -both in Russian- 
also command large audiences.
The general opinion of Ukrainian television remains rather low. The 
news broadcasts on Ukrainian channels lack the polish and 
professionalism of ORT news, for example, and ORT still carries items 
which interest the Ukrainian viewership such as Russian music and 
Ukrainian weather forecasts. Recent reports from Ukraine show that a new
Krouk, (1996), pp. 5-7. See also Kuzio, (1997), pp. 370-372, concerning fake joint 
ventures set up by Russian companies to avoid paying tax.
145
Chanel, Odyn plus Odyn, has started to improve this image slightly. It 
carries imported American and European films, all dubbed into Ukrainian. 
ORT has been moved to a lower channel, while UT1 has added popular 
programming including Santa Barbara five times a week instead of two, 
dubbed into Ukrainian rather than Russian. Kuzio comments.
This rather astute form of Ukrainisation produced only muffled protests from 
a small number of Communist Party pensioners In Sevastopol, which again 
showed that only in this region of Ukraine was there hostility to the Ukrainian 
language per se.^ ^
Radio seems to fare slightly better.Local radio offers a variety of 
programmes, including music from the West, Ukraine and Russia, news, 
and special interest reports. There are a large number of listeners for 
foreign radio as well, including Radio Liberty, Deutche Welle, and BBC 
World Service. Recent statistics show the breakdown of listeners as 
follows:
Station Any Language Russian Ukrainian
Radio Liberty 11 7.4 7.7
VOA 8.9 4.7 4.7
BBC 5.1 3.2 3.4
Radio Vatican 1.4 1.4 —
Deutche Welle 1.2 0.8 1.0""
Ukrainians Oniine: Developing resources on the internet
Any contemporary discussion of media must include what is 
available on the Internet. Here, Ukrainians are online more than one might 
expect given the lack of modern software and the host of other problems 
which thwart them. While many of the Ukrainian language sites are from
Kuzio, (1997), p. 371.
Kuzio, (1997), p. 371.
Statistics in percentages of persons polled, taken from BBC survey ‘Media Survey in 
Ukraine’, March/April 1995, BBC International Broadcasting Audience Research January 
1996.
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Canada or other areas of diaspora, these sites serve as a powerful 
resource in that they provide links and catalogs for other Ukraine-based 
addresses. These include newspapers which are updated on a regular 
basis, bulletins from the Rada, and Web pages from various institutions 
such as Taras Shevchenko University.
While it is difficult to make any list exhaustive, especially as sites 
appear and disappear almost daily, it can be noted that Ukrainian media is 
available from a number of good sources on the Web, in Ukrainian, and is 
but a simple download away from the computer-literate. Furthermore, 
many media organisations and others now have email accounts, making 
them accessible from yet another angle. This area is very much under 
development, and cannot be treated as totally reliable if only because 
some sites are irregularly updated or do not easily download. But armed 
with a basic list of Ukrainian sites which catalogue more recent 
developments, those seeking Ukrainian language can add their computers 
to the list of ways to interface with Ukraine.
Furthermore, a dictionary of basic terms in Ukrainian relating to the 
Internet and telecommunications has been produced. Though it is not a 
large volume, it contains not only relevant lexical items in English and 
Ukrainian, but also media information in the form of lists of calling codes, 
helpful addresses for Ukrainian users on the Net and basic information 
about the new technologies.^^
Language in advertising and cinema;
Another area of concern is the language of advertisements 
appearing in the media in Ukraine. Should ads appear in the state
Kossak and Kravec, (1996).
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language exclusively, or in the language of the publication or broadcast? 
Or should the law of compact settlement be followed so that 
advertisiments appear or are broadcasted in the language acceptable to 
the local minority. The law approved by the Verkhovna Rada on 5 March 
leaves the question unanswered. This means that on the streets of Kyiv, 
for example, one finds a mixture of Russian, Ukrainian and English along 
with other foreign languages in posted advertisements, while both Russian 
and Ukrainian ads appear on television and radio.
Cinema deserves a brief mention as this medium served the 
Soviets well in their propaganda campaigns, and as Russian films remain 
popular in Ukraine. One source recently commented that there were few 
films being made or shown in Ukrainian, but that on a brighter note, a new 
television channel broadcasts American imports dubbed into Ukrainian 
and enjoys huge popularity. '^*
Language planning and Ukrainian language media:
No one would be wise to paint the Ukrainian language media of 
Ukraine as a total success story. Especially compared to language 
planning attempts in education, the media seems to be lagging behind, 
thwarted by an inability to enforce language policies and by bad finances.
Regionalism makes this area of study even more complex: in the 
West, one would find Russian-language press and broadcasting relatively 
low-profile, hardly a presence at all. In Crimea, however, Ukrainian 
programmes are not trusted and may even be resented by locals who do 
not speak the state language. Ukrainian-language programmes are
Ermolenko, June 1998, comments as part of personal letter.
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considered unprofessional, and that Ukrainian journalists are too 
nationalist, too prone to stirring up ethnic discord or are partisan. The rest 
of the country is a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian.
What could be learned from the positive experience in the field of 
education and possibly transferred to media? As in education, Soviet 
language planners enjoyed great success first nationalising the media 
under Ukrainisation, and again during the years of Russification when 
Ukrainian-language media decreased significantly. Similar reasons for the 
success of Soviet programmes apply in both areas. First of all, the element 
of compulsion and fear meant that reading or listening to Ukrainian- 
language output could be dangerous. Next, Russian-language papers, 
radio programmes and other types of media, especially cinema were both 
widely available and appealing to the audience for their professionalism, 
high quality and ‘trendiness’. Russian films remain very popular, partly 
because of their high quality and partly because of their great influence 
during Soviet times, which meant no doubt that political influence 
transferred to linguistic influence via films which reached many, many 
people.
Obviously, the Soviets had better finances and resources at their 
disposal, and were not opposed to threats and coercion to increase the 
popularity of Russian-language media. Now in the democratic climate of 
Ukraine, when anything that looks like political influence or government 
bullying produces an outcry in the press, more moderate measures must 
be undertaken. A series of proposals forwarded by the Council on 
Language policy, (established in February 1997), which were later 
approved by the president include the following:
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• Tax breaks on Ukrainian language publications
• Greater subsidies to Ukrainian language textbooks in literature 
and education
• Financial subsidies to the Tovarystvo’s Prosvita, Znannia and 
Ukra j^na to help implement these policies
• Evolutionary protectionist policies for the printing of Ukrainian 
language publications^®
At the time of writing, the fate of this legislation remains unknown, 
but should it pass and be enforced, this could both generate revenue for 
an already strained industry and help limit the number and quantity of 
Russian language publications and programmes. Indeed, the National 
Council on Television and Radio Broadcasting, the State Radio Company 
and Ministry of Information have threatened sanctions if more Ukrainian- 
language programming is not introduced, a move which could indicate 
how media language usage will be regulated in the future.
Already one can see a difference in the quality of Ukrainian 
programming and papers, but this must continue to improve to win viewers 
and readers away from slick Russian products. In summary, while 
Ukrainian media leaders may feel they cannot afford to stop producing 
large quantities of Russian-language material, the government would 
benefit from making it so they cannot afford to keep filling the market with 
Russian-language products.
As with education, these changes must be gradual and work in 
tandem with other social and linguistic processes. As education reforms 
begin to work, and more people become comfortable speakers of
Kuzio, (1997), p. 367
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Ukrainian, one would expect Ukrainian-language media to increase in 
popularity, provided the quality is sufficient. On the other side, the media 
must be encouraged to support state-building, unifying processes and 
education by making good Ukrainian-language programming and printed 
matter available. Although at present, the media appears not to have 
benefited as greatly as education from language planning attempts, it is 
also not as firmly under government control concerning language 
practices; furthermore, it is not considered as high a priority as education. 
Those who hope to pass good legislation to improve the situation must be 
prepared to enforce these laws evenly, without resorting to censorship and 
without allowing politics to invade the press except as news. Although it 
may not reach as many people as the school system of Ukraine, media 
should not be underestimated as a means to support and implement 
language changes, as Soviet experience has shown. Nor should those in 
the media be prepared to undermine both language planning and state- 
building, whatever their finances, by continuing to fall victim to pressure to 
produce Russian-language materials.
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Supplement to Chapter Four: Media In Ukraine 
Sample of available media
It should be noted that the data appearing below is presented in the format 
in which it originally appeared. Spellings of publications and media bodies 
reflect the language of the publication of origin, although place names are 
rendered uniformly.
Some abbreviations have been used for reasons of space. Languages 
have been abbreviated so that U appears for Ukrainian, R for Russian, G 
for German, E for English, H for Hungarian, P for Polish and Ro for 
Romanian.
Online media in Ukraine has grown substantially since the data below 
were assembled. Numerous sites now exist for Ukrainian papers and 
educational establishments as well as Ukrainian cultural information.
Online media:
Name http Email
pEàstem Economist— 
"Ukraine Publications
' : homepage.interaccess.com/~matlid/index 
; .html.
Matlid@delphi.com
East View Publications 
Klkraine service 
Express Chronicle Daily 
News
i //www.eastview.com/ukri.html
//www.gu.kiev.uk/News/ExpressChronide 
■ /indes.html
books@eastview.co
m
Financial Ukraine _ 
Weekly
: //www.finukr.kiev.ua/
Kharkiv party //miso.wwa.com/~oleg/Kharkiv/index.html j oleg@mcs.com
Supreme Rada of 
Ukraine
.  hw
'. //www.rada.kiev.ua/welcome.html
M
\
j root@Alpha.rada.kie 
jV.ua,
Ukraine, the //world.std.com/~sabre/U KRAINE.html
1 WcDmasicr(a^ /Vipna.,.
ÜkrWne Home Page //www.physics.mcgill.ca/VWVW/oleh/ukr-
info.html
! oleh@physics.mcgilI 
! .ca
UkrsuneTV Information //W W W . webcom.com/~ninnet/ukraine.html ——
^Ukrainian Legal 
Foundation
//world.std.com/~sabre/lacd/ulf.home.html j sabre@sabre.org
! (Rebecca Schneider)
Ukrainian Newspapers {//kolo.esc.kharkov.ua/Ukraine/newspaper
iS.html
1 WebAdm@KOLO.K 
' harkov.Ua (Alex 
‘ Koval)
Ukrainian Server //www.osc.edu/ukraine.html ; pyz@panix.com
UN Office in Ukraine
. -
7/www.un.kiev.ua/ ' commando@un.kiev. 
jua
Looks International 
Newspaper
//W W W . lucky, net/looks/ 1 _
//www.gu.net/officemag/ - ——
//W W W . g u. n et/C H1P/
SGbamBk
//W W W . inf. kiev. ua/w/ ; —
gEkspr%SrKhronika ; //www.gu.net.News/Express Chronicle/
//www.kolo.esc.kharkov.ua i or
' //www.kolo.esk.khar 
! kov.ua/ukraine/Khar 
ikiv/VH/
InVestAsionnaia Gazeta ' //www.inf.kiev.ua/inf.paper/ —
' Kievskie Novosti //www.elvisti.kiev.ua
Ukrainian Press server //www.ukraine. org/press .html 
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VAvww.gu.net/NEWS/Radio 
Lux/RLux.html____________
/Avww.Ukrainet.Lvlv.UA ' //www.rada.kiev 
ua/bjack/radio/html
/  ' //www.ukraine.org/press.html
Journals;
Name Lang
u
\Sdbm6sti Verkhovna, U R
Rady ükrayiny 
Viche UR
Vf^lcoUkrayiny U
U
^ u
u
VsesW
Dzvin , '
Dllovyi Visnyk ' UR
Dnipro U
Derzhavnist* U
Ekomonika Ukrayiny U
Zhinka . U
! Zhumalist Ukrayiny U
20hliaiLiudy U
; Ukrayiny
Kyyiv- U
Kyyivs'ka Starovina ^  U
Kiynytsia . U
Kiefer lUNESKO :  U
L W # r iS v i t  U
Maliatkb . u
IWiizhnar&fnyi T uryzm U
Nâuibil Suspil’stvo - U
Ukrayiny
Poli 
Prav
RaduM -^ -
Ranol!^ ^^ >'y
4 ' U
RozbEKfova derzhavy U 
Svitovyd .V  V ' U 
SvitioiTih* % U
Sil’s’kyl Obriy U
U
Slovo I Chas 
Start
Soniashnyk
Suchasnist'
U
U
UE
U
Gity
Zhytomyr
Kyiv
Kharkiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Lviv
Kyiv
Kyiv
L'viv
Kyiv
EVA (Vilnius, foreign) UR —
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Poltava
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Aviv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Subject
literature, art 
kids
literature, art, politics
cinema
newsletter
politics
army
literature, art, politics 
foreign literature 
literature, art, politics 
trade, industry 
literature, art, politics 
Politics
Academy of Sciences and
Ministry of Education
Women
Women
Writers' Union
Technical practices. Ministry of
Agriculture
Politics, literature
Popular science and literature
Literature and art
UN journal
Erotic
popular science and religion 
Children
travel and business
popular science, literature, and
art
youth
movie reviews
Youth
Ecology
popular science
Socio-political
legal
literature, art, politics
politics, art, literature for youth
Nature
Political
literature, art
Photography
politics, literature, art
Ministry of Interior
Literature
Sport
youth writers 
literature, art, social life
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conomjst
Hadasho
Hal&
#m# -
Okiiiriian Business E
Ukrayins’kyi  ^ .7 U 
llitorychnyi Zhurnal "
I \^ndow on Ukraine E 
Zhumalist Ukrayina UR
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Aviv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Kyiv
Politics
politics, literature, art
culture and education
business
business
home interest
news
news, Jewish
finance
Agriculture
Medicine
Satire
Sport
Business
Business
History
economics, business 
journal of union_____
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Television and Radio:
; ; J MEDIUM LANGUAGE : CIRCULATION '
: 3. studio TV Broadcasting company ^TV ! 0^
TV 0
TV 0
# ^ O ^ ^ R # d n a t T V , TV U Ro 0
TV none 01
Gnme&tv-Radio Company TV none 0\
CommercialTV SIstema Ltd TV inone 0
iDer^a’^ a  Teieradiomqwa 
K o rn # #  Ukrayiny “
radio none 0|
s
H ü iB ^ a iiQ n â S V - ■ • TV U 1500000
TV UR 0
j Inïinacronal Comhiercfal  ^
; Telemion and Radio
radio U E R
i
0
i International Commercial TV and 
RadionCompany ICTV
TV U RE1
j :
i
International Media Centre TV U 0
ÎIPIKièyjK , ,TV u 01
ïWevCityiRadio , radio i none I 0,
! Khmgnyts’kyl TV and Radio 
lAssodation
TV ! U  R 0.
1 Kherson State TV and Radio TV : i Oj
[Wev Regional Radio radio none !^ I
1 kirovohrad State Regional 
! Teleradio Company
radio i U  R
; 1
800000.
i Kharkiv State TV and Radio TV i none 1 O '
j Aviv State Teleradio Company s^ radio ’ U 0
Aviv State Teleradio Company TV : U 5000000 i
; Luhansk State TV and Radio 
Comparty
jTV
1
0,
[Megapol Studio TV U R 0
iMisTTV. TV U 1000000:
'Nova^Mova ‘ TV | U  I 0|
i National Radio Company of 
luktaiife ■
j radio
1i !
520000001
i NaukajStudio TV i I O'
Î Marodnpe Televidenie ‘Galichina’ TV ! 1 O ’
! National TV Company of Ukraine TV u 16000000
iProvesin Radio Station radio ' none 0
i Prime Time TV lU R 0.
i PravoTV and Radio ' TV 0
radio Ro.R Oi
i Radio Ukraine World Sen& e:''*':' i radio iUEG 0;
i Radio Voskresinnya ” radio .none 0|
Skatev uV. , ' TV UR I o ’
! Tet a Tet Commerçai TV Company TV UR 01
TETTV Company r iTV R 10000.
iTeleradioReklama" /  ' TV U j O!
iTabatchukfv TV lU 1 0,
|T V 4  r _  " TV UR 01
I Uzhhorod-Contact Regional Radio radio !U  ! 0
1 Ünlka independent TV Association I TV IU  R  1 0:
; Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs TV 0
; Ukraine Teleradiocompany TV UR ! 5500000
• UTAR Ukrainian Television and 
[Radio
radio l u  1 0^
* The 'O' in this column means figures were unavailable.
155
ü^cralrüamKadlo and Television  ^ TV u 0
m rain lanTV ;& ^' % :^ p .. .  -  . TV u 0
K à ln ia n  TVw A m ef^^ ' TV u 01
Vm nitsiia , TV 1 0
W o m y r  S ts @ # R   ^TV ' u p Oi
' Z a p o r o z h s k o ^ fe a S ^ ^ ^ a ÏT i -  - ’ radio 
T e le ra cB o C o #% K  .4^
I F ^ ................... [ 2500000j
--------------------- -—1
I Company, 
Compat
radio
. radio
UGHSI
UGSIH
1500000
iU P
1500000
0 .
Newspapers:
-  Name Lang No City
. IrffiL, .if. ■ URA weekly Kyiv
Ahrami.Visti U weekly Temopir
U — Donets'k
[:^Baiaq_5 :R
:U
monthly
weekly
...Kyiv............ . .............. ..........
Kyiv
.UR 4/week Aviv
AvtomobiivSe<ro(^ra R bi-weekly Kyiv
Abdel . . R — Simferopol'
A%&o#ev . URE weekly Kyiv
|AVk) '  : tV . iU R bi-weekly Kyiv
jBanidvs’ka Hazela lUR weekly Kyiv
[WneiZbtftia -• 44^-^ lu 4/week Ternopil'
:B iz n a & ' " I r i weekly Kyiv
' B izn ^ ko n t# ( ; Z-.' > lUR * weekly Vinnitsia
'; Biaî^^tza Nedei@u): " lUR ' weekly Kyiv
( Boulevard R bi-weekly Kyiv
iB ü s în ^  Rlb » f  r }URE 1 weekly Kyiv
Bvkovma . . .  . iU 2 /week Chernivtsi
I B d l o f t l ’k e V j i ie  . ! r r 2 /week Chernivtsi
îBülava"/ ' S  * U 1 weekly Kherson
,u 3/week Chernivtsi
U weekly Khmel'nyts'kyi
U
U
<U
U
UR
U
' daily 
; 2 /week 
weekly 
12 /weekly 
weekly
Cherkasy 
Dniepropetrovs'k 
Cherkasy 
, Chernivtsi 
Chomobyl
1 Chemihiv |
f'ëhOT^yi' Prdm iMë^^:'- |U weekly Sumy 1
: Chomomors'ki Novyny^ 'U weekly bdesa i
DelovyeNovosti R 3/week Kyiv
Deiovôi luzhanîn iR — i Mykolayiv
ben'uben' lu 1 weekly Kyiv
Desnians'kaPravda ,u 2 /week I Chernihiv
Deutscherkdnal v" ' 'UR I monthly Kyiv
bialoh I U weekly Rivne i
U 3/week L'viv
Dilova Cherkashchyna U — ■ Cherkasy
Dilova Ukrayina UR 2 /week Kyiv 1
Diiove^karpattia iU weekly Uzhhorod ^
Delovlye Novosti |R weekly Kyiv _ ;
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Dàèpropetrovskaia,, i '
i m # Ë k , ( a z R ; j ^ % :  '
R
-------------
U
U
R
i 4/week
1"
4/week
weekly
i Dnepropetrovs’k
Sumy 
i Donets’k 
 ^Donets’k
Demokiatichna ukfévTna - y .... weekly Kyiv
Dziennlk Kiiowski p? ! monthly Kyiv
I E É ^ ^ p i i t ï s ^ i . -V .. R i weekly 1 Uzhhorod 1
iN f f i& f ia k h -  Ukra^hÿ-îk.^to U weekly * Kyiv 1
UR bi-weekly Kyiv 1
R weekly Kyiv
URA i 3/week ! Kyiv !
UR weekly Kyiv
RnansovyiKwiv UR weekly Kyiv
iMagRôdIny ' R daily  ^Sevastopol'
s R o f Ukrayiny U — : Sevastopol' j
[Fortuna R weekly ■ Kyiv i
iFrankova Krinitsia % \ ' U 1 weekly  ^Aviv Î
GoIos:Donbassa " iR weekly Luhans’k
Hovorif l Pokazuie Ukrayina U weekly Kyiv i
Gubemüa UR weekly Kherson 1
Halichina U daily Ivano-Frankivs'k
HalKs'ki Kontrakty U weekly Aviv
Hart i U weekly Kyiv
Nash Gorod R — Zaporizhzhia
Hbloœ^krayiny ^ 1UR 1 daily Kyiv
l a f v # U monthly , Kyiv i
1 Irtïérièm Zakonu U weekly __ Kyiv !
[ Indoéûààl’noe Zaporozh’e R 4/week Zaporozhye
; Interes UR — Zhytomyr
1 IndUsMai noe Zap o ro ^ ’e R daily Zaporizhzhia
lug R 4/week Odesa
Kam'lanyi Brid r i U monthly Luhans'k
karpafi IgazSzo - Uzhhorod
K # # # k a  Ukrayina U _ weekly Uzhhorod
W é^kylVestnik R 3/week Kyiv
Khadàshot Novosti UR monthly Kyiv
; Khersons'kyi Visnyk U — Kherson i
IkîevsJdye Vedomosti UR i daily Kyiv i
KIno Kyr*ier ; UR ! monthly Kyiv !
Kievskie Novosti R * weekly Kyiv i
Kyyiys'kà Pravda U , 3/week Kyiv i
ÎKievReklamy ^ UR weekly 1 Kyiv 1
W ro v o iriis ’ica Pravda •U ' 3/week i Kirovohrad 1
Krÿnskaia Gazeta R i daily Crimea
Komwhist U 1 — Kyiv
Kommersant Ukrainÿ.u : R 1 weekly 1 Kyiv
KbmrT6 i^ntlugâr":% ^?L_ R i weekly Odesa
Kontram; R weekly Kyiv
Vedomosti Daily Kopeika R daily Kyiv I
Kiev Post E weekly : Kyiv 1
Krai ; %^ UR weekly Kyiv 1
Kreshchatyk U daily _ Kyiv ____  j
Krimskaya Izvestiya R daily Crimea
ïôims?kaSvitlytsia i U I weekly Simferopol" |
Krylia Ukrairiy R ; weekly Kyiv !
Krymskaia Pravda R daily Simferopol' I
Kryms'kyi Visnyk U bi-weekly Crimea
Kul'tura i Zhyttia U weekly Kyiv
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UR iwæ kly Kyiv
K v 4 te M l”RàtriïrW iâ- •' ■•U Kyiv
.. jU R weekily Kyiv
,L i% % m m aU lM yinâ ........... |U weekly iKyiv
j G i —— Donets’k
,R 3/week ; Luhans'k
Usfifs-klOhôloshênnia . l u weekly Aviv
jU R weekly Kyiv
œ 6® s fa v ? R a ® » '£ 'ï - . : '  -4i R , daily Makivka, Donets’k
R  ^weekly Zaporizhzhia
jURA
i
1 monthly 1 Kyiv i
# # ÿ u l « ) # n é t g :  :r > lU weekly Chernivtsi i
!U 3/week Aviv
Mol’otfCherkashdhvny lu — ! Cherkasy
RKIBdIzhna Aazeta '  • lu weekly Zhytomyr j
i # # a  Hromada •' ’ U , weekly 1 Poltava i
# # 'D k r a y ih y U 3/week Kyiv 1
Moipda Volyn’ U — Luts’k 1
# A K n y h â u 2  week Kyiv 1
Nal^kChas - . U weekly Kyiv !
NashaDytyna .</ %  : U monthly Kyiv 1
! Naddniprians'ka Pravda u 3/week i Kherson 1
iNasha Respublika ^ R weekly Kyiv I
Narodna Hazeta , U weekly i Kyiv 1
■ Narodna Armila ' U daily Kyiv i
Nârodrie Slovo v U 3/week ! Kirovohrad j
1 Narodna Trybuna ÎU —— Luts'k j
! Nâèbdoznavstvo """ lu bi-weekly i^ iv  :
iN ^H a.V ira  ^ iU bi-weekly Kyiv
: Neskorena Islatslia iU bi-weekly iKyiv
I^News from Ukraine UE weekly : Kyiv
i Nêzavisimost’ U weekly Kyiv
ÎNôar UR? — Kyiv
|NovytB.en' - > IU , weekly ' Kherson.....................
fN o ^ S h a s  f  ' lu weekly * Ivano-Frankivs’k
1 N6 vàia£konomicheskaia 
-Pôlitika"
U bi-weekly Crimea
i Novosti . ‘ 4 IR weekly " l ^ v ........ 1
Novyny Zarkapaïtii! U weekly Uzhhorod I
, Odesskyi Vestnik .r R daily i Odesa |
O s m a  ^ U : weekly ' Kyiv I
W w ra m a  5-.f, IU 12/week 1 Vinnitsia i
UR 1 weekly i Kharkiv |
tPëœ nîenâ > i 3 î j R i weekly Kyiv j
rB em tsW L U ' bi-weekly Kyiv 1
fpjiO m - '= ' . U weekly  ^Kyiv 1
| P # a  . . U — Khmel’nyts’kyi 1
! p ^ a l .  . y U - 3/week 1 Vinnitsia i
Pcikarpats’kàR ûs’ 1 . 1 U i weekly : Uzhhorod ;
fPdldykSumilnnîà  ^ ' 1U i weekly L’viv 1
i Pi>ffâys!kyi VisdyR. -  1U weekly Poltava !
^Pôrib-Fcanko ; R 4/week Odesa !
IPc&Pbstup . " i l Y U weekly L’viv 1
tposrednik 1R weekly Kyiv i
. Pan +  PanI U weekly Temopir i
i Prapor lunosti - : UR weekly Dnepropetrovs’k i
 ^Pravda ükrainy  ^^  ’ î R daily Kyiv I
iPrèdprinimater , - R , weekly Rivne i
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P r ia z o ^ iî Babochîi R i 4/week ' Mariypol', Donets’k |
Prikordonnyk Ulqayloy i UR  ^2 /week Kyiv 1
Piik&rpafs'kaPiaviçra'’ U l2 /wek Ivano-Frankivs’k
1 Hjr ; weekly Kyiv
' f r k ^ B s v iè S '^ : - . - . R 1 weekly ' Dnepropetrovsk
p # m k o v a % W  : : : i .......... U : -- Kyiv
iJRlBoefiaya jGàzèta'Ulôaftiy^ R i daily 1 Kyiv
UR 1 weekly 1 Kyiv
U weekly Kyiv
iZ lîïfè tnyrshctoa  _ ,
U . 3/week Zhytomyr
i Raâians’ké Pc?blnfi^ia UR 3/week Mykolayiv
... U 13/week Aviv
UR I weekly Kyiv :
‘RIAiVÿt|iitsîa ^r,"  ^J / U ! weekly Vinnitsia !
m n a lê r n i ia U Î 2 /week Ivano-Frankivs’k I
RivôeJ^echimi ' ' 2 U — ! Rivne i
' Rcptaycha Hazëfa ^ UR daily Kyiv 1
Roden Krai B weekly Odesa ■
Ryoochnaia Ploshad’ R weekly Kyiv
! Rus'Kyyivs'ka U monthly —  ‘
f Sarnostiina Ukrayina " U  ^bi-weekly Kyiv
^Séilans'ka Hazeta ' UR weekly ' Kharkiv
‘S ioP o ltavske  " . j U daily ’ Poltava i
rSD^sTkiVistl U daily 1 Kyiv !
siava Sevastopolia i R daily Sevastopol'
1 Shiîakh Peremohy U weekly Aviv
iSlava 1 Chest" UR daily Odesa
; Sloblds’kyl Krai U 3/week Kharkiv i
jStoboda , i  i UR 2 /week ’ Kharkiv
SIdvo ' <■>;'. i U weekly Kyiv 1
Sobytie " I R 3/week ' Kharkiv j
iSôhor R — ' Dnepropetrovsk
i$pdftyvna Hazeta *U 3/week Kyiv
[Vedomosti Sport R 2 /week Kyiv
[&ibnaZem lia U weekly Uzhhorod 1
[Stadion UR weekly Kyiv
Starozhitnosti , , UA bi-weekly Kyiv !
Students'kyi Visnykr^* ! U monthly Kyiv
Sumshchyna . > V ! U 3/week Sumy
Sums’ka Novyna t 1U weekly Sumy
Svoboda %  ! U 2 /week Temopir j
SvoaDeio r .  - s. . ) R weekly I Dnepropetrovs’k !
iS elo lliudy^ ", ' U weekly Cherkasy !
!te m 5^ ty iS h liakh ..J  r , : i U weekly : Temopir |
T o W s h  -  Lr UR  ^weekly Kyiv
üïa-âlnran Business News . R  ^weekly Odesa •
ïükrayina. EvropafSvït U p weekly Kyiv i
Ûkrayins'ka Medychna 
+ jà z e fa '' " '
U weekly Temopir j
ükrayins'kyi Futbol U ......... weekly Kyiv
Ukrayins'ka Hazeta U weekly Kyiv
Ukrayina Moiodaya Ü 12 /week Kyiv
Ükrayins'kyi Ohliadach 
Ukraÿins'ke Slovo
UR
U
monthly
weekly
; K yiv .......... .........................J
Kyiv j
Vechemii Dnepr R 4/week Dnepropetrovs’k |
Vechemii Donets’k ;R 4/week Donets’k '>
Vechemii Kiev R daily Kyiv
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|R i ““ 1 Mykolayiv
R 4/week Odesa
jU 3/week 1 Poltava
% # # Ë s ^ ,^ p o r % IR i 2/week  ^Sevastopol'
jUR 3/week  ^Kharkiv
V @ a & n g Z h # & # ^ < IR ' weekly Zhytomyr
>fecheraiaia Yÿnnftsià - ;r : ' R ' weekly ^Vinnitsia |
# h * r 2/week Zhytomyr |
:u ! weekly Zhytomyr |
!#^#W Jkray|nw  < u i 3/week Aviv
u 12/week i Rivne
jU 3/week Vinnitsia
|U , 3/week Vinnitsia
:uR  ^bi-weekly Kyiv
u weekly 1 Kyiv
']@ W # ^ e n s W iv # .. ' u i 2/week Rivne
,u weekly Kyiv
î è ô i t i S  •;l : ' \ ‘ u ! — Kyiv
; # & i k IU 3/week Luts'k j
iVpIjw’^ Rivne) u : 2/week Rivne
iVoskresnaia Panorama R * weekly Kharkiv |
jVpered U weekly Ivano-Frankivs’k i
R  ^4/week Kharkiv '
N^limainskie Vedomoÿ R 14, daily Kyiv 1
^Khai^kovskie Gubemslde - R  ^weekly Kharkiv
1 Vedomosti
: ICimefnychchyna U weekly Khmel'nyts'kyi
iKhmefnyts’ki Visti U — Khmel'nyts'kyi
lYuzbnyKur’er R Simferopol
iZakomrSiznes ' :% U weekly I Kyiv j
i^karpats'ka Pravda U 2/week Uzjihorod !
! Zamkova Hora  ^ . . , u monthly Kyiv i
WsockyiZamok UR daily Aviv '
jZa NezaTezhnist' U weekly  ^ Ivano-Frankivs’k j
^Zapo# U . weekly Temopir |
Zapdrozhskaya Pravda U daily Zaporozhye
ZapomgkaSich . J\ UR daily Zaporizhzhia ;
Zakhidpyi Kur i^er U weekly Ivano-Frankivs’k I
Zakhidna Ukrayina / ,  „ U weekly Temopir
^oroViaKyian v  ™* {  I UR j monthly Kyiv j
Vashe^doroVia ^  :U i monthly I Kyiv i
-ZeleniiJ^vit. .4 ^ -  *4^' U^ ' bi-weekly Kyiv i
ZemHaPpdîrskâ, , r f : } U ■ weekly j Vynnitsia j
a y to n ÿ f  1U weekly Zhytomyr |
, v / \ R — Donets’k
9zn*£iganska ' R  ^weekly  ^Luhans'k
ZMca .  4 » ^ 1U 3 weekly Kyiv
Zlahoda . U weekly Kyiv
a tiln à -^  ë  . , U weekly Rivne
Zoriav-^x- ^ U 3/week 1 Dnepropetrovs’k |
Zoria Poltavshchyny U 3/week Poltava f
IZorile' Ro" 2/week Chemivtsi ’
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Chapter Five: Education in Ukraine:
The first thing one must note about the education system in Ukraine 
is that numbers may not entirely be trusted. As a mass means of language 
instruction, enculturation and socialisation, schools play a vital role in 
Ukrainian language policy and practice. Yet a quantifiable analysis of the 
position of Ukrainian language in Ukrainian schools remains difficult. A 
brief outline of the history of Ukrainian education, combined with a survey 
of legislation under the Soviets, and since glasnost and independence 
may yield a rough framework for study. The real picture—which language 
is used for instruction and examination, the teaching of Ukrainian and 
Russian in both Ukrainian and Russian schools and the situation in a 
given classroom -  escapes description by numbers alone.
An example of the complexity of the language situation in Ukrainian 
schools are English lessons at School 51, in the most expensive 
neighbourhood in Kyiv. This school is attended by the children of 
diplomats and members of the government, and is generally considered 
advanced. In a group of fifteen and sixteen year olds, who have been 
educated partially under the Soviet system and partly under the Ukrainian 
system, an interesting phenomenon appears. Lessons were conducted by 
the teacher in English, and Russian when necessary, as she had travelled 
as a child and found Ukrainian difficult. Students responded and did their 
translations into Russian, unless prompted by the teacher with warnings of 
failure at university if Ukrainian was not completely mastered. Some 
students responded naturally in Ukrainian, especially the ethnic 
Ukrainians. Others found this difficult, including several Georgians and 
Russians. When a recent translation of ‘Haiwatha’ by Longfellow was read
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to them in Ukrainian, most of the students laughed. They were used to the 
Russian version. Despite all of this, the school is considered a Ukrainian 
school.^
At first one is tempted to criticise such a situation as not at all 
conducive to the use and improvement of the Ukrainian of the school 
students. However, the English teacher has received a number of awards 
for pedagogy, and remains above reproach in her teaching methods if not 
in her use of Ukrainian. Should she be removed from her post since she 
does not use Ukrainian comfortably? Could a suitable replacement be 
found? Obviously, it is expected that these students will be forced to use 
Ukrainian at university, and indeed field work at Taras Shevchenko 
university proves this is very likely. For students who do not use Ukrainian 
at home, this transition may prove very difficult. Effort obviously has been 
made to incorporate the state language into education, but Russian 
remains prevalent. This situation is worrisome because if students do not 
learn to use Ukrainian in school and university, where will they receive 
adequate tuition in their state language?
This language situation in Ukrainian schools must be examined 
from two viewpoints. First, how many schools use Ukrainian as the 
language of instruction? Their situation is complicated by the lack of 
materials, the quality of materials they do possess, and the lack of trained 
teachers who can lecture in Ukrainian. Secondly, how much Ukrainian is 
taught in Russian and other minority schools? If Ukrainian is not the 
primary language in which lessons are conducted, the students still must 
receive enough Ukrainian language tuition to function in Ukrainian 
language universities or technical schools.
 ^ From field work in Kyiv, October 1997.
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The crucial question when profiling education in Ukraine remains 
how effective is the educational system, from pre-school to university, in 
supporting and enforcing language planning? It is important to decide if 
Ukrainian schools are not only educating Ukrainians in the Ukrainian 
language, but also in their native culture. As a tool for language planning, 
education should also prepare civic-minded citizens to be not only able but 
willing to support the state language, and maintain its literary standards.
The system:
Ukraine’s education system is comprised of a network of pre­
schools, elementary and high schools, technical schools and universities. 
Length of study depends on the qualification a student wishes to achieve.
Numbers vary as to the number of schools. For example, one 
source suggests there are 911 higher education establishments with four 
accreditation grades, while another source gives the totals at 255 higher 
education institutions, 68 of which are universities, 169 of which are 
institutes. In addition, 123 private institutions have been licensed by the 
Ministry of Education. It may be that the first source included higher 
vocational institutions as part of the 911 schools of higher education.^
The system may sound complicated to an outsider. One may become a 
junior specialist at either a vocational school (technical or practical degree) 
or an institution of higher learning after two years. After four or more years, 
one may become a specialist, receive a Bachelor’s degree, or receive a 
Master’s degree. A Bachelor’s degree usually takes four years; an 
additional year studying a specific subject will earn a specialist diploma
 ^The first source is website the second source is
from a background paper on Ukraine by Andrew Wilkens and Margrit Ostmann.
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and a qualifications such as teacher or engineer. Master’s degrees take an 
additional one to two years.
Postgraduate study is also divided by degrees. Three or four years 
of further study after the Master’s degree will enable a student to obtain a 
Candidate of Sciences degree, roughly equivalent to a Western Doctor of 
Philosophy. This degree requires submission of a thesis and its defence 
before a specially convened board of examiners.
The doctor of sciences is a more advanced degree following the 
candidate of sciences and requires more extensive research. Ukrainian 
education personnel insist this qualification is actually higher than the PhD 
earned in the United States or Europe. After this degree is obtained, a 
student may become an associate professor. An academic career can 
then progress to a full professor, which is equal to the status of full 
professor in other countries.^
Teacher training is level-specific. This means that primary school 
teachers and below are trained at institutes to the level of junior 
specialists, educators or teachers. Secondary school teachers attend 
teacher training institutes up to degree grade III or IV (as opposed to I or II 
for primary school teachers). Teachers who wish to teach at university or 
higher-education institutions must complete a university or higher 
education degree. Those with higher degrees usually have preference in 
the workplace.
For professions which require special professional training or 
vocational instruction in a trade, shorter courses exits as well. Vocational 
institutions also offer qualifications to graduates of secondary schools 
which do not correspond to university degrees but do prepare them for
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‘high-level work in more than 800 professions.’'^
There are presently 78,000 teachers in Ukrainian higher education 
facilities, with 880,000 students.^
Language policy and a brief history of Ukrainian schools:
From the viewpoint of language planning, a logical starting point for
a survey of the history of education in Ukrainian as well as in Ukraine is
the 1920s, under the policy of Ukrainization.® Although this policy began in 
the government, both with the hiring of more Ukrainians and increased use 
of the Ukrainian language in government work, ‘its greatest impact was on 
education. Unlike the Tsarist regime, the Soviets placed a high value on 
education.’  ^ The Soviets promoted education for a number of reasons. 
Their ideology demanded an educated society to serve as the model of a 
new order. This society would also be more productive, and therefore 
could increase the power of the state, if it were educated in science and 
technology. Furthermore, schools provided an excellent opportunity to 
indoctrinate the young with Soviet values.® Weinstein lists four goals of 
Soviet education policy as follows:
• To expand the school system to include all children
• To integrate communist doctrine into the curriculum
• To nationalise the educational system in each region so that
minority children learn in their own language
• To provide a foundation for assimilation into the Russian
3 Ihid-
' n u -
 ^Wilkens and Ostmann.
® Sources on pre-Soviet education include Subtelny, Ukraine: A History, pp. 300-01; also 
pp. 323-25 which includes treatment of the educational activities of the Prosvita learning 
society.
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nation by including Russian language as a subject in every 
school®
The first two goals reflect social and political aims; the last two 
demonstrate Soviet concern with language planning and their savvy use of 
education as one method of implementation. Thus, education in Soviet 
Ukraine broke with earlier tradition and modernised along Soviet lines. 
Desiring in particular to replace old ‘bourgeois’ traditions, the Soviets 
encouraged new experimental educational theories and new types of 
schools. Communist values emphasised work, so work-study became an 
important part of education. Communal learning and technical courses 
also gained prominence, while the humanities and classics were de­
emphasised, with the study of religion being banned altogether.^®
Within this new system, nationalising schools was a top priority. 
Lenin felt minorities could not be forced to assimilate into the Russian 
nation. He planned instead to appease national groups by allowing and 
even encouraging education in their own language. Given this much- 
demanded right, minorities would be unlikely to reject Russian as a foreign 
language or a second language in local schools. Then, since business and 
industry, and in particular the political machine operated in Russian, 
minorities would voluntarily speak Russian as the language of 
advancement.^^
These innovations may not have all been pedagogically viable, but 
education did become more accessible. As schools charged no fees at the 
elementary and secondary levels, children of poor peasants and workers
 ^Subtelny, (1988), p. 388. 
®Subtenly, (1988), p. 388.
® Weinstein, (1942), p. 125. 
Subtelny, (1988), p. 397.
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could afford to attend classes and receive at least a basic education. 
Perhaps the most impressive progress the Soviets actualised was against 
illiteracy: Ukraine was 40% literate before the revolution but by 1927, this 
figures had increased to 70% overall. In the countryside, where literacy 
had only been at 15%, the Soviets could claim an increase to 50% during 
the same period.Facilities destroyed during years of civil war were 
gradually rebuilt, providing first four year elementary schools, then seven 
year ‘incomplete middle’ schools and finally ‘complete middle’ ten year 
schools. Meanwhile institutes were established to offer professional 
training. As the system grew in number of schools and in facilities, it also 
became more and more Ukrainised.^^
This process gained support from legislation passed in 1923 and 
1924, which guaranteed education in Ukrainian by setting up practical 
guidelines—the placement of teachers, the production of materials, and 
the language of instruction were specified. These laws also provided other 
minorities, such as Germans, Poles, and Jews in Ukraine with national 
schooling, provided Ukrainian was also taught as part of the curriculum.
Though Ukrainisation progressed steadily, there was resistance at 
all levels from parents and school personnel. To combat this reluctance, 
Ukrainisation was declared a high pressure campaign during 1925-26.^^ 
Skrypnyk, the head of the Commissariat of Education (1927-33) became 
the ‘driving force’ of the promotion of Ukrainian language. In 1927, the 
Commissariat issued a directive which stipulated students must pass 
exams testing their knowledge of Ukrainian to enter higher education, and
”  Weinstein, (1942), p. 127. 
Subtelny, (1988), p. 388. 
Weinstein, (1942), p. 130. 
Weinstein, (1942), p. 130.
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furthermore, that faculty at these institutions must also demonstrate 
proficiency in Ukrainian equal to that required of government officiais.**® In 
1929, this was supplemented by an additional Ukrainian language exam 
given to students hoping to graduate higher education institutions who 
could not receive their qualifications without pass ing .B y 1929, 80% of 
general educational institutions, 52% of vocational schools and 30% of 
universities conducted instruction in Ukrainian alone.^® Secondary schools, 
which in 1922 had only been 1% Ukrainian rose to 66% by 1929, with a 
further 16% teaching in both Ukrainian and Russian. As these numbers 
show, higher education remained mostly in Russian, resulting mainly from 
reluctance on the part of faculty in Institutes of People’s Education (former 
universities), technical colleges and worker’s preparatory schools to 
change the language of instruction."*® Adult literacy courses, traditionally 
taught only in Russian, were 81% Ukrainian by 1925. Further successes 
were reflected in the student body. Ukrainians made up 57% of the total 
student body by this period (30-40,000 students).^® The remaining 
students were 20% Russian and 22% Jewish.
By the peak of Ukrainisation in 1929, 97% of Ukrainian 
schoolchildren received instruction in Ukrainian. In addition, even in 
schools conducting lessons in another language, Ukrainian literature, 
language and history were required subjects.^^ Skrypnyk’s achievements 
are even more impressive considering the obstacles he faced. Though he
Weinstein, (1942), p. 131.
Weinstein, (1942), p. 134.
Weinstein, (1942), p. 134.
Subtelny, (1988), p. 389.
Magosci, (1996), p. 543.
Magosci, (1996), p. 543, cites 57%, and 35,000 students. These figures are from
Subtelny (1988), p. 389.
Subtelny, (1988), p. 389.
Subtelny, (1988), p. 389.
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estimated 100,000 teachers would be necessary, only 45,000 could be 
found, and the Soviets refused to allow ‘imports’ from Galicia, as these 
academics were not ideologically reliable. Some teachers plainly refused 
to teach in Ukrainian. There were few available materials in Ukrainian for 
use by teachers, and shortages hampered production of texts.
Policy and the direction of Soviet language planning was about to
shift.
The years up to 1933 constituted the high pressure period of Ukrainization; 
after 1933 the government concentrated its attention chiefly upon 
suppressing the tendency to over-Ukrainize where such a tendency was 
discernible, and upon rectifying the results of this tendency which had 
already appeared. This was not a new policy: it was, rather, a change of 
emphasis from one part of the linguistic policy to another. Ukrainian schools 
for Ukrainian children remained, but now the stress was placed upon 
schools for the national minorities within the Ukrainian majority, and 
particularly for the Russian inhabitants of Ukraine.^'^
With the benefits of hindsight, a modern reader could consider 
Weinstein’s comments remarkably sanguine. Writing during the time of 
Stalin’s regime and largely unaware of the sinister undercurrents rippling 
beneath Soviet language planning, he could not have known what course 
this and related policies would take.
Accusations of over-Ukrainisation took two main forms. First, 
minorities wished to be able to move freely about the USSR, which 
required a knowledge of Russian, the language of inter-ethnic 
communication. In Ukrainian schools, one could graduate with a better 
knowledge of Ukrainian and one’s native language and a less extensive 
knowledge of Russian. Secondly, since Ukrainisation really meant a
Subtelny, (1988), p. 389. Weinstein gives the following statistics for 1927, which show 
similar progress: In 1927, 75.8% of elementary pupils were instructed in Ukrainian, 6.9%  
in Ukrainian and one other language, 10.6% in Russian. In 1927, Ukrainians made up 
80.15%  of the total population, Russians 9.2% so this means schools in Ukraine were 
rapidly approaching their target balance.
“^ Weinstein, (1942), pp. 135-36.
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Russian schools in Ukraine became Ukrainian schools, many Russians felt 
deprived of national schooling. However, this claim could be answered.
There were fewer Russian schools, but the number of Russian 
classes remained proportionally high with reference to the number of 
ethnic Russians.
In 1933, Ukrainisation came under review as part of a general 
assault on Ukrainian nationalism. Skrypnyk was dismissed and replaced 
with Zatonsky, who immediately confirmed that over-Ukrainisation had 
taken place. Figures released in 1937 show the number of schoolchildren 
had expanded, with 83.0% studying in Ukrainian. Similar growth was 
evidenced in minority schools as a result of emphasis on their expansion. 
Zatonsky set about remedying the mistakes of his predecessor: despite 
adamant claims to the contrary. Russification in Ukraine crept back into 
the policy of the ruling regime. Decreasing the number of children studying 
in Ukrainian was only one part of Soviet policy, however.Education
would assist the Soviets in the attainment of the second part of their
language planning goals, total bilingualism and eventual assimilation.
Justification for these plans was not difficult. With Russian language 
thoroughly in place as a second language in schools all over the Soviet 
Union, it was a small matter to continue to promote it, even at the expense 
of other languages. Skrypnyk himself had allowed that Russian must be 
learned as a means to access Russian culture. Renewed vigilance against 
Ukrainian nationalism uncovered 'neglect' in the teaching of Russian: 
great works of Russian literature could only be found in Ukrainian
translations, students failed their Russian courses at higher rates than
other classes, and methodology had not been updated for years. Students
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were deemed more than willing to study Russian, if only they were given 
an opportunity, and since most of them would encounter more Ukrainian in 
their daily lives than Russian, to attain equal fluency the time allotted to 
Russian classes was increased.^®
Writing in the seventies, Farmer observed.
The state policy effectively discriminates against the Ukrainian language. It 
does so directly, by requiring the study of the Russian language in primary 
schools (since 1972, also in kindergartens) and by conducting instruction in 
Russian, and indirectly through the structure of incentives: because the 
better institutes of higher education conduct much, if not most of their 
instruction in Russian, parents...do well to send their children to Russian 
schools.
From the standpoint of language planning, this process was 
encouraged in several ways. Students were not able to learn good 
Ukrainian at school. Negative stereotypes were insinuated in connection to 
Ukrainian, while educators made positive associations with Russian. The 
same motives which would compel parents to send their children to 
Russian schools also appealed to students’ self interest; There is a 
material premium attached to the mastery of Russian, as well as a social 
stigma attached to speaking Ukrainian in some contexts.
As fluency in Ukrainian dropped among students, the Soviet 
administration further discouraged use of Ukrainian by passing a series of 
educational reforms in 1958-9 which removed compulsory education in 
both languages. The text of the law entitled ‘Regarding the Strengthening 
of the Relationship of School and Life and for the Further development of 
the System of Public Education in the USSR’, states as follows:
In the Soviet schools instruction is conducted in the native language. This is 
one of the more important achievements of the Leninist national policy. At 
the same time in the union and autonomous republics is also studied the 
Russian language which is a great means of international communication, of 
strengthening of friendship among the peoples of the USSR and of
Weinstein, (1942), pp. 140-42.
Weinstein, (1942), pp. 144-47.
Farmer, (1978), pp. 133-34.
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introducing them to the treasures of Russian and world cultures.
Nevertheless, we must not fail to take into account that in connection with 
the language study in the union and autonomous republics there is a great 
overloading of children. As a matter of fact, in the national schools the 
children study three languages: their native tongue, Russian and a foreign 
one.
Consideration should be given to the question of delegating to parents the 
right of deciding to which school, with what language of instruction they wish 
to send their children.^®
The result of this decree was for parents to send their children to better 
equipped, more modern Russian schools with an eye to improving their 
children’s' career prospects.Meanwhile, to minimise the discontent this 
policy could produce, the regime carefully avoided publishing comparative 
statistics which might show not only a decline in the number of Ukrainian 
schools, but a decline in the number of pupils in the number of students 
relative to Russian schools. As in the 1930s, Ukrainian schools tended o 
be smaller than their Russian counterparts and were concentrated in rural 
areas. Farmer cites rare statistics published for 1955-6 which prove this 
point.^°
Language No of schools % No. of pupils %
Ukrainian 25,034 85.32 3,845,754 72.79
Russian 4,051 13.81 1,392,270 26.35
Moldovan 159 .54 27,102 .51
Hungarian 93 .32 16,622 .31
Polish 4 .01 1,875 .04
Kolasky details other means of Russification, or neglect of 
Ukrainian schools in favour of Russian ones. By the 1960s there was a 
severe lack of textbooks in Ukrainian, and many of these were present in 
two editions with the larger edition appearing in Russian. Where a lack of
Kolasky, (1968), p. 27.
Farmer, (1978), p. 134.
Farmer’s source is Cherkasyn, ‘Zahal’ne navchannia v Ukrains’kyi RSR v 1917-1957, 
Kyiv 1958, p. 61. Kolasky also has statistics for the year 1953-4, which show that 25,192 
Ukrainian schools were attended by an average of 177 pupils, while Russians schools 
averaged 351 pupils though there were only 4,027 of them. (p. 50).
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textbooks appeared, the numbers were made up with Russian books 
imported for that purpose. The language planning process began long 
before students reached higher or technical education, however. 
Children’s films, songs and television programmes all appear in Russian. 
At the level of higher education, Ukrainian students confronted with 
handbooks and texts in Russian, or even outright discrimination. Russian 
schools remained better funded and received a disproportionate share of 
the education budget. By 1958-9, Soviet attacks on education in Ukrainian 
had taken their toll: in 12 major cities, at least 60% and sometimes over 
90% of schools had adopted Russian as the language of instruction.^^
Problems which were present at the time Farmer and Kolasky 
wrote their articles remain relevant. The quality of Ukrainian language 
instruction in both Ukrainian and Russian schools has been sharply 
criticised, then and now. Like dictionaries, textbooks contained Russified 
forms or examples of surzhyk, more apparent in Western Ukraine than in 
other areas. Teacher training bears the blame for some of these problems; 
Farmer explains that many teachers of Ukrainian were taught in Russian 
by people who did not speak Ukrainian at all. Higher education remained a 
problem as it had been in the earlier years of Soviet rule. Of the 56% of 
higher education staff who were ethnically Ukrainian, only 34% taught in 
Ukrainian even though 61% of their students were also ethnically 
Ukrainian.
Kolasky, (1968), p. 57.
Farmer, (1978), pp. 137-8. Also citing report by Y. M. Dadenkov, Ukrainian Minister of 
Higher and Secondary Education 1960-73. His figures apply to the 50 schools under the 
direction of his office.
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Education, State-building and language planning for the present and 
future:
From the standpoint of language planning, Ukrainian education is 
absolutely key not only in providing a place to learn good Ukrainian, but in 
the process of state-building. Shamsur observes.
To enhance the status of the Ukrainian language through its role in social life 
is likely to be a most arduous task, due to the perverse linguistic 
environment still existing in the Republic. The latter is at variance with the 
growing ethnic self-awareness of the Ukrainian people, its striving for real 
sovereignty. Thus the field of education becomes the critical sphere, where 
the future of the new Ukraine is being shaped.^^
A number of traits characterise the entire system, which will 
challenge policy makers until they are rectified. The educational system 
remains divided, not only linguistically between mono-lingual and multi­
lingual schools of different types, but also in that the bulk of Ukrainian 
schools are rural, while Russian schools are overwhelmingly urban. The 
usual regional differences also apply, with Western schools at 90% 
Ukrainian while in Donets’k, Ukrainian schools make up only 8.9 percent 
of the t o t a l . A s  observed by Farmer, Ukrainian schools are still 
decreasing in overall percentage of schools, but growing in pupils and 
number of schools. This is mainly due to the existence of multi-lingual 
Russian and Ukrainian schools, and schools for other minorities.^^
The legislation to promote Ukrainian-language education is in 
place. The 1989 law on language specifically grants the right to education 
in one’s national language, which led to the creation of new kindergartens 
and schools and allowed special language classes in otherwise 
mainstream schools. However, this law preserved compulsory Russian
33 Shamsur, (1993), p. 162.
^  Shamsur, (1993), pp. 159-167, p. 163.
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classes along with Ukrainian language classes.^® This law was supported 
by the Law on National Minorities in 1992 which also guaranteed the right 
to be educated in the language of one's nationality.^^
Though incapable of showing all the complexities of Ukrainian 
education, statistics on language and schooling offer some basic ideas 
about the usage level of Ukrainian in schools as a means of instruction.
Instruction in one language:
1993 (in thousands and percentages)
language Ukrainian Russian
city 2197 1804
% 36.0 29.6
village 13464 1128
% 89.1 3.8
total 15661 2932
% 73.8 3.8
1994 (in thousands and percentages)
city 2289 1811
% 37.2 29.4
village 13534 1131
% 89.1 7.5
total 15823 2942
% 74.1 13.8
two languages:
city-34%, village-2.5%, overall, 11.5% (1993) 
city-33%, village 2.4%, overall 11.3% (1994)
where one is Ukrainian:
city 33.8, village 2.4, overall 11.4 (1993)^®
Another more recent chart shows a comparison of 1994 and 1995 by 
percentages of students studying in Ukrainian and Russian by region. This
Shamsur, (1993), p. 163.
Shamsur, (1993), pp. 161-62.
Solchanyk, (1993), p. 4.
Statystychyi dani, do zasidannia kolehiyi ministerstva aza pidsumkamy 1994 roku 
Kyyiv, 1995c., ministerstvo osvity ukralny p. 45, ‘rospodil dennxy serednlx 
zahal’noosvitnix navchal’no-vyknovnykh zakaldiv za movamy navchannia’
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highlights regional differences and shows areas which might still benefit 
greatly from Ukrainization policies. These figures are for kindergartens, 
which means ‘graduates’ of these will be prepared for further instruction in 
Ukrainian.
Ukrainian Language
1994 1995
Ukraine 65 6 6
Crimea 0.3 0.2
Vinnitsia 99 99.9
Volhylnia 99 99
Dnipropetrovs’k 78 77
Donets’k 9 10
Zhytomyr 98 98
Zakarpattia 89 89
Zaporizhzhia 37 36
Ivano-Frankivs’k 99 99.8
Kyiv oblast 96 97
Kirovohrad 95 96
Luhans’k 13 14
L’viv 99.7 99.6
Mykolaiyiv 6 6  71
Odesa 32 33
Poltava 98 98
Rivne 99.6 99.4
Sumy 8 6  87
Ternopil’ 100 100
Kharkiv 48 48
Kherson 83 82
Khmelnits’kyi 98 99
Cherkasy 98 99.6
Chernivtsi 91 92
Chernihiv 89 92
Kyiv city 99 99
Russian Language
1994
34
99.1
1
1
22
91
2
1
63
1
4
5
87
0.3
34
66
2
0.4
14
52
17
2
2
1
11
1
1995
33
99.5  
0.1
1
23
90
2
1
64
0.2
3
4 
86 
0.3 
29
65.5  
2
0.4
13
52
18
1
0.4
0.5
8
1
Other languages included (where percentages do not equal 100) are Moldovan, 
Romanian, and Crimean Tatar.^^ Figures are for 1994, M 9 5  m  %  _________________
This chart combines two given in a handbook of statistical 
information about Ukrainian schools. It shows both the number of 
institutions (zaklady) by language, and the number of students receiving 
instruction in each language.
39 Chart and statistics taken from Statystychnyi Shchorichnyk Ukraiyiny, (1996), p. 441.
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Region
Institutes
/Students
U Schools/ 
Students
R Schools/ 
Students
Crimea
Vinnits’ia
Volhylnia
Dnipropetrovs’k
Donets’k
Zhytomyr
Zakarpattia
Zaporizhzhia
Ivano-Frankivs’k
Kyiv oblast
Kirovohrad
Luhans’k
L’viv
Mykolaiyiv
Odesa
Poltava
Rivne
Sumy
Ternopil’
Kharkiv
Kherson
Khmelnits’kyi
Cherkassy
Chernivtsi
Chernihiv
Kyiv city
Sevastopol’
Overall
557/310109  
1087/238455  
845/163741  
1026/ 503804  
1231/644484  
945/ 206860  
710/ 204045 
656/ 273761 
728/215258  
787/ 259865  
633/159634  
814/368498  
1410/ 383484  
658/ 191726 
891/340127  
990/219823  
769/ 186876 
693/179799  
893/ 164924 
967/ 389047 
557/ 185543 
1074/209284  
703/ 200504 
441/132851  
864/170092  
349/ 334434 
64/54276  
21344/689214
0 /214
1048/214365  
831/ 159293 
567/210626  
117/ 34949 
894/ 175955 
579/ 171001 
311/81453  
717/210276  
740/ 236806  
561/114982  
181/32219  
1354/ 366002 
514/102229  
462/ 102096 
932/ 177202 
756/ 183945 
510/ 107289 
886/ 162804 
573/ 137039 
418/111040  
1025/187557  
656/ 167926 
312/102790  
764/ 132580 
107/211979  
0/11 
15823/ 3895183
536/308842  
3/ 24090 
1/4376  
102/293178  
832/609535  
5/ 30905 
4/ 8930 
203/192308  
1/4965  
1/23059  
20/ 44652  
490/ 336279 
8/16744  
55/ 89497  
238/ 230944  
10/ 42621 
0/ 2931 
99/ 72510 
0/2120 
191/252008  
45/ 74503  
1/21611  
1/32758  
4/ 8439 
6/ 37512 
23/122416  
63/ 54265
2942/ 2942106
The goals of the Ministry of Education for 1991-3 were ambitious 
but are indicative of the necessary direction of government policy:
• The first year of higher education should be in Ukrainian
• Nursery and elementary schools should be in Ukrainian in proportion 
to the population
• Departments for Ukrainian studies should be established in higher 
education, which focus on language, literature and culture
• Ukrainian history should be taught as a separate subject
• Higher education students must take language tests
• The Ukrainian system should be integrated into the international
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system of education
• A nationally oriented education system should be developed which 
corresponds to historical traditions'*®
• Education should incorporate both Ukrainian and world trends
• Ukrainian history, culture and language must be compulsory
• All pupils should sit Ukrainian language exams from 1993
These policies have several goals, which relate both to state- 
building and to language planning in Ukraine. Essentially, the government 
hopes to create loyalty to Ukraine and unify the country, while supporting 
the state language and raising its popularity and status in the population. 
Partly, this must be accomplished by creating a distinct history and culture, 
and by supporting national traits and traditions. Most importantly, 
education is the process of creation of new elites, who must be avid 
supports and speakers of Ukrainian." *^
Serious challenges must be faced by educational authorities in 
Ukraine before these goals can be met. Even with the elevated status of 
Ukraine brought on by independence and the increase in the number of 
Ukrainian schools, Russians living in Ukraine remain reluctant to adopt the 
state language in schools. In Crimea, for example, even though a quarter 
of the population is ethnically Ukrainian (half a million), not a single 
Ukrainian school has opened there. As the previous pages show, several 
of Ukraine's major cities also lack Ukrainian schools: In Donets’k less than 
5% of students are taught in Ukrainian, and in the Donbass over 90% of 
children learn in Russian. In Luhans’k, only one Ukrainian school exists
40 Ukrainian education for the Twenty-first century, pamphlet published by the Ministry of 
Education.
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though there are 225,500 Ukrainians living there. Dnipropetrovsk has no 
Ukrainian schools at all. Odesa’s population is nearly half Ukrainian, but 
only two schools had opened by 1990."^ ^
Language planners clearly recognise the importance of education in 
Ukraine, as both a means to improve the usage and status of the state 
language and as a way of uniting the heterogeneous population, creating 
civically-aware citizens. Already the number of Ukrainian-language 
kindergartens and their enrolment is impressive. This means language 
planning can start from the bottom, training each year as it enters the 
school system and allowing Ukrainian-language education to develop as 
students progress. However, the language of universities, like the 
language used in business and government influences both parental and 
pupil choice. This means that universities and higher education facilities, 
which remain more Russified than other levels, must improve the 
availability and quality of instruction in Ukrainian.
Ukrainisation has worked as a policy in Ukraine before. However, a 
number of important changes have occurred since the inception of the first 
Ukrainisation policy in the Twenties. What Arel terms the rural reservoir' is 
depleted since more Ukrainians have moved into cities. More Ukrainians 
speak Russian, which may or may not qualify them for Russian-language 
education (depending on whether the criterion is an ethnic one or a 
linguistic one). Furthermore, in the current climate a lack of choice in 
language of instruction might cause outcry from both Russian and 
Ukrainian parents, who could see this kind of affirmative action as
Kuzio, (1997), p. 117.
Molod Ukrainy, 24 February, 1990. Quoted by Solchanyk, (1993).
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undemocratic.'^^
A change to education primarily in Ukrainian may be a formidable 
task without affirmative action, as Kuzio observes' '^ .^ One must risk outcry 
and claims of over-Ukrainisation to protect what is really the language of 
the majority if it is to function as a proper state language, widely used and 
fluently spoken. At the same time, the rights of national minorities must be 
protected including their linguistic and educational righgts. This must not 
exempt them from knowledge of the state language, however.
Why is language planning in education so crucial? Thus far it 
appears that the promotion of Ukrainian has enjoyed greater success in 
education than in media. What causes an ethnic Ukrainian to buy only 
Russian papers, yet insist on Ukrainian-language education for his or her 
children? Education is easily the greatest sphere of linguistic influence. 
Conceivably a person who does not buy newspapers, watch television or 
listen to the radio might feel very little influence from the media in Ukraine. 
By law, however, every person must attend school. Therefore, while too 
much Russian-language media in Ukraine is a problem, education is far 
more important and more urgently in need of de-Russification since it must 
necessarily be a part of the life of every citizen.
Language planning involves a goal, a plan or policy and the 
enforcement of that plan. In education that goal is ultimately the product: 
civic-minded, Ukrainian-speaking, educated citizens. In the interim, the 
aim is to create educational facilities able to do this. The aims of the 
language law of 1989, the Constitution and the government education plan 
(mentioned above) all must be enforced by educators starting from the
^^Arel, (1993), pp. 196-200.
Kuzio, (1997), p. 114-18.
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Ministry of Education extending to kindergarten teachers.
Enforcement should take place outside the classroom, in teacher 
training, textbook publishing and the creation of Ukrainian schools and 
language classes. It must also be enforced within schools, so that all 
subjects are taught in Ukrainian, Ukrainian literature, history and culture 
are taught as specific, separate subjects in all schools and Ukrianian 
language classes are taught by qualified teachers with relevant, modern 
materials and resources. All of this should be supported and validated by a 
third level of enforcement, society as a whole. In the West and in the 
country little active promotion or language planning is needed. In the 
cities of other regions, however, the results of Russification remain in 
evidence.
Current policies have taken Ukrainisation to a certain level in 
education. The numbers show improvement especially in early education, 
but the number of children in Ukrainian schools is not yet equal to the 
number of ethnic Ukrainian children. It would therefore be useful to 
analyse the two previous attempts at languge planning this century which 
were successful (Ukrainisation in the 1920s-30s and Russification in the 
1930s to Gorbachev), to discover what attributes they share which could 
be usefully applied to the current education programme in Ukraine.
I. Multi-front offensive. Both Ukrainisation and Russification were applied 
on several levels from different directions. This means that all aspects of 
education must also be systematically oriented or re-oriented towards the 
Ukrainian language.
Most obviously, textbooks should be available at every level. This is 
where finances remain the biggest problem. The ideal situation would
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provide each child with a personal copy of the relevant texts. But in the 
meantime, some creativity on the part of teachers must fill the gap, both in 
language classrooms and in other subjects. It may appear more 
convenient to use Russian-language history or chemistry books and 
computer programmes, but the long-term influence may be fairly 
detrimental. After all, every classroom has a chalkboard, and most 
students can afford pencils and copybooks until appropriate Ukrainian- 
language books and software are available. Under Russification, all texts 
which were deemed 'inappropriate' or likely to have an adverse effect 
were banned; such an extreme measure is probably no longer necessary 
or advisable in a democratic society, but the laxity displayed in schools 
with regard to Russian materials is equally hazardous.
Teacher training would benefit from re-organisation. Institutes to re­
train teachers do exist, but often classrooms contain pupils with differing 
levels of fluency in Ukrainian, which makes teaching difficult for the 
instructor. Because bi-lingualism is still prevalent, teachers who do not 
speak or do not use Ukrainian are tolerated, especially as filling their posts 
would be difficult. Most teachers would see language classes as a chore 
and expect to be paid to attend, or at least to have the cost of the classes 
or lessons met by their school. Under previous policies, teachers were 
given a deadline to learn the language being p r o m o o r  face 
redundancy. In addition, no new teachers would be appointed to a post 
without passing a language exam. If teachers coalcf be persuaded to view 
Ukrainian lessons not as extra work, but as the means to keep their jobs 
(just as history, literature or science teachers usually attend refresher 
courses to keep their knowledge of the field current), especially if local
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universities offered free or inexpensive courses, this sector might witness 
rapid improvement.
Within the classroom, changes are necessary as well. First, in
Ukrainian schools instruction should be in Ukrainian in all subjects. If
finances do not permit pay rises to reward those who do teach in
Ukrainian, similar to the rises offered by the Soviets, teachers must be
made to feel their job security in both the long and short term depends on 
their ability to instruct in Ukrainian.
Already pupils are told Russian will not be acceptable for entrance 
exams, although with so much instruction in Russian both during high 
school and at higher education institutes, this warning lacks bite. If 
students were graded on their Ukrainian usage in history or business 
classes too, they might feel more urgency to speak Ukrainian correctly. 
Self-interest motivated ambitious students and parents during 
Russification and Ukrainisation, since university and career success 
depended on language knowledge. Parents chose Russian schools when 
Krushchev’s education legislation gave them the chance, as they were 
aware that mobility around the Soviet Union and the chance for a 
successful career depended on fluency in Russian.
Not all of the lack of use of Ukrainian can be blamed on inertia, 
laziness or simple reluctance to change. Students must have a good 
command of Ukrainian in order to use the language. For children whose 
parents speak Ukrainian at home, this may not be a problem. However, 
many children live in homes where only Russian or surzhyk is spoken. For 
them, Ukrainian must be learned at school. Vashulenko comments that to 
listen to a Ukrainian language course in many schools, one would think
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every student intended to become a philologist.'^® Students are taught the 
literary language in such a formal manner that they do not learn how to be 
comfortable using Ukrainian in a variety of settings. Vashulenko argues 
that a methodology overhaul is needed so that students may learn a more 
user-firendly lexicon and grammar with a wider spectrum of spoken and 
written Ukrainian.'^® The Soviets reaped the benefits of trying new teaching 
strategies both during Ukrainisation and Russification; modern educators 
could do the same. At present the methods used to teach English are 
modern and interesting for students, so perhaps application of these 
tactics is all that is required.
II. Short and long term goals. Soviet planning had a range of immediate 
matters considered urgent, which were supported and made permanent by 
more extended plans. For example, in the short term teachers learned to 
instruct in the promoted language to keep their jobs. In the long term, 
teacher training was conducted to prepare suitably trained new teachers 
for their jobs, and no new teachers were hired without the required 
language. Students switched languages immediately to keep good marks 
or pass entrance exams, but were able to maintain the new language 
supported by higher education and society at large. Texts in the ‘wrong’ 
language were banned and removed in the short term, and replaced by 
those in the ‘right’ language as soon as possible. A ‘transitional’ 
moderately tolerant approach was quickly replaced with a less tolerant 
long term enforcement strategy: students did not enter university without
Vashulenko, (1996), p. 40.
Vashulenko, (1996), p. 40, For more information concerning methodology in teaching 
Ukrainian, particularly using more modern teaching methods, see Movoznavstvo,{'^996), 
ed Taranenko, related articles.
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exams, teachers were sacked, ‘unqualified’ teaching graduates were not 
hired. ‘Making do’ with Russian materials because they are modern and 
available may be convenient in the short term, but in the long term it will 
be much harder to convince students that Ukrainian is necessary if they 
have been allowed to ‘make do.’
III.Appeal to Self-Interest. Although usually associated with the stick, 
Soviet policy made use of the carrot too. Herein lies the difference 
between media and education: education provides the tools to build a 
successful career, while most people gain or lose nothing by reading or 
viewing material in either language. At every stage, incentives were 
provided by the Soviets to appeal to self interest. Schools using the 
promoted language were newly-opened (during the time of the 
Ukrainisation policy) or thoroughly modern (during the time of 
Russification). Pupils who want to attend prestigious universities or 
institutes of higher education must maintain good marks and pass 
entrance exams. The Soviets made the task of internally converting 
schools to the desired language much easier for themselves by making it 
advantageous for students to pursue the promoted language. Educators 
must continue to present Ukrainian as the language of the future to help it 
gain badly needed social status.
The Soviets were able to promote Russian as an international 
language of cultural exchange and opportunity, a role many young people 
in Ukraine now attribute to English. The prominence of Ukrainian in 
Ukraine could be improved by de-emphasising Russian whilst promoting 
the continued and even increased presence of Ukrainian at all levels. If 
English provides access to the international market and cultural scene,
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Russian is no longer necessary if Ukrainian can be used within Ukraine for 
communication and everyday interaction. Here, media could help by 
offering opportunities to use Ukrainian and by making the language more 
of a force in daily life.
Societal support must take two forms: example and peer pressure. 
By means of immigration and media measures, the Soviets were able to fill 
the airwaves and the streets with Russian. One had to leave the city to 
speak Ukrainian except in the West. Earlier, during Ukrainisation, the 
countryside spilled into the city, helping to promote the use of Ukrainian. 
Without the tactics of fear and threats used by the Soviets, Ukrainians 
must see speaking the state language as beneficial and necessary. Then 
society can reinforce what students learn both by example and by creating 
the perception of higher status for Ukrainian. Students must feel that 
without Ukrainian, cities would be a labyrinth of signs in a foreign language 
and unhelpful urbanites who do not wish to speak to them. Without 
Ukrainian, their education will end at a low level with no prospect of a well- 
paid job. Most of all, without Ukrainian, no one in the elite or working 
classes will have any interest in speaking to them. When this kind of social 
pressure exists, as it did during Russification, no one will have to beg 
young people to speak Ukrainian.
IV. Affirmative action. In the interest of democracy and fairness to all its 
citizens, coercion has not been applied in language planning by the 
Ukrainian government thus far. Ethnic Ukrainians protest if decisions 
about schooling are made for them, while many Russians are quick to 
accuse authorities of forced Ukrainisation. Arel alleges that Ukrainisation
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is indeed taking place, but Kuzio rightly disputes this claim/^ Ukraine’s 
record concerning minority rights (and Russians are after all an ethnic if 
not linguistic minority) shows liberal and tolerant legislation. Where 
Russians form a majority, as in the Crimea, education occurs in Russian. 
The statistics presented above show that Russian schools elsewhere are 
larger and more numerous in comparison with the number of Russians. 
Until the percentage of students learning in Ukrainian is higher than the 
percentage of Ukrainian students, or even ethnic Ukrainians overall, 
Ukrainisation has not taken place."^ ®
The only group who may feel disgruntled with any real justification 
are Russian-speaking Ukrainians. Many of these people speak Russian as 
a direct result of Russification policies; statistics from the thirties show 
ethnic Russians became Ukrainised under the Ukrainisation policy in a 
similar fashion."^ ® Even if these so-called Russified Ukrainians do not 
consider themselves as victims, and indeed even if they choose to adopt a 
‘regional’ identity as suggested by Kuzio, they are now citizens of a 
Ukrainian state with a state language that is not Russian. This means the 
issue is not their linguistic rights, but rather their linguistic duties.^^
In education as in other areas, the affirmative action policy 
recommended by Kuzio seems necessary; ‘Affirmative action in favour of a
Arel devotes an entire article. The temptation of the nationalizing state’, to the theory 
that Ukraine is nationalising and practicing a policy of Ukrainisation. Kuzio refutes this 
claim repeatedly in his work, including pp. 143-47, p. 156, pp. 245-53.
One should note here differing uses of the terms ‘nationalising’ and ‘Ukrainising’. This 
can be interpreted to mean policies which seek to assimilate ethnic minorities by forcing 
them to give up their own culture, by persuasion or coercion. Ukraine’s record with 
respect to the support of minority languages and cultures shows this is certainly not 
occurring. Ukrainisation in the sense of the creation of a politically and civically Ukrainian 
state may be happening slowly, but even then the goal is not to force all minorities into 
using Ukrainian or attending Ukrainian schools, but rather to have enough Ukrainian 
schools, newspapers and other cultural fixtures to be in proportion to the number of 
ethnic Ukrainians present.
This is documented by Weinstein, (1942), cited previously.
Kuzio, (1997), p. 143. The adoption of a regional identity should not be taken as a
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formerly discriminated against language and culture is a perfectly 
reasonable policy’.®^ The short term goal of free choice may have to be 
replaced in favour of a long term policy aimed at the promotion of the state 
language and the improvement of education in Ukrainian schools. This 
would mean total Ukrainisation, as in the 1920s, of all Ukrainian schools 
and the institution of mandatory Ukrainian language classes in minority 
schools, including Russian schools. This policy worked for the Soviets, 
though in the case of Russification no real democratic choice was present. 
During Ukrainisation, Russians living in Ukraine were often displeased 
with the policy, as it meant that Russian schools became Ukrainian 
schools, an apparent loss for Russians. Similar dismay has been 
expressed in the present as Russian schools undergo language planning. 
What may seem unfair or undemocratic to some, particularly to Russians, 
truthfully represents the undoing of what really was an unfair policy, in 
favour of education that accurately represents the population.
V. ‘P.R.’ (Public Relations). Few would dispute the impressiveness of 
Soviet mastery of propaganda. The first stages of Russification were 
disguised as corrective measures against over-Ukrainisation. Russification 
itself was couched in terms of access to Russian culture and society, or to 
improve mobility for minorities within the Soviet Union. Ukrainisation 
served to promote the Soviet regime as a tolerant government, eager to 
grant autonomy and support the rights of national minorities.
The current language planning policies in education could benefit 
from more careful public relations. No one would suggest a return to the
tout
deceit and doublespeak that characterised Soviet propaganda/ better
tendency towards separatism, howver, as explained by Motyl, (1993), p. 9.
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Kuzio, (1997), p. 336
presentation of the aims and goals of the Ukrainian government could 
allay fears that democracy was slipping and arm the public with 
knowledge. Although the present campaign does seek to promote the 
Ukrainian language, and indeed some Russian schools may change over, 
the aim is not to discrominate against ethnic Russians but to rectify 
previous discrimination against Ukrainians. This means it is not 
Ukrainisation, but rather de-Russifi cation.
Policies and laws are generally available for the public to read, 
whether in newspapers which specialise in legislation and politics (like 
Ukr’iadovyi Kur’ier) or as part of pamphlets about new programmes. Given 
the level of interest in the general population for poring over pages and 
pages of legal documents, presenting the information even with 
explanations and commentary is not the same as promoting these ideas. 
What will the results of new policy be? How long will it take to implement? 
How will students benefit? What about their prospects for the future? As 
long as parents can still choose Russian-language schools, some public 
relations statements made in favour of Ukrainian language establishments 
and education may not only be advantageous, it may be what is required.
One can imagine Iryna Bilyk, the popular singer, appearing in 
advertisements similar to the American ‘Just Say NO’ campaign urging 
young people to learn their state language, or Kuchma making an 
‘infomercial’ similar to Ross Perot or a British party political broadcast to 
explain education policies and urge parents to support sending their 
children to Ukrainian schools. Even a campaign modelled on the British 
‘no one forgets a good teacher’ drive to recruit new educators could enjoy 
huge success both in attracting university students to the teaching
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profession, and attracting students to Ukrainian schools. Essentially, a 
good public relations campaign, with familiar and respected celebrities 
donating their time to present a good case for Ukrainian, could make a 
very real difference in the status of the state language. Young people 
everywhere are naturally drawn to what they perceive as fashionable, 
what they believe will give them access to the level of society they wish to 
enter. The current opinion that believes Ukrainian youth will naturally want 
to do their civic duty and speak Ukrainian does not take into account not 
only the mentality of the average teen, but also the thinking of the 
population at large, who will continue to do what they perceive is socially 
acceptable and convenient whether they feel patriotic or not.
Education in Ukraine is making progress, supported by good 
legislation and an appropriate level of emphasis. Still, for more progress to 
be made and for language planning goals to be realised, the programmes 
begun at independence must continue, and the regime must not shy away 
from affirmative action or measures they may feel are too extreme, too 
sudden, or even too populist to encourage change. Given the role of 
schools in preparing children and young people for society, no amount of 
emphasis and encouragement is too much in creating Ukrainian-speaking, 
state-minded adults to support and maintain Ukrainian independence and 
state-building.
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Chapter Six: Beyond Politics -  Internal problems of the 
Ukrainian language:
Along with other language planning issues facing the Ukrainian 
language, the debate over what is acceptable, correct or pure Ukrainian 
continues. This question concerns not external linguistic issues such as 
government policy, education or media usage of the state language, but 
rather internal questions of lexicon, spelling and style. After stating that 
Ukrainian must assert its functional differentiation, and develop a standard, 
neutral lexicon and spelling system, the question remains: whose Ukrainian?
This question is perhaps more complicated than it appears at first 
glance. A number of aspects must be examined. First, which words and 
phrases, or even spellings and gender endings, should be preserved? Which 
sources of enrichment are acceptable, and how should new words be 
changed to fit Ukrainian? Though translation of terms into Ukrainian itself is 
not directly relevant to internal language problems, coming up with terms for 
new concepts, especially those for which other languages already have a 
word clearly is, as well as the incorporation of international lexicon. How long 
does a word need to be part of the general lexical fund to be deemed 
acceptable, and how should new terms be popularised in order to weed out 
old Soviet words? How much variation is acceptable? Lastly, why interfere in 
the development of the language, why are some forms permissible when 
others are not, and why continue the struggle against Russian? The process 
by which Ukrainian underwent standardization and revision under the Soviets
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to better reflect its similarities with Russian is well-documented elsewhere/ 
The process of adapting standard Ukrainian continues as part of post­
independence language planning.
The debate amongst linguists, scholars in all areas and members of 
the general public with an interest in language remains lively. Though a great 
deal of thorough and useful scholarship on language has appeared in 
Ukraine, some writers appear heavily influenced by an ideological bias, their 
professionalism called into question by their obvious nationalism which 
interferes with objectivity. Others seem to state the obvious or re-hash long­
standing arguments, or manufacture ‘witch hunts’ for insidious Polish (or 
Russian, or Church Slavonic) loan words which have been in the language 
for over a century. Some merely do not do their homework: one source 
suggested that Ukrainian independently expanded the semantic load of 
biological terms such as root’ to espouse a linguistic terminological meaning, 
unaware that this expansion had taken place in other languages and was 
reflected in Ukrainian.^
Farmer somewhat problematically describes two different approaches 
to language planning and purification. First, he explains what he terms ‘non­
nationalist’ planning, which ignored origins of words and dialect features. 
Instead, the language was encouraged to become more efficient and flowing- 
-using aesthetic criteria alone. In contrast, so-called ‘nationalist’ language 
planning concerns itself with the pursuit of ethnic authenticity and 
differentiation through the effort to exclude external linguistic influences-the
 ^ Shevelov, (1989), and Wexler, (1974); see also Chapter Two.
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pursuit of linguistic purity’.^  This approach may have been applicable at some 
stages in Ukraine’s linguistic development, but with reference to the twentieth 
century, other distinctions better apply. Some modern linguists adopt a third 
approach, allowing pragmatism and a variety of sources to decide which 
forms for a variety of reasons are acceptable , and which should be 
encouraged out of the language. Still, Farmer’s classification could be altered 
slightly so that ‘nationalist’ language planning might represent those who 
seek to actively promote Ukrainian, using the language’s resources to the 
fullest, in order to increase both usage and the functional load of the 
language. Even this changed definition remains problematic, as Russian 
speakers may regard as ‘nationalist’ planning any attempt to promote 
Ukrainian at the expense of Russian. Ukrainian speakers, on the other hand, 
would perhaps argue the support and spread of Ukrainian need not have a 
negative effect on Russian usage, and in fact, that the two trends are not 
linked.
The key problems Ukrainian faces as a changing language are amply 
covered in Ukrainian academic and public writing, but there is little recent 
coverage of this subject in English. Certainly no work has been uncovered 
which assimilates relevant information from a number of approaches to 
establish a common ‘to-do list’ for Ukrainian, or traces trends present in the 
overall social and linguistic climate in Ukraine. Though a detailed historical 
discussion or even a lengthy pure linguistic analysis would be well beyond the 
scope of this work, it is possible to trace problems of standardisation and
^Budniak, (1993).
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modernisation over the course of the twentieth century to the present, where 
work is still being done to universalize terms, print dictionaries purged of 
excessive Russification, and establish grammatical norms based on 
Ukrainian models.
A complete examination of every language issue would still present a 
formidable task for a researcher. The manageable option suggests extracting 
examples of types of issues, some of which directly result from Russification 
and others which remain from earlier decades. Spelling, particularly the letter 
for the phoneme [g] remains a problem" .^ Grammatical forms such as the 
present active participle (which is viewed as a Russian caique and not widely 
used otherwise) or certain syntactic questions of phraseology (including the 
preposition po) vex linguists, along with issues of style. The entire lexicon 
appears to be under discussion, but immediate relevance and the need for 
rapid standardisaion characterise some branches such as scientific 
terminology, military lexicon or the language of the Constitution. This widens 
into a discussion of which sources may contribute to the language out of the 
possible donors, including diaspora Ukrainian, Western Ukrainian, Russian, 
Russian caiques and borrowings and international vocabulary. All of these 
have made contributions which must be evaluated. In this manner, a number 
of revealing profiles establish an overall image of flux and change in 
Ukrainian.
 ^Farmer, (1978), p. 140.
 ^For the sake of clairty, it should be noted that phonemes appear in square brackets, while 
forms transcribed from Ukrainian, Russian or German (as noted in the text) appear in italics 
to represent the letters rather than the phonemes present.
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In this discussion, examples will be cited only to illustrate the nature of 
the problems they represent, not to present every instance a given problem 
occurs. Extensive listings of problematic spellings, terms or phrases would be 
appropriate to a linguistic survey or analysis, but not within the frame of 
reference of sociolinguists and language planning. Instead, one must 
investigate the character of core problems to abstract common themes and 
trends, and to generalize the implications these issues have for Ukrainian 
language. Furthermore, why certain terms bother linguists is more significant 
than the fact that they are troublesome, particularly when suggestions are 
offered for improvement. This sheds light on what is acceptable as a 
corrective. Essentially, this means that a roll-call of Russianisms in Ukrainian 
is less valuable to this research than the fact that they exist, and on several 
levels; this then allows us to estimate the depth of their penetration into the 
language and further, to understand what kind of efforts must then be made 
either to accept and incorporate them, or to reject and replace them. By 
clarifying attitudes towards the problems Ukrainian faces, one can discern 
new directions language planning may take.
The overall attitude of language specialists can be assessed; is there 
a trend towards purism or some other system of regulation? The enrichment 
of the lexicon from the fund of international vocabulary receives a mixed 
reaction partly due to the concurrent and perhaps consequential importation 
of Western culture. Whether objectively true or not, the liberalising of society 
and the lifting of social taboos on certain subjects is perceived to demand 
imported terminology to cover the lack of indigenous vocabulary for these
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long-forbidden areas of conversation, if the typical movoznavets^ is not 
following a Purist approach in Wexler’s sense of the word, what approach is 
used?® And most importantly, whose opinions matter most, those of linguists, 
policy-makers in the government or the general Ukrainian-speaking public? 
Some of these concerns have appeared in the general discussion of 
Ukrainian by such scholars as Karavansky, Taranenko, Yermolenko and 
Buriachok. Now they can be placed in the context of other questions of the 
changing language.
To tinker or not to tinker:
Any critic must decide whether to remain an observer or to become a 
participant in the subject he or she hopes to analyse. This is one of the most 
serious issues confronting linguists, whether it is acceptable to interfere or 
more accurately, to practice ‘prescriptive intervention’ in an effort to dictate 
the way their language will develop.^ Those who believe it is acceptable or 
even productive to intervene may nevertheless disagree over what kind of 
interference is beneficial (as non-nationalist and nationalist planners disagree 
on the ultimate goal of intervention). Some linguists who consider themselves 
purists’ (those who oppose nonnative forms) have been criticised for 
inconsistency and impracticality. Wexler gives the example of Telefon in 
German, which was criticised by German purists and the alternative
 ^This term remains difficult to translate while preserving the exact meaning. ‘Linguist’ does 
not convey the degree of expertise such scholars usually have concerning their language, and 
the terms enthusiast', ‘specialist’ and ‘supporter also fall short. Even the Russian lazykoved’ 
is not used in the same manner. Thus, the term ‘movoznavets’ in the meaning of one who 
avidly researches and studies, and is an expert on the Ukrainian language, appears 
untranslated in the text.
® See the discussion of Purism in Chapter One which explains Wexler’s approach.
 ^Wexler, (1974), p. 2
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Femsprecher, a neologism that was suggested to replace it. This form, 
however, did not carry over to the derivatives of telefon, such as the verb for 
‘to telephone’, showing attention to lexical items but not syntactic ones.®
Motives for intervention can also affect the results linguists achieve. 
For example, the Soviet interpretation of Marxist ideology supported the 
heavy Russification practiced on Ukrainian language by suggesting 
languages and peoples should ‘merge’. Most speakers of a language have 
their own ideas about what is correct, good or proper speech-though their 
ideas may not be in accordance with the standard form, or may have 
particular regional or social biases.® In all of this, it is important to remember 
that factors outside the language itself, such as culture, politics, social forces 
and attitudes may have an effect on what kind of intervention occurs and its 
success in implementation.
This tendency towards regulation in Ukrainian has spawned a curious 
idea for the transliteration of Ukrainian in English. The Ukrainian scholar M. 
Vakulenko, funded by the Czech government, has created a system of 
transliteration that allows a one-to-one correspondence of Ukrainian letters in 
English, which is usually a problem. While this system is unlikely to ever gain 
acceptance since most English speakers are satisfied with existing systems, 
and lack the funds or the time to re-write absolutely everything containing 
Ukrainian words, that a Ukrainian would feel justified in influencing the way 
other languages represent Ukrainian words suggests the extremes that
® Wexler, (1974), p.3 
® Wexler, (1974), pp. 1-9.
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regulatory tendencies may reach, although one must remember mainstream 
Ukrainian scholars have no such pretensions/°
Languages have a number of potential sources for new terms, which 
must then be evaluated as acceptable or otherwise. Ukrainian thus far has 
not taken advantage of all of these together, but at various times its 
developmental history used dialects, archaic vocabulary, related languages 
and ‘international vocabulary’ as donors.Some or all of these have been 
rejected at one time or another. Soviet planners disliked using Galician forms 
or other dialect influences, while Ukrainian planners have rejected overt 
Polish imports in the past. The result is a modern language which has all the 
necessary terminology, laboriously produced and documented, but which has 
not always been widely accepted by speakers or spoken uniformly by 
everyone who uses it.
A glance back at language issues In 20th century Ukraine:
Normalisation and regulation have long concerned linguists in Ukraine. 
Since the language had the stigma of backwardness and provincialism, 
terminology associated with modernisation drew the attention at an early 
stage of those creating dictionaries and grammars. The first attempt at a real
Vakulenko’s work includes the following: A contribution to a dictionary of English, Ukrainian, 
Russian, German and transliterated Ukrainian words; an article entitled ‘Pro skladni problemy 
Ukrayins’koho Pravopysu’, Kyiv: Kurs publishers, (1997); and a final report of his research 
entitled ‘Computerised simple correspondence system for the transliteration of Cyrillics (sic) 
into Latinics (sic), and vice versa in the Ukrajinian, Russian and Belorussian Languages’. 
Despite all of his attention to Ukrainian language issues, Vauklenko neglects to adopt the 
preferred spelling of Belarusian’.
Wexler explains the problem with this term thoroughly. For Ukrainian, most international 
words are present as scientific or technical terms, which are indeed based on ancient Greek 
or Latin lexicon’ or else words which fit the more loose definition of terms which appear in 
three non-related languages’ such as faks, student and the like. For non-related languages, 
one may assume Wexler has in mind languages from different language ‘families’ such as 
Slavic languages, Romance languages or Asian languages.
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system of terminology can be dated to the 1880s and 1890s, by Galicians 
Volodymyr Levyts’kyi and Ivan Verkhrats’kyi. Following the foundation of the 
Shevchenko Scientific Society, they began to print small terminological 
handbooks in its newsletter. This was followed by efforts in Kyiv on the part of 
the terminology commission associated with the Society. Activity surged in 
1917, when the Central Rada and the Ukrainian People’s Republic were 
established. During this time both public and private efforts were made to 
produce dictionaries and record the so-called ‘folk’ l e x i c o n . T h e  
Terminology Commission of the Kyiv branch of the Shevchenko Learned 
Society was responsible for the creation of dictionaries in a variety of 
subjects including botany, zoology, geology, meteorology, anthropology, 
chemistry, mathematics, physics, agriculture, medicine and veterinary 
science, produced by sub-committees working in each of these areas. Other 
committees were added in the fields of orthography, natural sciences and 
technology. In 1921, the Institute of Ukrainian Scientific Language of the 
Academy of Sciences was established, which became the centre of work in 
terminology.^^
This institute had six sections, which covered a wide range of 
scientific, mathematical, linguistic and socio-economic topics. It employed a 
large staff, all working on the creation of thirty-four dictionaries (twenty-four of 
which were published). Although Ukrainian-Russian dictionaries were by far 
the most usual, work was also done on Ukrainian-German, -French, -Latin 
and -English dictionaries. These works contained not only the recommended
Kochera and Kulyk, (1994), p. 55.
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term, but also included dialect and other existing words along with each 
etymology. This Institute established a standard in terminology, which served 
as a widely used reference by those in a variety of fields.
The thirties brought purge-associated re-shuffling here as in all other 
areas of life in Ukraine. Despite the repression which had begun in the 
Academy, four dictionaries were published between 1931 and 1933. Then, in 
1933, things changed for the worse. The attacks on Ukrainian nationalism in 
linguistic began with an announcement by Andriy Khvylia, Ukraine’s deputy 
commissar of education, that ‘ideological verification' would be the new 
modus operandi of language specialists in Ukraine. During the next two 
years, a special team proof-read the dictionaries created by the Institute and 
prepared bulletins which dictated a new lexicon for the creation and 
production of terminologies more acceptable to the Moscow-centered frame 
of reference. Certain terms were forbidden, and replacements suggested. 
Usually the new word was Russian calqued into Ukrainian or introduced from 
international vocabulary via Russian. These new lexical items appeared in an 
(otherwise unspecified) ‘pure’ dictionary in 1936, while the offending 
dictionaries of previous years were confiscated or destroyed.Overal l , it is 
estimated that 50-80 per cent of terms were ‘cleaned up’, a total of around 
14.5 thousand wo rds .Vo vk  lists caiques which are obviously Russian 
derivatives such as probirka, dvyzhok, burav, voronka, kliukva and parus,
Kochera and Kulyk, (1994), p. 55.
Kochera and Kulyk, (1994), p. 56.
Kochera and Kulyk, (1994), p.56. The article goes on to list those works which remain from 
the pre-Ukrainisation era and where they can be found.to be used for reference in restorative 
endeavors.
Vovk, (1979), pp. 87-8
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which replaced Ukrainian forms probivka, bihunets\ sverdel, liyka, 
zhuravlyna, vitrylo^ .^ He notes words which exist in both languages, but in 
different meanings, which in Ukrainian were changed to include the Russian 
meaningT These include horilka (pal’nyk= Eng. burner), maslo (oliia = Eng. 
vegetable or mineral oil), or trava, which best corresponds to ‘grass’ but 
expanded to include ‘herbs’ as well, replacing the indigenous Ukrainian word 
zillia.^^ More on such changes appears later in the chapter.
The Soviets sought to justify these activities in several ways. The new, 
Russian-based terms were referred to as ‘international’, a word that 
suggested access to the world scientific community which was theoretically 
only possible through Russian midwifery. Enthusiasts of the new terms called 
old Ukrainian words antiquated and archaic, and impractical for use.^° These 
claims would later be complemented by the Marr theory, and aggravated by 
assertions that Ukrainian nationalism manifested its treacherous presence in 
dialect words, folk lexicon and words of Polish origin.
From the forties until the sixties, newly united Post-War Ukraine 
struggled under the influence of two predominant trends: first, the newly 
united lands of Ukraine permitted an expansion of the education system and 
the creation of an universal media throughout the country, which had a 
normalising effect on the language. This tendency towards a common
These words mean test tube, anode,drill bit, funnel, cranberry, and sail.
In my own comparisons, I found various confusions surrounding words such as plattia 
meaning either clothes or dress and robyty/pratsiuvaty meaning ‘to do’ and ‘to work’ though 
the meaning of the first was expanded to match Russian rabotat’.
Vovk, (1979), pp. 92-3pp. 87-8.
^°Vovk, (1979), pp. 87-8.
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standard contrasted sharply with the inherent resistance to dialect words and 
Galician Ukrainian which was typical of Russophile linguists. This period 
represents two diametrically opposed processes in the Ukrainian language: 
the spread and development of Ukrainian contrasted with the overall 
assimilation and Russification of the language.^^
When the glasnost' era began, Ukrainians were again able to turn their 
attention to their own language. Beginning around 1989, articles appeared 
which expressed concern and even anger at what had been done to the 
Ukrainian language, with lists of controversial words, cataloguing 
Russianisms, Sovietisms and older Ukrainian forms for comparison. Work 
from this period, before Ukrainian independence, begins to discuss the value 
of Ukrainian as a language and not as a dialect of Russian, and looks to past 
efforts at standardisation for guidance. While ideological arrows fly thick and 
fast, diagnostic work that is both observant and thorough fills newspapers 
and journals alike.^^
With the establishment of an independent Ukraine, new problems 
confronted linguistic circles. These scholars knew that language is a strong 
indicator of national identification, and that many of the people in Ukraine 
speak Russian or the surzhyk] the task of first creating and then widely 
implementing a new (or at least rejuvenated) version of standard literary
The Marr Theory, as espoused by Stalin during part of his regime, suggested that all 
nations of the Soviet Union should gradually become one ‘Soviet’ nationality. See Chapter 2 of 
this work for details.
Ermolenko, (1993), p. 200.
For examples of diagnostic works, Karavansky is a good source. He comments on a 
number of problems with Soviet language planning and suggests guidelines for replacing 
obvious Russian words with Ukrainian ones.
201
Ukrainian must have seemed a formidable task. First, the Pravopys^"  ^ had to 
be revised, or as some would argue, a new Pravopys had to be created. 
Then, this standard version of Ukrainian, which must reflect social and 
political changes and technology, had to be popularised-i.e., made 
accessible and useful to the general public. Before either of these processes 
could begin, the language required serious diagnostic and rehabilitative work. 
Soviet intrusive language policy, along with a rather lamentable apathy on the 
part of much of Ukraine’s population, left the language in no condition to 
serve as the single, official and national vehicle for communication in every 
function a language should fulfill. This highlights the language’s potential for 
creating and accepting interesting new words, but the linguist reminds 
readers that rnova mozhe, a movoznavstvo ne opratsiuvalo usikh 
mozhlyvostei ukro i^n’skykh slovotvorchykh birtsiv.’ The language needs not 
only creation, but regulation.
What ails the Ukrainian Language?
Russification. An allegory characterises the effect of years of Russification 
on the Ukrainian language: A King had a beautiful wife, whom he adored. He 
commissioned a portrait showing her high forehead, her long face, her dark 
eyes and hair. The beloved Queen died, and the King swore never to remarry 
unless he found a girl exactly like his deceased wife. One day he was out 
riding and saw a shepherd girl with a pleasant chubby face and blonde hair
This word appears In Ukrainian in the meaning of ‘orthographical dictionary’. It contains 
proper spellings of foreign words, difficult Ukrainian words and other questions of lexicon and 
style.
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with blue eyes. Several days later, he went to look at the portrait of the 
Queen and thought her hair looked too dark, so he lightened it a little. After a 
few more days, he thought the picture’s eyes were really not just the right 
colour and painted them light blue. Every day, he noticed little things about 
the portrait that did not please him and little by little, changed it. One day an 
advisor remarked to him that the portrait was exactly the likeness of the pretty 
shepherd girl, and thus the King could marry again.
This viewpoint seems especially bleak: the reworking of Ukrainian so 
that it resembles Russian. Kachurovs’kyi, the author of the article containing 
this allegory, laments small changes-such as the stress shift in bAt’kivshyna 
to read bat’kivshYna—which, while not a Russified term, he perceives as 
symptomatic to the degradation of Ukrainian from the beautiful Queen into a 
lowly shepherdess. This, he feels, is the result of rarely hearing Ukrainian 
spoken aloud for six decades under the Soviets. While the word in question is 
not an example of a Russified term, Kachurovs’kyi appears to fear the 
degradation of Ukrainian from a lack of knowledge as much as from the 
Russification of the language.^^ Articles such as Kachurovs’kyi’s, published 
around the time of Ukrainian independence provide valuable information 
concerning linguistic casualties of the Soviet era, the depth of Russian 
influence, and the deplorable state of Ukrainian as it appeared in Russified 
dictionaries at that time when so-called dialect or archaic words did not 
appear.
25Karavansky, (1989), p. 694. The language can, but language studies has not used all the 
possible means of word creation.’
Kachurovs’kyi, (1991), pp. 341-49.
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The effects of Russification remains ‘public enemy number one' for 
certain linguists and nationalists in Ukraine, though there are a host of 
equally complicated and potentially damaging problems to conquer. The 
damage inflicted by Soviet efforts to ‘tidy up’ Ukrainian remains evident in the 
contemporary language. Overall, Russification of terminology occurred on 
several levels: lexical, semantic, syntactic, morphological and orthographic. It 
may appear extreme to suggest that the Soviets launched a planned attack 
on every level of Ukrainian language, but it is certainly safe to interpret their 
policy as an attempt to sabotage the language, decrease its viability as a 
modern language and bring it closer to Russian. With these considerations in 
mind, one can examine areas where this Russification occurred.
[G] and [H]. Kachurovs’kyi states, ‘One of the first victims of language policy 
was the letter g.’ Perhaps the most heated spelling disagreement concerns 
the phoneme [g], and the inclusion of a new letter to distinguish this phoneme 
from [h]. In the 1989 Pravopys, the letter which spells the phoneme [g] had 
not been included, and foreign words were still spelled with a Russian 
influence, using [kh] instead of [h] (which Russian lacks)^®.This publication 
included heavily Russified vocabulary, calqued from Russian forms that did 
not reflect older or more accurate Ukrainian. This letter appears in numerous 
words in old and new sources alike. Yet it was removed from the language for 
two main reasons: since there was no letter like it in Russian, the [g] was 
removed from Ukrainian. Secondly, with the [g] and the [h], Ukrainian could
Kachorovs’kyi, (1991)This also piece lists noted linguists who suffered repression under 
Soviet rule in Ukraine.
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accurately reflect foreign spellings, especially European names such as 
Hegel, and this could contribute to an increase in the status of one’s native 
language as one which could cope with international information and 
vocabulary. This change left a paradoxical effect, so that even a native 
Ukrainian word such as hyrlyha would be pronounced as written, though 
originally the words used [g], as gyrlyga. The average person would probably 
say gyrlyga anyway under the influence of Russian or the surzhyk. Without 
the letter for the phoneme [g], educated speakers have no way of guessing 
the correct pronunciation of such words. (The letter for the phoneme [g] has 
since been ‘rehabilitated’ and appears in the latest edition of the Pravopys.) 
Lexical and morphological changes. Besides the banishment of [g] under 
Russian rule, Ukrainian began to metamorphose in other ways. Lexical 
changes could be blatant, as in the replacement of native words with a 
borrowing, or more subtle. Vovk’s examples (as mentioned earlier) include
O Q
iashohyk, nasos and parus for skrynia, pompa and vitrylo. Morphological 
changes, which these examples illustrate, include the substitution of Russian 
endings or prefixes for the Ukrainian forms. Sometimes the number and 
gender might be affected at this level too, changing Ukrainian forms to 
resemble Russian ones. Syntactic changes include Russified forms such as 
zhidno teohyi, komunikatsiia po telefonu or kafedra po matematytsi instead of 
zhidno z teorieiu, komunikatsia telefonom, or katedra matematyky.^^ Even
Karavansky covers this [g], /kh/ vs [h] topic more than once. In ‘Hanna chy “Khanna” he 
connects the use of the [h] to Ukrainian independence. (1993), p. 720.
Chest, pump, and sail respectively.
These mean ‘According to the theory’, ‘communication by telephone’ and ‘department of 
mathmatics’. It should also be noted that the letters represent z + h, not zh.
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common idioms enter the language from Russian, such as the non-Ukrainian 
adjective nevmisnyi, which copies neumestnyi, (from the phrase ne u mesta, 
meaning ‘inappropriate’ or ‘out of place’.). Ukrainian has the idiom ne do 
rechi, so that an accurate adjectival form should read nedorechnyi instead. 
This does not mean, however, that people will agree to say nedorechnyi, 
especially as the Russian caique is so well-established as not to sound 
peculiar to most speakers.
[I], [O] and [E]. Another topic under hot discussion is the phoneme [i] and its 
relationship to [o] and [e]. Because of regular sound changes, many words 
which appear with an [o] in Russian have an [i] in Ukrainian-Zcon/Zc/n’, 
dom/dim, rodnyi/ridnyi (horse, house and native, respectively). However, as a 
consequence of language confusion, this phonemic difference in othenA/ise 
similar words means sometimes speakers overcompensate and pronounce [i] 
when it is actually [o] in Ukrainian, or leave out [i] and use the Russian word 
instead. Since there are words which have preserved the [o] phoneme 
through another set of linguistic changes and developments, this spelling 
challenge for Ukrainians is not an easy one. Nor do linguists agree on the 
use of [i].
An example of how heated such arguments may become appeared in 
the newspaper Literatuma Ukrayina. A certain Oleksiy Dmytrenko printed an 
article headed ‘Sich-Zaporgz’ka!’^^  This sparked a volley of literary missiles 
arguing the point, appearing in the June 17 edition of the paper. Shevchenko 
writes zaporoz’ka according to the Dictionary of the Language of
31 Karavansky, (1997), p. 98-101.
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Shevchenko, as also suggested by the diaspora contributor, Levyts’kyi. 
Ponomariv agrees the word is often written this way, and suggests this may 
be the result of Ukrainian speakers’ confusion from writing a great deal in 
Russian. Those who know both languages realise the [i] in Ukrainian usually 
corresponds to [o] in Russian equivalents, and when a closed syllable 
becomes open in declension, the [o] replaces [i] in Ukrainian as in porih- u 
poroha^ . . One would therefore expect zaporiz’ka, since the
third syllable is closed. However, a variety of sources in addition to 
Shevchenko support the [o] spelling, despite some protest that this is really a 
caique from Russian.
Another possibility is that the [o] form is not a Russianism at all, but a 
reflection of sound changes taking place around the time of Shevchenko’s 
career, when rules of Ukrainian spelling were less firmly fixed. As with many 
languages, spelling does not always indicate pronunciation. Therefore, 
Shevchenko may have said zaporiz’ka while adhering to the existing 
orthographical rule calling for -oz’ka.
Why did the spelling of one word create such a furore? This case 
shows the affect of cultural and social issues, which add importance to 
spelling questions. First, this period in history is revered by Ukrainian patriots 
and nationalists for the independence it symbolises. It is interesting to note 
that Ponomariv supports his explanation of the problem with historical data 
and several dictionaries, in contrast to Levyts’kyi’s complaints of linguistic
32 Dmytrenko, (1997). 
Lev^sk’yi, (1997).
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‘trendiness’ and his call to defend the purity of the language. As seen in 
Chapter Three, these viewpoints place these two authors in the pragmatic 
viewpoint and the neo-Romantic school of thought respectively.
This issue touches another sensitive topic, the spelling of surnames. 
Ponomariv, for example, could be expected to decline his surname u 
Ponomar’ova, which some Ukrainians feel causes confusion as to the 
ethnicity of the person in question-in this instance, he could be the Ukrainian 
Ponomariv, or the Russian Ponomariov. Some Ukrainians have adopted an 
alternative spelling, u Ponomariva. It is curious that Levyts’kyi calls this 
arrangement artificial, especially as he writes from Montreal and likely does 
not have the heightened sensitivity of local Ukrainians to Russian-sounding 
f o r m s . T h i s  brings up another question: should Ukrainian names 
automatically undergo sound changes when they are under discussion in 
Russian, especially as most speakers are presently bilingual and can easily 
make this change? Ponomariv mentions Maksym Kryvonis, and Petro 
Kryvonos, Liudmyla Staryts’ka-Cherniakhivs’ka and Ivan Cherniakhovs’kyi as 
examples. But if Kryvonis and Staryts’ka-Cherniakhivs’ka were topics of 
conversation in Russian, would Ukrainians pronounce them the same as the 
others mentioned? A more accurate and also more nationally-conscious, 
nationally-aware ‘transliteration’ into Russian would involve the Russian 
phoneme [i] instead, and not an automatic change to [o].
^  Dictionaries consulted include L viv, 1957 Ukrainian-Polish dictionary, Leipzig 1941 
Ukrainian dictionary, and Rome 1941 Ukrainian dictionary. Only the L’viv dictionary has the 
form as zaporiz’ka.
Olena Bekh, in a discussion of this problem offered the example Stakhiv-u Stakhova-vs u 
Stakhiva as an example. As a scholar of the language, she adopts the view that while this
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Foreign names and places. Spelling of foreign names and places presents 
a different kind of problem. Russified forms use kh where English shows an 
h, for example, even though Ukrainian has the >/? sound already (Hegel, 
Helsinki). Ai versus El, as in Einstein, presents a similar problem.^® In fact, 
spelling of foreign names and places encapsulates neatly the difficulty of this 
kind of spelling problem: usually variations in spelling arise when 
transliterations are made from Russian. The standard and a uniform 
Pravopys have not existed long enough, nor become widespread enough to 
fulfill their corrective function in such cases. Thus, differences in spelling may 
appear out of ignorance or insecurity about Ukrainian spelling, or even a 
desire to sound and write in a more ‘Russian’ manner.
This kind of problem, the non-correspondence with Ukrainian rules of 
style, emerges in other words calqued from Russian. The clash may result 
from the use of a participle when Ukrainian calls for an adjective, or represent 
a stylistically and aesthetically displeasing phrase. Examples of this include 
temperaturiachyi khvoryi, (more acceptable would be khvoryi z 
temperaturoiu), haiopuiucha infliatsiia for nestrymna or bezupynna infliatsiia, 
koordynuiuchyi tsentr for koordynatsiinyi tsentr and vyvuknovebezpechnyi 
instead of the preferred peredvybukhovyi.^^ Confusion may emerge when 
similar forms based on a Ukrainian root become confused with a Russian 
word: dukhovyi (spiritual) is not the same as dukhovf^i, (ecclesiastical); the
spelling is not in accordance with orthographical rules, it is a permissible variant to avoid 
confusion with Russian.
Vovk, (1979), pp. 92-94.
^^Karvanskyi, (1993a), p. 73. These terms mean ‘cold’ (referring to temperature), the idiom 
galloping inflation', and co-ordination centre.
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two can be confused by those who equate the second form with Russian 
dukhovnyi.^^
Another area of Russification was the derivation -  beyond the words 
themselves -  of technical terms such as those used in chemistry. Ukrainian 
and Russian are among a number of languages which use a ‘native’ basis 
instead of the Latin roots familiar to English speakers. Here too, Ukrainian 
roots were deemed unacceptable and replaced with Russian ones. For 
example, the word for sodium chloride khl’orak sody (khl’orak sodovyi) as 
suggested by Levits’kyi (1903), or khl’oryd , as preferred by Horbachevs’kyi 
(1905) became khl’orystyi natryi, in Zenkevych (1928), a direct caique from 
Russian.Sometimes, the new Russian word, transcribed into Ukrainian, 
would be given alongside a word based on the international Latin words."^° 
Terminology. International vocabulary and Russian terms have both invaded 
Ukrainian over the course of the twentieth century. This creates still another 
area for confusion, where advocates of international words cannot 
understand those using native Ukrainian creations, who in turn cannot talk 
with users of Russian-influenced terminology. Why is terminology given so 
much attention? One linguist offers the explanation:
By the inteilectualization of the standard language, which we could also call its 
rationalization, we understand its adaptation to the goal of making possible 
precise and rigorous, if necessary abstract, statements, capable of expressing 
the continuity and complexity of thought, that is, to reinforce the intellectual side 
of speech- This inteilectualization culminates in scientific (theoretical) speech, 
determined by the attempts to be as precise in expression as possible, to make 
statements which reflect the rigor of objective (scientific) thinking in which terms 
approximate concepts and the sentences approximate logical judgements.'*^
^®Karavansky, (1989), p. 694.
Levits’kyi, Horbachevs’kyi and Zenkevych as cited by Vovk, (1979), pp. 90. 
‘‘“Vovk, (1979), pp. 90-91.
Nepyvoda, Interview August, 1996.
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Another linguist, writing about multilingual dictionaries as a 
terminological base for the formation of standard Ukrainian terms, includes 
his thoughts on language as not only a reflection of reality, but the 
embodiment of all a given nation has learned in the world, and an influence 
on that nation’s view, ‘something more than blood’/^
As in science, both military and legal terms display a lack of uniformity. 
Karavansky criticises the Russian-Ukrainian dictionary for military servicemen 
on several grounds, which highlight terminology problems. First, he says 
subjectively that the dictionary suggests forms which are hard to say, 
rendering them inefficient as commands. He lists vzutta zniaty ta sklasty 
(better zniatyj klasty), Zakincheno rezhym ‘tysha’, but would prefer Kinets’ 
rezhymu Tysha’. One expression is rendered ’Zbil’sh prosto!’ which he 
complains is lifted straight from Russian, though the more Ukrainian ‘Dodai 
prosto’ is admittedly harder to pronounce. Second, some forms are not 
effective or unclear in the dictionary. He does not like usi donyzu; tykh, khto 
kupavsia, pereviryty; zrobyty perervu and offers usi nanyz; khto kupavsia, na 
perevirku; pererva. Third, commands listed in the dictionary do not have wide 
acceptance. He finds some divisions use what is suggested, while others 
have their own forms. This eliminates mutual understanding."^^
If the common elements were to be emphasised, a more 
understandable, unifying lexicon could be established. Karavansky laments
Kyiak, (1996), pp. 250-56.
These phrases, from Karavansky (1997b), are translated roughly as 1. Boots off and piled 
up; 2. Quiet time is over; 3. Straighten up!; 4. Everybody down; 5. Present for inspection after 
bathing; 6. Rest (Take a break').
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that the editors of the dictionary did not avail themselves of any ‘helpful 
instruction books or handbooks’. Finally, commands need not be copied from 
Russian, but should follow Ukrainian language traits instead. In any case, a 
unified, universal lexicon for the military must eliminate ambiguity in 
commands, denomination of military units and vocabulary.^ ^^  ^As mentioned in 
Chapter 2, this lack of agreement has the potential to make joint exercises 
difficult when translators are unfamiliar with terminology, or when the 
translator and Ukrainian military personnel use different words for the same 
concept. The more disastrous wartime implications of a lack in mutually- 
comprehensible commands are obvious.
Official terminology also changed under Soviet influence, leaving 
Ukraine with rather artificial bureaucratic jargon. Besides all of the political 
compromise and debate centering around Ukraine’s new Constitution, some 
linguistic issues have created tensions. The best known example is perhaps 
the phrase ‘people of Ukraine’ which won over Ukrainian people’ in the 
preamble. Legal language, along with military and academic terminology, 
remains a problem area. Karavansky takes up this cause comparing phrases 
which appear in the Constitution, which could have been phrased differently. 
His complaints include the lexicon, grammar, word usage and stylistics. For 
example, the constitution uses the phrase prava liudyny, although liuds’ka 
prava means the same thing. He complains this is a caique on Russian, 
which prefers forms of the pattern noun + noun, genitive case, such as noga 
cheloveka. Ukrainian favours adjective + noun in these cases, with the
44 Karavansky, (1997b), pp. 238-42.
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adjective derived from a noun. He dislikes the word isnuiuchyi, the 
objectionable present active participle used as an adjective, (rakhuiuchyi, 
temperaturiachyi) because this word is not Ukrainian. He prefers teperishnii 
for the meaning of ‘at present, existing’, and suggests other words such as 
zafiksovani prava, naiavna merezha, chvnvi poriadok areshtu to cover other 
places where the offending isnuiuchyi appears. On the subject of stylistics, 
Karavansky notes problems with the active versus the passive 
{zabezpechuye, zabezpechuyet’sia), impersonals (pokladeno, pokladaiets’ia), 
and tsenzuru zaboroneno or tsenzura zaboronena (he prefers the former)."^  ^
He notes two grammatical errors and several word usage problems {ne 
dopuskaets’ia should have been zaboroneno; virazhennia, which is a 
borrowing, was used instead of poshyrennia and vyiav. He blames the 
occurrence of most of these errors on translation from Russian (whether in 
the heads of the authors or in actuality)."*^
Some of this may be resolved with the publication of the legal 
dictionary which is still in production. One reference does exist which serves 
as the first stage of standardisation, entitled Russian-Ukrainian-English 
dictionary of terminology: difficulties of word usage.
One potentially interesting area of terminology is currently under study 
in a new project, outlined in a paper by W. Moskovich."^  ^He seeks to analyse 
the development of new Ukrainian political terminology since 1985. His work
These terms mean ‘is protected’, ‘to be placed’, ‘censorship is forbidden/not allowed’; the 
next three all mean ‘manifestation, expression’.
Karavansky, (1996), pp. 1411-16.
The outline of Moskovich’s talk appears in Movoznavstvo,\he collected papers of the 1996 
Kharkiv congress of Ukrainianists.
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may well yield evidence of linguistic trends which, with further investigation, 
could also be applied to other areas of terminology. He suggests the 
following classification for new terms:
1. Soviet terminology with a changeiconnotation
2. New original Ukrainian terms
3. Revived Ukrainian terms
4. Terms which were previously used mainly in Galicia and the diaspora."*®
One can see how these categories might lend themselves to wider
application. He continues with hypotheses about sources for these terms. He 
suggests that Russian terminology serves as a pattern, but that time and 
increased status will diminish the number of borrowings and caiques from 
Russian. Conversely, the number of foreign loans, especially American 
English words, is large. Perhaps most interestingly, Moskovich claims that 
language previously used in dissident circles has been transferred to offical 
usage, though he gives no examples of such words."*®
There are linguists who seek to produce terms which conform to 
Ukrainian stylistic and lexical norms, and not merely adequately cover new 
phenomena with a hodge-podge of borrowings. One author notes a large 
number of new terms occur in pairs, one with a Ukrainian suffix and the other 
with a non-native suffix: alhebraichnyi, alhebrychnyi; synusiodal’nyi,
synusiodnyi; binominal’nyi, binomnyi. The first term in each case reflects what 
the author calls Russified international vocabulary. The use of the second 
member in each pair would not only tidy up a confusing situation, but would
"*® Moskovich, (1996), pp. 260-62.
214
also support the assertion that Ukrainian has sufficient lexical means to 
express any scientific concept without resorting to Russian. Some 
dictionaries (such as the 1993 edition of the English-Ukrainian mathematics 
dictionary) use the form which follows Ukrainian word-formation rules. Others 
preserve the more Russified term (such as the Russian-Ukrainian dictionary 
of physics terms, 1994 edition.)
This shows two things about terminology in Ukraine. First, the effects 
of Russification still influence some areas of Ukrainian linguistic terminology. 
Secondly, that non-objectionable borrowings from international vocabulary 
may be adapted to fit standard Ukrainian rules, or in other words, rendered 
nearly native.^® In addition to linguistic considerations, one must not forget the 
macrosystem within which terminology operates. Terminology must express 
not only the relationships between words, but also the relationships of 
concepts to one another, and of terms to the concepts they classify.®^
These situations extend beyond merely stylistic concerns: orders must 
be understandable to soldiers, and legal documents must express in exact 
terms what they seek to enforce. These are separate but overlapping issues, 
concerning spelling, puristic leanings, value judgements on whose Ukrainian 
is best and the need to standardise all aspects of the language, particularly 
as it is now officially a state language which will have to be correctly and 
efficiently implemented, taught and learned everywhere in Ukraine. In every 
article and in every argument, linguists seem to agree on one thing:
'’^ Moskovich, (1996), p. 261. 
Boiarova, (1996), pp. 247-50.. 
Kochan, (1996), pp. 256-60.
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terminology must not impoverish Ukrainian by introducing borrowings, but 
rather enrich the lexicon by expanding the forms and meanings of existing 
native words.
Variety and productivity: A related argument appears in the pages of 
Literatuma Ukrayina. The author, Bohdan Kinash, discusses the creation of 
new nouns and adjectives from verbs .He urges linguists to use the existing 
lexicon of Ukrainian, which he believes is not poor or scant, in creating new 
words. As an example, he lists words created from the verb ‘stavyty’ to 
demonstrate how the use of prefixes and suffixes can aid in forming new 
words (vystava, vystavka, vystanova, and vystanovka; vidstava, vidstavka, 
vidstanova, and vidstanovka for example.®  ^ The list uses a total of thirteen 
prefixes and creates fifty-two noun forms. He urges linguists to protect the 
purity of Ukrainian, and not to pollute the language with borrowings (he 
mentions American English words like ofis, reitinh, bryfinh, seks) at the 
expense of good Ukrainian words, and not to try to be ‘trendy’. That this 
contributor to the debate is an engineer shows the level of participation some 
speakers feel in the health of their language.
Variation and linguistic choice represents viability and diversity in the 
functional load of a language, some linguists assert. Others feel the influence 
of diaspora Ukrainian, based on Galician dialects, ruins the pure’ Ukrainian, 
such as Shevchenko’s central dialect. Ermolenko and Dziubyshyna-Mel’nyk 
comment that the first view seems more objective and fact-based. They are 
quick to point out that too much variation can effectively dismember the
Kinash, (1997).
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system of the language, however. When several versions of a term exist, as 
they do in the military, it makes vital communication difficult. Companies from 
different regions may find working together difficult if they do not have the 
same orders. Similarly, lawyers who seek to draw up contracts and 
agreements may discover they cannot be as specific as they must if no one 
agrees upon terminology. This situation can become dangerous when 
medical vocabulary is not agreed upon, as is often the case with frequent re­
writing and re-doing, potentially preventing effective communication between 
laboratories and doctors, doctors and pharmacists, and medical personnel 
and the public.
Their work documents a trend towards neutralisation within variation in 
Ukrainian. This occurs in a number of lexical areas, including words which 
may have been previously marked as dialectal, rarely used, or archaic in 
dictionaries (fundatsiia, svitlyna, ofiruvaty, lektura, mapa, naklad, poetka, or 
zaky)f^ borrowed words from the colloquial or conversational vocabulary 
(zavshe, perevodom, ruinatsiia, chyslo-\n the meaning of ‘number’- ,  zadlia, 
popervakh, shtybf^ words which do not have corresponding qualification in 
the dictionary but are in fact stylistically marked (provid, spil’nota, znosyny, 
filiia);^^ or some words which are marked neutral but have a ‘tone’ or inferred 
colour when used in typically Ukrainian phrases {na tereni, v tsaryni, dilianka,
Levyts’kyi. (1997).
These mean ‘foundation’ (the usual word is fondatsiia), ‘photograph’, ‘to offer, consecrate’, 
‘lecture’, ‘map’, ‘outlay, ‘female poet’ (at present, this has a negative connotation), and ‘until’.
Zavshe is defined as always. For perevodom, the dictionary only offered perevid in the 
meaning of passage. Ruinatsiia is defined as destruction or subversion. Chyslo usually 
means date or quantity. The remaining three mean ‘for the sake of, ‘in the first place’ and 
‘form’.
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chasopys, tlo)f^ and finally words which do not appear in many dictionaries 
at present (zauvahy, rizhnyi, rizhnytsia, zasadnychyi, pozemf^. In all of these 
areas, the process of neutralisation may be observed, so that while these 
lexical items could be deemed ‘marked’ or non-neutral at present, they are 
becoming more acceptable and losing their inferred semantic colour.
These linguists also caution against the phenomenon of ‘hyperism’, 
meaning an enthusiastic purism which roots out normal, historically Ukrainian 
words which happen also to appear in Russian. This same tendency towards 
exaggeration occurs with [g], when (especially under the influence of 
emigres, who also use another language regularly) it can be overused. 
Examples of ‘abuse’ of the phoneme and letter [g] include pedahogyka, 
original, argument, gerb,or gazeta. Newsreaders and others in the media 
receive some criticism for encouraging by their own careless speech the 
maintenance of poor Ukrainian. These authors assess such conflicts, and the 
presence of variation in the language as signs that Ukrainian is in transition.®® 
Lack of knowledge and the surzhyk. Russification carries the bulk of the 
burden for incorrect or historically inexplicable forms in Ukrainian, but it is not 
the sole culprit. International vocabulary has enriched the language, but has 
complicated the spelling system and the terminology lexicon. Diaspora 
Ukrainians helped keep the language alive, but also introduced spelling
Conductor (of electricity), leadership and aesophagus are all given for provid. The 
remaining words are defined as ‘familiarity, commonness’, ‘relations’, and ‘affiliate, branch.’ 
The first three are all defined in a figurative sense as ‘domain, territory, field of knowledge’. 
The remaining words mean chronicle’ and backdrop’.
Zauvahy only appears in the singular, zauvaha and for this the alternate form zawaha is 
given in the meaning of remark, notice, rebuke’. Rizhn- is an alternative spelling of the more 
usual form, rizh, hence the next two words mean ‘different’ and ‘difference’. The remaining 
two words mean ‘fundamental’ and ‘horizon’.
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‘errors’ as their Ukrainian was both archaic and influenced by other 
languages. In addition, since diaspora Ukrainian is based on the Galician 
dialect, Russianisms appeared under the influence of ‘Moscophile’ 
intellectuals at the end of the 19th century. Emigre linguists, however, are 
some of the most vocal critics of ‘Sovietisms’ in Ukrainian. Social attitudes 
exacerbate these kinds of problems: diaspora Ukrainian may be rejected 
since some indigenous Ukrainians feel these emigres deserted the 
homeland, international vocabulary may be seen as the messenger of 
European or American influence and many speakers of the surzhyk are 
looked down upon, instead of receiving encouragement to develop their 
language skills.
Karavansky speaks out against the poor usage of Ukrainian in the 
press and in education. He notes that many speakers did not learn their 
Ukrainian at home, but at school and from newspapers. He notes that the 
press in Ukraine fulfills not only the role of ‘orhanizator ta propagandyst’ , but 
also educator. Using examples from various articles, he highlights not only 
lexical or orthographic mistakes, such as semydesiatelitnii for simdesiatylitnii 
or simdesiatHtnii, (seventy-year old) but also stylistic problems like po 
shkil’nym fondam which should have been first of all po shkil’nykh fondakh, 
and secondly would have been better expressed as metodysty shkihnykh 
fondiv, not the non-Ukrainian sounding metodyst po shkihnykh fondakh 
(educational resources specialist).Karavansky does not feel that the
Ermolenko and Dziubyshyna-Mel’nyk, (1993), pp. 199-204. 
Karavansky, (1993c), pp. 993-97.
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Ukrainian press serves as a good example, because if the of tolerance for the 
surzhyk, and also of rather sloppy attempts at purism.
The response in the language community to the emergence of the 
surzhyk and the lack of knowledge of correct Ukrainian has varied. In 
Ukrains’ka Mova v Shkoli, for example, one author suggested a game of 
linguistic questions as a way to drill language knowledge. The questions 
show an acceptance of the variety present in Ukrainian (alfavit, abetka, and 
azbuka are all given as acceptable words for ‘alphabet’), an interest in how 
international words enter the general lexical fund, and therefore Ukrainian 
(Captain Boycott inspired the ‘international’ word boikot; the Latin word canis 
in astronomy marked the time when the sun was in that constellation, 
corresponding to the summer months called kanikuly in Ukrainian), and an 
assumption that students in Ukraine will be familiar with both Russian and 
Ukrainian.®^
Others criticise the use of the surzhyk instead of educated Russian or 
Ukrainian, as in Marharyta Zhuikova’s ‘Chy potribna Ukraintsiam 
Russkoiazychnaia Mova?’ in Literatuma Ukraiyna, or her ‘lak hovorytymut’ 
Nashi Nashchadky: Ukrains’koiu Movoiu chy Malorossyiskim Narechiem?’®^. 
One author derisively lists ‘kvitky’ like na rakhunok toho pytannia (confusion 
with Russian naschet. Instead of ‘on the subject of that question’, the phrase 
then reads ‘on the cheque of that question’.) or ‘/ur/7 Meshkov ne vidbuvavsia 
lak presydent’ (confusion with Russian ne sostoialsia, so the expression
Karavansky, (1993), p. 996. 
Ostapchenko, (1990), pp. 67-72. 
®^Zhuikova, (1993), pp. 123-28.
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originally meant as ‘does not look presidential’ now reads ‘has not frequented 
as a president’.) as examples of this mixture®"^ . He blames both the surzhyk 
and the confused spelling of foreign names on an insecurity complex in 
Ukraine in relation to Russian.®  ^ Karavansky wryly notes ‘Tsarstviiu ts’oho 
surzhyku ne vydno kintsia.’®®
Language regulation: The new Pravopys
Wexler categorises puristic tendencies as ‘opening’ or ‘closure’ to certain 
donor languages. Nowhere are such tendencies more apparent than in the 
latest work of the language regulators, published in the new Pravopys. This 
question is important as the rejection of linguistic elements result from, or 
mirror, a social and political rejection on a larger scale. Thus, one may expect 
greater sensitivity to what are perceived as Russian forms, a lack of 
awareness regarding words originally found in Polish (Ukraine’s relations with 
Poland being less stressful than the relationship with Russia), and a 
willingness to adopt international vocabulary, with all its suggestion of 
cosmopolitanism, into the spoken language at least.
The Pravopys serves to regulate spoken and written Ukrainian by 
presenting a model for correct usage. Thus, spelling and grammar issues 
must be decided, along with syntax, style and lexicon. The new Pravopys 
attempts to correct a number of previous problems in orthography. This 
includes the spelling of geographical and foreign names and places. 
Recommendations include correcting [g] and [h] inconsistencies; only using
^  The kingdom of the mixture language is never-ending. 
Zadorozhnyi, (1995), pp. 10-1.
Karavansky, (1993a), p. 74.
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[kh] for velar fricatives (as in Dachau or loch). Careful use of the soft sign and 
apostrophe are also recommended, especially where confusion with Russian 
might occur. A more phonetic spelling of the problematic German ei/ey 
(Einstein) is suggested, using Ukrainian ai and not ei, and for German eu, 
Ukrainian oi should be used (Neuman). Greek letters for th and eu in words 
derived from Greek should be rendered t and ev in Ukrainian, as in katedra 
and evforiia. The transliteration using u for English [w] is rejected in favour of 
V, yeilding for ‘know how’ the form nov hav instead of the objectionable nou 
khau. (Even this form could elicit some protest as the word for a dog’s bark is 
hav.) These suggestions take advantage of the phonemic system of 
Ukrainian which includes the bilabial [w] and the voiceless velar [h] which 
Russian lacks.®^  In general, a careful compromise must be attained which 
balances an accurate representation of the phonemes (not necessarily the 
letters) of the donor language, but is also realistic with respect to the 
Ukrainian phonemic system.
The most-argued aspects of the spelling system are as follows: [g] vs 
[h], r  versus I (as in zalia/zala), the declension of type III nouns in the 
genitive, locative and dative (Holoskevitch uses -/ in the locative and -y in the 
others; the 1997 edition uses -/for all of them), the declension of surnames 
ending in -iv (normal rules demand the -/V become -ov in oblique cases, but 
then the name resembles the Russian variant so many Ukrainians preserve 
the -/V even though this is against spelling rules), the use of jot between 
vowels in words such as spetsial’nyi/spetsiialnyi (with no jot between vowels
^^Zadorozhnyi, (1995), pp. 10-11.
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and with a jot, respectively); the doubling of consonants in words and names 
of foreign origin (Hrimm vs Hrim)-, the spelling of -th  with either - f  or - t  in 
Ukrainian (controversial in Latin or Greek borrowings).®® Some of these 
disagreements involve more than just orthography, however. In particular, the 
I versus I’ not only indicates a difference in spelling but one in pronunciation: 
Ukrainians in Ukraine do not believe the diaspora who use the I’ are speaking 
correctly, much less using correct Ukrainian spelling.
The discussion surrounding the most recent editions of the Pravopys remains 
complicated. Diaspora Ukrainians usually favour earlier editions of this 
reference, especially the 1928 edition by Holoskevych. In contrast, until 
recently the accepted (albeit heavily Russified) edition was the 1960 
Pravopys and subsequent revisions. After glasnost’, new editions began to 
appear which launched various debates including those mentioned above. 
Opinions of various linguists and scholars working on and around the new 
edition are discussed below. Judging from the response the newest version 
has elicited, the controversy is far from resolved. It is safe to say whichever 
side of the various linguistic issues one takes, the main problem remains 
consistency: once the rules are decided for good, they must then be applied 
universally, instead of including page after page of exceptions and variations. 
When compromise and uncertainty as to the correct form become less of an 
issue, the Pravopys will be much more ‘user friendly’.®®
These are gathered from a variety of sources which list most of the same problems. These 
sources are documented throughout this section of the chapter. The reference Ukrayins’kyi 
Pravopys: tak i ni contains several comprehensive listings, as does an article in Den’ entitled 
‘Gramatychna anarkhiia skoro mae skinchytysia’ by Mykola Siriuk. One could also consult the 
Pravopys itself to observe the rules for spelling contentious forms as they now stand.
®® Interview, Olena Bekh, December, 1997.
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The number of available sources discussing or arguing various points 
in connection with the Pravopys is substantial. Ermolenko, for example, 
discusses the function of the Pravopys as a universal guide, meant to be 
available to all speakers of Ukrainian and its contradictory nature as both a 
solid, stable reference and a dynamic reflection of the language as it 
changes. She explains her view that the earliest versions of the reference 
were not consistent since the language was not yet completely codified. The 
1928 version cannot be considered totally reliable for the following reason:
The 1928 edition, the so-called Skrypnykivs’ky Pravopys, which functioned in 
Western Ukraine until 1939 and is also used today, although not always closely 
followed, among Western diaspora. For the overwhelming majority of our 
contemporaries in Ukraine, this Pravopys is already history, even in its lexical 
practices which were published in the twenties and thirties in this century.
The arguments surrounding the latest edition highlight larger cultural 
debates. There is no neat, tidy way to divide and classify the nature of the 
conflict. Essentially, disagreement occurs on a variety of levels. First, native 
Ukrainians support a standard language which reflects recent social and 
technological changes. Diaspora Ukrainians tend to prefer a radical overhaul 
and a return to Holoskevych and the 1928 Pravopys. In addition. Eastern and 
Southern Ukrainians tend to support only very limited, gradual changes, 
perhaps symptomatic of their support of Russian language, and therefore of 
the more Russified editions of the Pravopys, while the West and Centre 
would prefer more fundamental alterations which would reflect the modern 
language’s sui generis path of development. This leaves the diaspora, the 
South/East and the West/Central regions of Ukraine in conflict with one
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another. The varying degrees of conservatism, radicalism and positions on 
each particular issue (-/ or doubling of consonants in foreign words, for 
example) complicate the picture even more.
Professor O.Taranenko, the head of the commission which made 
decisions concerning the latest edition, reflects the government view. He 
explains the problems highlighted above, and remarks that there is only one 
Pravopys which must serve Russophone Ukrainians, Ukrainian speakers. 
Westerners and Easterners. Although an ideal and perfect reference is 
impossible, he comments that some countries take a more theoretical stance 
towards their written standard, and preserve rules that no longer apply in the 
natural language, that of its speakers. He suggests that in Ukraine, the 
editors and compilers on the committee attempted to reflect real Ukrainian. 
Here, there are issues not only of the official Ukrainian enshrined in the 
Pravopys, but also of standard literary Ukrainian, which may or may not have 
stable, reliable norms to follow. Therefore, the controversy around the 
Pravopys assumes another dimension; it is no longer an argument whether 
the book correctly captures Ukrainian in the best and most suitable manner, 
but has also become an argument as to what actually is correct, standard 
literary Ukrainian, the language the Pravopys must attempt to characterise.^^
Taranenko leaves aside the specifics of the Ukrainian situation and 
describes the role of grammatical and lexical normative works of any 
language. First, an orthograhipical dictionary should present the living 
language as accurately as possible. Second, it must be reasonably stable
Ermolenko, (1997c), p. 45.
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and reliable. Third, in the writing of foreign words, a good compromise must 
be reached between correctly capturing the original word and the restrictions 
of the phonetic system of the recipient language. Fourth and finally, the 
Pravopys must be internally coherent and consistent, and embrace the 
maximum orthographic and stylistic potential of the language.^^ He adds that 
the commission working on the newest edition must be governed by realism 
and not romantic idealism. Taranenko concludes by saying the nation awaits 
their work, which will not only produce a ‘vseukrayins’kyi Pravopys' but also 
aid in consolidating the country.
Those in the East view the purpose of the Pravopys in a slightly 
different way. For many of these Ukrainians, or Russians living in Ukraine, 
the more recent editions with Russified vocabulary may not be wholly 
objectionable, and a return to norms of 1928 would be undesirable. One 
writer from Luhans’k suggests that changes to the Pravopys must be gradual 
and realistic, ‘evolutionary, not revolutionary.’ Many of his sentiments do 
resemble others from different regions, such as the need for a single 
standard used uniformly throughout Ukraine. "^^
What is perhaps most astonishing about the debate surrounding the 
Pravopys is the number of participants and their combined contributions to 
the discussion.
Taranenko, (1997), pp. 12-8. 
Taranenko, (1997), p. 15. 
Taranenko, 0997) pp. 16-8.
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Too many cooks? Professional and amateur linguists in Ukraine:
A great deal is still being written on these linguistic problems by 
Ukrainian and foreign linguists. Below, some of their work is discussed in an 
attempt to catalog and analyse any general trends in opinion, or the 
endorsement of a popular approach.
Experts don’t exactly agree, one quickly discovers. For example, the 
foreword to the new English-Ukrainian Dictionary of Business states ‘We 
draw your attention to the fact that we have avoided forms that are not 
characteristic of Ukrainian (e.g. active participles with the ending -uchyi, 
iuchyi, and others.)’^ ® One finds as a lexical category in a new stylistic 
handbook, ‘words, in the place of which often erroneously other lexemes are 
used, for example: vvniatkovvi-vvkliuchnvi, zavdiakv—diakuiuchV (meaning 
‘exceptional’ and ‘owing to’ respectively; objectionable form underlined). 
Besides rejecting archaic and dialect words generally, this handbook also 
claims there is no difference in meaning or usage for plattia—suknia, plyvty- 
plysty, (‘skirt’ and ‘to swim’) though some would suggest a Russian influence 
in plattia and plyvtyJ^ In this case, plyvty might actually be preferable 
according to Nepyivoda, because plysty can be confused with plisty, ‘to 
braid’. Hlyts’kyi rejects all Russianisms, whether introduced by Galician 
Moscophiles or Soviets, while Karavansky somewhat reluctantly allows that 
Russian imports may be treated as any other borrowing, provided Ukrainian 
words are not displaced, and the new lexeme conforms to Ukrainian word-
Uzhchenko, (1997), pp. 160-162.
Krouglov, Kurylko, and Kostenko, (1997), preface, p. viii.
76 Holovashchuk, (1995), p. 4.
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formation rules/^ This tension between different sources for new lexical items 
can be seen by contrasting the choices of dictionary editors O. Popovych 
(vyzyvaty, zakliuchaty fakt, narushennia, nevmisnyi, nehoduvannia, 
typohrafiia, ushcherb) and O. Bartoshchuk (vyklykaty, ukladaty fakt, 
porushennia, nedorechnyi, oburennia, drukamia, shkoda) who used different 
pre-Soviet dictionaries as their sources^®.
One of the problems in such discussions is a certain lack of 
meticulousness on the part of those writing about linguistic problems. It is 
difficult to ascertain if this is academic hubris, or indicative of the damaging 
effects of Russification on even expert knowledge. For example, in 
discussing the carelessness of the press and other linguists, Karavansky 
quotes Popovych and Bartoshchuk as supporting certain words in the lexicon. 
Popovych claims his list is acceptable as those words appear in the 
Ukrainian-German dictionary published in Leipzig in 1943, when anti-Russian 
feeling would have been very prevalent indeed. His list includes vyzyvaty, 
zakliuchaty pakt, narushennia, nevmisnyi, previously mentioned as an 
acceptable alternative; nehoduvannia, typohrafiia, and ushcherb. Of these 
words, two of them are blatant Russianisms (nehoduvannia and ushcherb) 
and three of them do not actually appear in the 1943 dictionary at all. The 
‘rival’ list furnished by Bartoshchuk contains the words vyklykaty, ukladaty 
pakt, porushennia, nedorechnyi, oburennia, drukarnia, and shkoda. Of these
Karavansky, (1994b), p. 89.
Karavansky explains Popovych's choices reflected his use of the Ukrainian-German 
dictionary of 1943, Kuzeli and Rudnyts’kyi, eds. The list from Bartoshchuk reflects loyalty to 
the 1930s dictionary of Paneika. Karavansky cites the ‘Little Russian-German dictionary’ or E. 
Zhelekhivs’ky, published in L'viv in 1884-6 as a source of both archaic and Russian 
introductions. (1997), p. 98.
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words, six appear in the 1943 Liepzig dictionary as acceptable Ukrainian 
words. In addition, although the two lists are supposed to contain possible 
synonyms, or alternatives with the same meaning, this is not entirely true. 
Nedorechnyi and nevmisnyi are defined differently, as ‘inopportune or 
unreasonable' and ‘illicit, unbecoming’ respectively. Typohrafiia is translated 
as ‘typography’, while drukarnia is taken to mean ‘a print shop’. Essentially, a 
list of potential synonyms is offered, when the words do not actually 
correspond.
These mistakes or inaccuracies may be blamed on Popovych 
originally, though Karavansky is guilty of his own errors later. Karavansky 
explains the basis for using both sets of words but dislikes nehoduvannia in 
particular. This word is suggested as a translation of ‘disapproval’, calqued 
from Russian ‘negodovanie’. He would prefer the use of a similar building 
process as in English:
prove-approve-approval-disapproval;
khvalyty-skhvaiyty-skhvaiennia-neskhvaienniaJ^
He creates this ‘chain’ of words by adding prefixes and suffixes, linking the 
English words prove-approve-approval-disapproval. This is also 
problematic because he is mixing criteria, confusing semantic and 
morphological links to which he, and any average speaker, may not be 
sensitive. The same error applies to the Ukrainian chain, as the words mean 
‘to praise’, ‘to approve’, ‘approval’, and ‘lack of approval’ (not disapproval, 
which is oburennia). Karavansky rightly claims that the Russianism 
nehoduvannia is objectionable as it does not mean disapproval’ as Popovych
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would like, and as it is a direct caique from Russian. He is also correct in 
asserting the word is a ‘fifth wheel’ since Ukrainian already has words to 
mean both ‘disapproval’ and ‘indignation’. T h e s e  valid observations 
notwithstanding, Ukrainian linguists, even non-professional ones, should be 
more careful to check sources and seek verification. Clearly, some of them 
are not as familiar with their native language as they could be, and entering 
meticulous debates necessitates careful research and documentation.
Solutions and suggestions: What to do?
Two immediate problems confronting Ukrainian demand attention. 
First, whatever standard emerges must encompass forms understandable to 
all speakers of Ukrainian to allow easy communication and mutual 
intelligibility. Second, and perhaps more optimistic, the language enthusiasts 
would like this standard to be aesthetically pleasing, following rules of 
Ukrainian style and word-formation. This would then lead to functional 
differentiation, allowing Ukrainian to serve as the only means of 
communication needed for normal daily business, and elevate the language's 
status in the eyes of both its speakers and the world community.
How best to handle Russianisms and other questionable forms in the 
language? Here, opinions vary considerably. Vovk adopts a pragmatic view, 
that the speaker must differentiate between useful words borrowed from 
Russian, and those which obscure a good Ukrainian term and should
Karavansky, (1997), pp. 98-9. 
Karavansky, (1997), pp. 98-9.
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therefore not be used.®^  There is a definite trend away from words perceived 
to be Russian. One example is the preference for shtampovannia over 
shtampovka, reflecting the choice of a Ukrainian ending over the Russian - 
ovka. Some suggest avoiding obviously Polish words as well, but often words 
have been in the language so long they are no longer recognised as having 
foreign origin An example is palyty: it is worth mentioning that more than one 
native speaker used this example, and said the word had been imported from 
Polish, though it is arguably an older Slavonic word. This indicates the 
instincts of even linguists and movoznavtsi may not be totally reliable as 
filters for borrowed words.There  are Russian words which fit this category 
as well, such as ploshcha, velosiped or sportsmen.
How do Ukrainians decide which words may stay in the language, and 
which are too obviously remnants of Russification? (Or unacceptable new 
creations from whatever source?) In 1994, Karavansky offered the following 
set of rules:
The lexicon should be understandable
Words should be pronounceable and not too long
Obvious Ukrainian words should be kept
Words should have Ukrainian roots
Rules of Ukrainian word formation should be followed
Ermolenko, interview, August, 1996.
This also touches on a topic beyond the scope of this work but which might prove fruitful 
ground for further research, the process by which existing words expand their semantic load 
to cover new concepts. Palyty originially meant burning, or giving off smoke as did Russian 
kurit’, both of which were essentially intransitive verbs. The meaning expanded when tobacco 
entered the culture (originally the English verb primarily meant ‘to give off smoke’ as well, not 
‘to smoke’ transitively). It would be interesting to explore whether Ukrainian pursued similar 
lines of incorporation with other new terminology.
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Words should not have any ’undesirable undercurrents'®^
Without sounding too critical (after all, Karavansky is taking an avid 
and active interest in the health of his native language), one could note that 
not all of his suggestions are helpful. Undesirable undercurrents’ could be 
taken to mean words which are semantically marked (‘Soviet’ words, for 
example), but this is at best a subjective means of assessing vocabulary and 
therefore not totally reliable.
As far as the introduction of new words is concerned, he suggests a 
few additional criteria: the new words should not replace existing Ukrainian 
ones, and are particularly desirable if a word can replace a phrase.®® Krouglov 
wrote on the same problem in 1995, suggesting the criteria of specificity, 
usage, self-descriptiveness and approval of authorities should apply.®® 
Nepyivoda, who is an expert in stylistics, believes concern for readability must 
be taken into account. She chooses words which she feels are pleasant to 
read, and easy to understand.
Common sense will dictate which words are useful enough to keep, 
and which are archaic or unrecognizable for speakers. Ermolenko reflects 
this pragmatic attitude, and suggests leaving usage to individual taste and 
sense, as this is a policy in itself. She does not reject dialects of Ukrainian 
outright, but feels everyone should know the standard. Her other concern is 
to avoid extreme slang, or extreme high style. She rejects attempts to 
maintain an artificial language, neither democratic nor neutral, i.e. Soviet
®® Karavansky, (1994b), pp. 85-8. 
®'* Zadorozhnyi, (1995), pp. 10-11. 
®® Karavansky, (1994b), pp. 85-8.
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coinages such as Ukrderzhmiaskombinat or Komzavod. Personal style and 
feeling for the language are universal criteria, although there is concern that 
many people's sense of what is good Ukrainian has been damaged by 
bilingualism and years of hearing'bad'Ukrainian.
A rejection of Russification is not the only issue in determining what 
the ideal lexicon of Ukrainian should be. New words, both acceptable and 
unacceptable, enter from a variety of sources including Russian. The new 
lexicon of Ukrainian allows regulation using a set of criteria, or a combination 
of recommendations, to test individual words and phrases for feasibility. 
Borrowings must not be universally rejected, as they appear in most world 
languages. Here again, criteria are offered which would help regulate their 
inclusion in the lexicon. Essentially, borrowings must enhance and enrich the 
language, and they must not replace native Ukrainian words. According to 
Karavansky, imidzh fails the test, as it replaces obraz and does not cover any 
new concept. Here he has failed to perceive the expanded semantic load of 
this word, which now also includes the meaning ‘reputation, public face’ and 
as such may need to be retained in Ukrainian. Other words from English may 
perturb linguists, such as the overt borrowings konsensus and prevaliuvaty. 
Sometimes the problem relates not to the actual word, but its pronunciation. 
The adverb tsilodoboho (based on Russian kruglotochno) has vowels i-o-o-o- 
o, which do not flow in Ukrainian. The Russian word, in contrast, has a 
normal Russian vowel pattern of u-a-o-a, and therefore sounds pleasing to 
Russian ears. Karavansky remarks that in situations such as this, ‘treba ne
Krouglov, (1995).
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copiuvaty, a tvoryty svoyi movni standarty i movni zrazky’.®^ Another 
unacceptable word is the caique vytoky which copies Russian istoki: the 
caique appears in place of the Ukrainian words dzherela and korinnia, the 
word is hard to say correctly and speakers who do not know Russian will not 
understand it. Such criticisms, which differ from expert to expert, obviously 
reflect subjective views and as such cannot be deemed absolute. A 
particularly good example of a new Ukrainian coinage is letovyshche which 
replaces foreign words aerodrom and aéroport (airport). It fills the other 
criteria: easily understandable, from Ukrainian roots, easily prounounceable 
and follows the model of other words already in the lexicon like budovyshche, 
kladovyshche, rodovyshche and stanovyshche}^ The diaspora may be an 
acceptable source for new lexicon, as in the case of dovkillia. This word 
follows the structure of other Ukrainian words, such as zillia, pidpillia and 
Podillia and is instantly understandable. Even when words are not othenA i^se 
problematic, they may still be unacceptable for social or psychological 
reasons. For example, the expression blyz'ke zarubizhzhia (near abroad) 
entered Ukrainian via Russian. This term fulfills all of Karavansky's 
requirements even though it is Russian in origin. This alone, he says, is not 
reason to discount a term. He appears more uncomfortable with the 
ideological weight of the phrase, which was used to name the former Soviet 
republics. He suggests that this phrase reflects Russia's refusal to call the 
new entities ‘countries', naming them instead the 'nearby abroad'. In any
Karvansky, (1993a), p. 73. ‘We must not copy, but create our own language standards and 
linguiste models’.
Karavansky, (1994b), p. 87.
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case, it is apparent that while new coinages, imports and international 
vocabulary may be welcome in theory, they must be assessed individually in 
order to justify their incorporation into standard (rather than colloquial) 
Ukrainian.
Conclusions:
Answers are not as satisfactory a means of summarising this area of 
work as a list of good, relevant questions. Overall the internal problems of 
Ukrainian represent a problem that is both aesthetic and symbolic. The 
linguistic war embodies the struggle of Ukraine to free itself from Russian 
influence and participate independently in the international community, and 
creates a thumbnail sketch of the bruised self-esteem of Ukraine as a state, 
its learning processes and development out of post-Soviet puberty into young 
nationhood. Were a critic to form an opinion based on only what has been 
achieved thus far, he could be forgiven for finding much of Ukrainian 
language either copied or retrospective, borrowed from neighbours or the 
past. Such as assessment would not be entirely fair to such a new state, 
which despite its present and ongoing troubles has made great strides in 
improving the language situation, and has recognised the importance of 
Ukrainian as a national symbol supporting and representing independence 
and bolstering national pride.
Any good critic must offer constructive suggestions for change, or 
characterise in a useable way, the main challenges facing a subject. 
Therefore, it is only sporting to produce a task list for Ukrainian language. 
First on the list, one must mention the lexicon. At present, a great deal of
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variety exists which may add to the richness of the language but also cause 
confusion. Some variations retain non-objective ‘colour’ betraying dialect 
origins, Soviet-era borrowings and caiques or international vocabulary 
borrowings. Many linguists argue that borrowings or ‘trendy’ international 
words replace easily-attainable Ukrainian words created using prefixes and 
suffixes, or by creating new nouns and adjectives from existing verbs and 
vice-versa. Time will show which variations lose this colour and become 
synonyms within the standard. Even terms and vocabulary items which are 
not archaic, obvious new introductions, or Russianisms, including the newly- 
set standard terminologies for scientific, legal and business fields, are not 
widely or universally accepted by the population. A universal standard must 
emerge, to avoid confusion and set a guide by which every one can operate. 
Karavansky reccommends a central linguistic committee to regulate this 
emerging standard, and keep the press, educational and academic spheres 
and government in line with one another.®® It may be an idea to expand the 
role of the Ukrainian Institute of the Academy of Sciences to include a 
‘watchdog’ function, which would allow for the regulation new forms and 
further ensure that good examples are available for new or reluctant 
speakers.
The grammar and syntax of the language might benefit from a touch- 
up in the same fashion. Phrases have entered colloquial Ukrainian and to a 
lesser extent, written Ukrainian, which draw the attention of linguists due to 
their resemblance to equivalent Russian phrases. Many of these linguists
®® Karavansky, (1993c), p. 997.
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dislike the Russian-sounding forms and offer archaic or Western Ukrainian 
alternatives. Here again, time will decide whose Ukrainian will gain the 
necessary status to prevail. A universal rejection of all things Russian, while 
natural and understandabe, may be counter-productive. Polish, English or 
French forms do not suffer this kind of purging from the language; and 
Ukrainian is related to Russian more so than to any of these. Some 
Russianisms serve a useful function in the language and could well be 
missed if they were to be forced out by excited purists.
Finally, one must turn an eye to the spelling system, already under as 
much corrective attention as the other two areas. Here again caution must be 
exercised. The return of [g] should not be an excuse to change good, 
Ukrainian pronunciation for diaspora Ukrainian with English or French 
influences. At the same time, Ukrainian has no need for Russian’s 
compromise [kh] for the [h] sound, since it has both phonemes already. The 
same drive to weed out Russian could also lead to hyper-’i'-ification in words 
containing [o] or [e], though in some cases Russian influence has indeed 
changed Ukrainian spellings over time and corrections are necessary to 
accurately follow spelling rules and represent past sound changes.
There is also the matter of competing or at least co-occurring trends 
towards variation and standardisation within the normal literary language; 
neutralisation of previously marked forms and competing political trends of 
pragmatism and neo-Romanticism. All of this compounded by the relatively 
few speakers of standard literary Ukrainian, and the role of the press as a
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primary language educator complicates the linguistic situation in Ukraine 
almost beyond comprehension.
What does this mean for Ukrainian? Essentially, speakers who wish to 
improve their language skills may find a dictionary handy until the process is 
complete. Schoolchildren may have to resign themselves to learning entirely 
different words for elements or new spellings of foreign countries and names. 
Military personnel and lawyers might have to put up with some confusion until 
one set of terms wins out over the others and gains wide acceptance. 
Government officials must seriously consider their policy options, and 
whether their support of a non-objective, nationalistically inclined language 
approach really presents the best picture of Ukraine and the Ukrainian 
language both at home and abroad. Those in the media, intelligentsia and 
educational spheres have a duty and responsibility to accurately reflect the 
standard, as it is at the moment, in every utterance and written work. Theirs is 
the arena where the language battle must eventually be won, where new 
terms must fight it out with old Russified words and coinages -  and will either 
sink or swim.
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Conclusions;
What has been established in the preceding discussion of the 
language situation in Ukraine and language planning measures being 
undertaken at present?
First and foremost, language planning is taking place in tandem 
with state-building in Ukraine. While the immediate and pressing goal of 
these policies is to create a unified civil society in the newly-independent 
country, in the long term, the Ukrainian language must be supported as 
the state language, the language which all citizens use to communicate 
with the state and with one another. One part of state-building is to reverse 
the effects of Russification. This means standardising a cleaned-up 
version of Ukrainian purged of glaring Russianisms, and also a shift in the 
perception of Ukrainian as a peasant dialect.
A complementary aspect of language planning is the creation of a 
uniquely Ukrainian identity, for the country and for individuals that may or 
may not include Ukrainian ethnicity but must certainly eventually include 
the Ukrainian language. This means that the Ukrainian language must shift 
its meaning from a marker of ethnicity to a marker of nationality, as a 
component of Ukrainian identity. For some this means changing from a 
regional or ethnically Russian self-perception to an allegiance to the 
political and territorial unit that is Ukraine. Those who do not already 
identify themselves as possessing a Ukrainian national identity, and 
therefore who do not feel that it is necessary to speak Ukrainian as the 
state language must be made to view Ukrainian as a necessary tool for 
participation in the state in which they live.
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This new Ukrainian social and political identity contains several 
components. First, the population must perceive Ukrainian history as 
separate from that of Russia, though common events and regimes have 
linked the two countries in the past. Secondly, both ‘folk’ culture and high 
culture must also be viewed as Ukrainian and separate, though again 
there are links. Politically the territory and statehood of Ukraine must be 
respected and the Constitution with its political, cultural and civic rights, 
should be upheld by citizens. Legally, Ukrainian law establishes the 
dominance of Ukrainian language and culture as that of the majority, but 
liberally protects and allows for the promotion of minority rights and 
cultures in Ukraine. It may be some time before Russians in Ukraine 
become accustomed to viewing themselves as a minority and consent to 
adopt at least the linguistic and political components of Ukrainian identity; 
thus far, they have not become politicised in their demands for a return to 
the Soviet Union or for dual citizenship. One may expect that in several 
generations they will assimilate into the majority culture.
As a component of civic identity, language cannot be 
underestimated. Symbolically, it represents Ukraine’s independent status 
and serves as a link to the past, with its great heroes and poets. 
Pragmatically, as the state language, it must eventually become the 
normal and usual language of social contact. In this way, while minorities 
may keep their own language and culture they must also learn Ukrainian in 
order to participate. Ironically, as English gains wider popularity as an 
international language, the role of Russian may diminish leaving room for 
the growth of Ukrainian. Though Ukraine does not appear to be 
‘nationalising’ in the ethnic sense, nor should it if peaceful relations
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internally and externally are to be maintained, the country is nationalising 
linguistically and socially. Dual identities are perfectly reconcilable as long 
as Russian or another language is the marker of one’s ethnic background, 
while Ukrainian is one’s language of interaction within society and the 
state. Given the closeness, whether historical or forced, of Ukraine and 
Russia not only geographically but culturally and linguistically, some 
differentiation is necessary. The efforts of linguists are directed at the 
removal of any artificial closeness in the language; historians have gone 
about reclaiming a separate history for Ukraine. As a means to emphasise 
political independence, particularly as it is not universally recognised, 
language may serve as an important distinguishing feature between 
Ukraine and its neighbours. Language may also serve as a rallying point 
for the population, especially given the lack of a single state religion or 
unifying ideology. In its role as a symbol of the state, language can be as 
potent as the flat, the Constitution or any historical monument in capturing 
what it means to be Ukrainian.
Currently the Ukrainian language is undergoing both natural and 
engineered processes which better prepare it to serve as the only means 
of communication for citizens of Ukraine. Whereas in the past and in the 
diaspora, Ukrainian was often mythologised as the language of 
Shevchenko and the Cossacks, young people now are beginning to feel 
comfortable addressing previously taboo topics in their native language. 
Mass literature can now be written in Ukrainian without the view that this is 
somehow ‘sullying’ the ‘great’ Ukrainian language. Admittedly, most 
swearing seems to be in Russian, but there are words for socially
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marginalised activities and groups which previously did not appear in the 
lexicon.
Kuzio notes several positive changes which support both the growth 
of Ukrainian as state language and the progress achieved in state-building 
partly as a result of language planning policies. These include
• Increase in the use of pure Ukrainian instead of Galician or 
surzhyk
• Removal of hostility and disdain towards the public use of 
Ukrainian
• Greater use of Ukrainian in higher education
• More Russian-speakers wishing for their children to learn 
Ukrainian as a career move
• Decline in the knowledge and use of Russian
• Increase in the use of English^
As stated above, English is rapidly replacing Russian as the 
language of international communication. This effectively removes 
justification for the presence of Russian in Ukrainian schools and 
institutions except as a foreign language like any other, and creates space 
for Ukrainian as the language used within the country.
This does not mean that Russian will vanish overnight, or even 
become a truly foreign language in the immediate future. In the media, 
Russian remains prominent and even more widespread than Ukrainian, 
largely for financial reasons but also due to lack of incentives to reverse 
the situation. In education great strides have been made in some areas, 
but the use of Ukrainian does not reflect the predominance of Ukrainians
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in the population. These two cultural institutions provide necessary 
background training and support for using Ukrainian and as such, cannot 
be allowed to slip back into Russian. While finances do not allow monetary 
rewards for publication or instruction in Ukrainian, the implementation of 
penalties could provide just the right reverse incentive to encourage a 
change. Once this change has begun, social pressure and self-interest 
could keep up the momentum so that in one or two generations, Russian 
is indeed a foreign language for citizens of Ukraine.
From successful language planning attempts, both abroad in 
countries such as Tanzania, or in the recent past such as the policy 
instrumented by the Soviet government one can identify several factors 
which aid in the implementation of a coherent language planning policy. 
Some policies have the advantage of a charismatic leader or champion, 
liked and respected or at least noticed by the public to popularise the 
issues. One could cite feminists such as Gloria Steinem (who brought the 
attention of the public to sexist use of language in English) or Eliezer Ben 
Yehuda in Israel or even Joseph Stalin, who for all his tyranny and evil 
intent certainly displayed sufficient charisma to push his policies into 
effect. Equally, the legacy of a past hero or leader could serve as an icon 
of national pride along the lines of Pushkin in Russia, or even 
Shakespeare and Daniel Webster in England and the United States 
respectively. Ukraine seems to fit more into the latter category, with the 
nearly universal adulation of Shevchenko, than into the first. Although 
there are a number of colourful figures in both government and academic
 ^ Kuzio, p. 356.
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circles, no one seems to have become the standard-bearer for Ukrainian 
patriotism and linguistic development.
Timing plays a role in the success of a language planning policy. If 
appropriate social and political precedents have not taken place, it is 
unlikely that the public will see the need for language changes or even feel 
prepared to make them. Related to the time at which a policy is launched 
is the environment in which the targeted society functions. French society 
of several centuries ago felt sufficient pride in its premier place on the 
world stage to advocate the kind of purism put forward by Richelieu, and 
the government of that time could effectively engineer such active controls 
on the French language. Attempts to keep foreign borrowings out of 
contemporary French are not as successful (le walkman, le computer, le 
tee-shirt) probably due to a more relaxed attitude on the part of the French 
population, a globalising marketplace and a less strict style of government. 
Ukraine is at a crucial stage in terms of language planning at present. It 
has survived as an independent state long enough for many of the earlier 
political and linguistic demands of ethnic Russians and Russian speakers 
to have died down, while citizens are beginning to formulate a new 
national identity. Given its absolutely crucial position between the former 
Soviet Union and the West, a policy which seeks to remove Russian 
influence and promote indigenous features, especially language, would 
help to align Ukraine with Western democracies and away from the former 
Empire in the East. The economic and political benefits of language 
planning in this instance are obvious.
Status can also aid in the acceptance of a promoted language. In 
Wales and Ireland, such status appears to be somewhat lacking. Although
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ethnie Irish and Welsh people verbalise a great deal of respect for the 
language of their ethnicity, they must communicate with the central British 
government in English, thus undermining the position of Welsh and Irish 
languages. Much of the Spanish-speaking population of the United States 
is made up of poor immigrants who have not acquired any political weight 
in local governments. This means that for the time being, English is fairly 
secure in its position as the national language due to the greater political 
and cultural status and influence of English speakers. In Ukraine, status 
has been something of an issue. Russian allied speakers with Moscow 
and urbanite society, while Ukrainian appeared provincial in comparison. 
This element of language planning still needs to be addressed, though 
independence and some measure of success in self-government and 
democracy have helped to undermine the notion that only peasants speak 
Ukrainian. As improving finances allow the media to present more glossy 
local products to compete with Russian imports, and as young people 
learn their own history and literature this discrepancy in perception should 
vanish. Here again the presence of English could be influential in providing 
another foreign language to link Ukrainians to the international community. 
Already there are some signs that language enthusiasts are reluctant to 
promote English as an alternative to Russian (thus in their minds trading 
one Big Brother for another). English, however, has none of the 
throwbacks to the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union and would be less 
likely to adversely affect the position of Ukrainian.
What may be truly lacking in Ukraine is the more elusive component 
of coherence in language planning. A good policy should have definite 
aims, both in the long and short term allied with a vision that is appropriate
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to the culture one hopes to influence. This must be supported by careful 
and detailed schemes of implementation at every possible level, with 
realistic and sensible means at hand. Most of all, such a plan should be 
tailored to appeal to the masses as well as to academic and political 
leaders.
Reading the mission statements or plans of intelligentsia members 
-  both politicians and academics -  one is immediately tempted to ask how 
such general and far-flung ideas could be implemented. When journalists 
complain that they are struggling in a predatory environment, the 
government responds by banning ORT coverage of the Olympics. No one 
disputes that the population does not yet have sufficient affluence to 
support a media structure to rival that of other European countries. 
However, measures which would promote the development of local media 
remain to be implemented (such as tax breaks for Ukrainian-language 
media and publications, or a tariff on Russian-language media and 
publications).
Members of the Ukrafinoznavstvo movement are particularly guilty 
of such unsupported aspirations. Their demand for Ukrainian-language 
schools for ethnic Ukrainians in Russia has little chance of being met, 
especially when Russian-language schools remain in Ukraine. The goal of 
establishing Ukrainian-studies departments in foreign universities is an 
understandable one, and if realised would promote Ukrainian interests 
abroad by raising awareness and interest. This plan appears to rely on 
goodwill or diaspora involvement to be successful, since the Ukrainian 
university community does not seem to have funding to send scholars 
abroad, pay for lecturers to work in other countries or to publish translated
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materials for foreign consumption. One scholar’s attempt to gain control 
over the representation of Ukrainian words in foreign languages or in 
transliteration demonstrates how unrealistic some of these aims can be. 
Another element of language planning which remains problematic is the 
element of messianism or messianic ideas which some scholars 
propagate^. From the standpoint of sociology or anthropology, the belief 
that Ukraine occupies a unique place in the history of the world, that its 
culture is somehow superior and that its people have a mission in the 
international community to bring enlightenment to others can probably be 
explained in terms of insecurity and reaction to upheaval. Ukraine has 
been the object of numerous foreign campaigns and subject to foreign rule 
many times in its history. Ukrainian culture has been undermined and 
under-valued, or assimilated into that of ruling powers. As an independent 
country, Ukraine faces a depleted stock of viable national icons and 
ideologies leading some scholars to resort to elevated notions of Ukraine’s 
messianic role for inspiration. It is important to remember that these ideas 
do not have the support of mainstream political or academic figures, but as 
one potentially subversive trend Ukrainian messianic beliefs should be 
noted. If a political or academic figure who supported this rather grand 
vision of Ukraine’s international role ever did gain prominence, the 
consequences could be serious. Extreme nationalism can accompany 
such ideas, which has led to the justification of violence, genocide and 
tyranny in the recent past, all of which could cause the world community to 
recoil should Ukraine begin to demonstrate such trends. Such beliefs in
 ^L. Fylypovych, ‘Ideia mesiansvta ukrayins’koho narodu’, in the papers of the 
Second Annual Congress of Ukrainists in L'viv, (1995), pp. 50-3, is an example of 
this.
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Ukraine have caused concern in the mainstream, if not for their potentially 
explosive content, then for the ridicule and contempt they inspire abroad.
One need look no further than education in Ukraine for some idea 
of how to forge a successful plan for language promotion. As discussed in 
the education chapter, this sector has benefited from a policy containing 
both long and short-term goals that have been formulated to fit the 
Ukrainian reality. Although the long-term aims of policymakers are 
ambitious, the pace has been slow and cautious, improvisation occurs 
when there is a lack of funding and realistic incentives have been 
provided. Although language planning in education remains a work in 
progress, there are signs that it will be a success.
One should not be in the habit of consultation with a crystal ball 
when predicting the future of Ukraine in general, or of its language 
planning policies in particular. A number of factors coincide in Ukraine 
which could underpin the success of attempts to promote Ukrainian, while 
there are also very definite obstacles and pitfalls with which policy-makers 
must contend. The presence of ethnic Russians and Russian-speakers of 
other ethnic groups remains an issue since Ukraine cannot abandon its 
liberal minorities policy without considering the potential outcry and loss of 
support this could cause. Financial limitations prevent the implementation 
of this policy on a grand scale, and do not allow language to become a 
priority ahead of the promotion of industry and the improvement of the 
economy and standard of living in Ukraine These two problems need not 
prevent the success of language planning; rather the presence of tension 
between sectors of the population only indicate a slow pace of change is 
required.
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Ukraine may benefit from a number of favourable factors as well. Its 
strategic importance (due to size, natural resources and geographical and 
political position as a buffer against Russia) means that the West will 
continue to take an interest in the welfare of Ukraine, and will remain 
supportive of any policy which places distance between Ukraine and the 
former Soviet Union. Similarly, although the population does bear the 
effects of Soviet rule and the seeming laziness and apathy this created, 
Ukrainians as a whole are educated, highly skilled and becoming aware of 
their national identity. If certain policy-makers remain unhelpful by 
formulating impossibly general and daunting schemes, then equally there 
are scholars and other enthusiasts working diligently to create a workable 
lexicon and to introduce the masses to literary, standard Ukrainian. 
Newspapers are full of linguistic debates, young people appear eager to 
read mass literature in Ukrainian when it is available and the presence of 
‘New Russian’ jokes demonstrate a change in orientation, a rejection of 
past humility in favour of increasing patriotism and participation in the new 
state.
One is reluctant to leave the future of Ukraine in the hands of the 
young or youthful. After all, the older generation has not only survived 
Soviet rule; the older intelligentsia preserved Ukrainian culture and 
language under that repressive regime and outlasted the policies that 
sought to destroy Ukrainian culture and independence. These Ukrainians 
have a valuable sense of the language, of what words will best fit the 
changing lexicon together with a knowledge of Ukrainian literature. 
Younger educated Ukrainians, however, may be freer in their willingness 
to ignore previous taboos and stretch the language to incorporate
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thoroughly modern ideas, new slang and topics their elders may not have 
wished to discuss publicly. This may be the most important goal that 
language planners set for themselves: any successful promotion of 
Ukrainian as the state language must not only utilise the knowledge and 
sensibilities of older Ukrainians, it must also capture the interest and the 
support of the young.
Here Ukraine shows potential. To those who wrote while fearing 
possible repercussions should their work anger Soviet leaders, the open 
climate must provide not only inspiration but also a drive to express their 
ideas. Certainly a great deal of diagnostic and even exhortative work has 
appeared since independence, from which valuable insights can be 
gleaned. Meanwhile, young musicians, authors and entrepreneurs have 
gone about modernising the language by creating Ukrainian-language 
software, writing new fiction and recording Ukrainian-language popular 
music. All of these contributions enable a new image of Ukraine to 
emerge. No longer a republic of Cossack warriors, peasants and romantic- 
minded poets, Ukrainians can begin to see themselves as a modern nation 
of entrepreneurs, academics and civic-minded participants in the new 
state. Both as the driving force behind the shaping of this national identity, 
and a result of it, language planning in Ukraine and the speaking of the 
Ukrainian language in Ukraine remain a viable determining force in the 
success of independent Ukraine.
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